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In this dissertation, I attempt to better understand the inner workings of the
household: Do parents favor certain types of children? When do parents decide to
have their children work? How can we identify inequality within the household?
These issues are fundamental to economic development and closely related to indi-
vidual welfare. However, studying these questions is difficult since the household is in
many ways a blackbox to economists; consumption data is typically collected at the
household level, and concepts like bargaining power are not observable. My research
examines these questions in a variety of different contexts in the developing world. In
Chapter 1, I test for consumption inequality between foster and non-foster children in
Sub-Saharan Africa. In Chapter 2, I examine the relationship between child labor and
fertility in Nigerian households. Lastly, I study the identification of intrahousehold
inequality in collective households in Chapter 3.
Chapter 1: In “Consumption Inequality Among Children: Evidence from Child
Fostering in Malawi" , I study how resources are allocated among foster and non-
foster children in Malawi. Child fostering is widespread in parts of Africa and the
wellbeing of these children, who may be particularly vulnerable to impoverishment, is
not well known. However, identifying individual-level consumption is difficult, since
goods are shared and consumption is measured at the household level. Recent work
on intrahousehold resource allocation has inferred child consumption from household-
level spending on child-specific goods (e.g., child clothing).1 This literature is often
dependent on the existence of goods in the data that are consumed exclusively by a
particular type of person in the household. These studies are therefore limited by the
level of assignability of goods within the consumption survey. Stated differently, to
identify inequality between foster and non-foster children using existing techniques, I
would need to observe expenditure on a good that is consumed separately by foster
and non-foster children. Because I do not, I develop a new methodology using the
1See Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013), for example.
collective framework to measure consumption inequality between foster and non-foster
children. I find little evidence of inequality between foster and non-foster children. I
then divide foster children by whether the child is orphaned, and I find that orphan-
foster child consumption is 23 percent less than non-orphan foster child consumption.
The results of this paper suggest that policymakers should design programs to improve
the relative standing of orphan-foster children in the household. The methodological
contribution of this paper is applicable to other contexts as intrahousehold inequality
among children is widespread.
Chapter 2: In “Child Labor Laws and Household Fertility Decision: Evidence from
Nigeria" I study the Child Rights Act of Nigeria (CRA). In 2003, the Nigerian Na-
tional Assembly implemented this law, which codified existing child labor standards
and dramatically increased the penalties for employing children. I exploit the Child
Rights Act to both understand the employment consequences of a child labor legisla-
tion, and to analyze the effect of lowering the economic value of children on fertility
rates. Identification comes from variation in the timing of when each Nigerian state
adopted the law, and from variation in the law’s age restrictions. Consistent with
recent theoretical and empirical evidence, I find the Child Rights Act increased child
employment at both the intensive and extensive margins. I then model household
fertility decisions to demonstrate that the demand for children is increasing in child
wages and therefore influenced by changes in the child labor market. I empirically test
the model implications by examining the effect of the Child Rights Act on fertility
rates, but find little to no effect.
Chapter 3: In “Identification of Resource Shares with Multiple Assignable Goods"
(with Caitlin Brown and Rossella Calvi), we study intrahousehold inequality. We de-
velop a new methodology using the collective framework to identify resource shares,
defined as the fraction of household resources consumed by each household member.
We build upon recent work by Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013) (DLP) who
identify resource shares by observing how expenditure on a single private assignable
good varies with household income and size.2 They achieve identification by mak-
2A private good is a good that is not shared. An assignable good is a good that is consumed
ing semi-parametric restrictions on preferences across either household members or
household sizes. Because our data contain multiple private assignable goods, we are
able to employ this additional data to weaken the DLP preference restrictions using a
different approach, which we call “Differenced-Similar Across People" (D-SAP). Un-
der D-SAP, preferences for the assignable goods are allowed to differ entirely across
both household members. However, we introduce a weaker restriction that requires
that preferences differ across people in a similar way across goods.
exclusively by an individual known to the econometrician.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my advisors S Anukriti, Arthur Lewbel and Donald Cox for
their invaluable guidance through the dissertation process, and teaching me almost
all of what I know about doing research. I appreciate their patience in allowing my
to make (many) mistakes over the past couple of years, and their knowledge that
has contributed immensely to this dissertation. I would also like to thank Andrew
Beauchamp and Scott Fulford who’s classes were tremendously helpful.
There are many friends and classmates who have contributed in a variety of ways
to this dissertation, however I would be remiss not to mention Rossella Calvi, Nicholas
Diebel, Mehmet Ezer, Sylvia Hristakeva, Deeksha Kale, John Lindner, Ethan Struby,
Lauren Hoehn-Velasco, and Solvejg Wewel. I spent too many hours in the economics
department, but it was tolerable entirely because of the people I was working with.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Richard and Essa Penglase. They have
assisted me in all parts of my life and I owe any success I’ve had to them. I feel
tremendously fortunate to have gone through graduate school with my parents so
close by. I would not have graduated without their support.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Consumption Inequality among Children: Evidence from Child Fos-
tering in Malawi 1
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Collective Model of the Household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1 Identification with Private Assignable Goods . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2 Identification with Private Partially Assignable Goods . . . . 12
3.2.1 Approach 1: An Extension of SAT Identification . . 12
3.2.2 Approach 2: An Extension of SAP Identification . . 15
4 Application: Child Fostering in Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.5 Poverty Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.6 Why are Orphans Treated Worse? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.1 Is Clothing a Private Good? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.2 Are the Restrictions Valid? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.3 Is There Selection Bias? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
i
Appendix 44
1.A School Enrollment and Child labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.A.1 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.A.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.B Fully Specified Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.B.1 Additional Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.C Identification Theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1.D Identification Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
1.D.1 Proof of Theorem 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
1.D.2 Proof of Theorem 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2 Child Labor Laws and Household Fertility Decisions: Evidence from
Nigeria 79
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2 The 2003 Child Rights Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.1 Adding a Child Labor Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1 Employment Effects of CRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.2 Fertility Effects of CRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.1 Child Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.2 Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3 Identifying Resource Shares Using Multiple Private Assignable Goods
(with Caitlin Brown and Rossella Calvi) 107
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
ii
3 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.1 D-SAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.2 D-SAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.3 Graphical Intuition for D-SAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Appendix 119
3.A Theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.A.1 Theorem 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.A.2 Theorem 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.B Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.B.1 Proof of Theorem 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.B.2 Proof of Theorem 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Bibliography 130
iii
iv
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.2 Determinants of Resource Shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.3 Determinants of Resource Shares: Estimates by Identification Assump-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.4 Estimated Poverty Rates by Household Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5 Probability of Staying in Same HH by Foster and Orphan Status . . . 37
1.6 School Enrollment by Foster Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.7 School Enrollment by Foster Status (Detailed Categories) . . . . . . . 48
1.8 Weekly Hours Worked by Fostering Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.9 Weekly Hours Worked by Fostering Status (Detailed Categories) . . . 49
1.10 Household Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.11 Determinants of Resource Shares: Household Type Indicators . . . . 55
1.12 Determinants of Resource Shares: Orphan Interactions and Nuclear
Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
1.13 Determinants of Resource Shares: Age-Restricted Sample . . . . . . . 57
1.14 Determinants of Resource Shares: Estimation with SAT Restriction . 58
1.15 Probability of Staying in Same HH by Foster and Orphan Status (Dou-
ble vs. Single) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.16 Sample Means by Household Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.17 Sample Means by Household Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.18 Distribution of Foster Caretakers by Household Composition . . . . . 61
v
1.19 Predicted Resource Shares: Households with Only Non-Foster Children 62
1.20 Descriptive Statistics: Education and Child Labour . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.1 Timing of CRA Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.2 Descriptive Statistics (MICS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.3 Descriptive Statistics (DHS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.4 Effect of CRA on Hours Worked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.5 Effect of CRA on Hours Worked by Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.6 Effect of CRA on Hours Worked Treated State Subsample . . . . . . 104
2.7 Effect of CRA on Employment (Probit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.8 Effect of CRA on Number of Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.9 Effect of CRA on Number of Children at Age 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Children’s Clothing Engel Curves by Household Composition . . . . . 14
1.2 Foster and Orphan Status by Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Predicted Resource Shares: Reference Household . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4 Predicted Resource Shares by Presence of Orphans . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5 Individual Poverty Rates by Household Expenditure Percentile . . . . 36
1.6 Predicted Men’s and Women’s Resource Shares: Reference Household 54
2.1 Effect of CRA on Probability of Giving Birth . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.2 Effect of CRA on Number of Living Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.1 Individual-Level Engel Curves: SAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.2 Individual-Level Engel Curves: D-SAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
vii
CHAPTER 1
CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY AMONG CHILDREN: EVIDENCE
FROM CHILD FOSTERING IN MALAWI
1 Introduction
Do parents favor certain types of children? Dating back to Becker (1960), economists
have recognized that parents can to some degree choose the “quality" of their children
through schooling decisions, health investments, and consumption allocations. While
many parents treat their children equally, some parents may have a preferred type of
child. Gender, birth order, prenatal endowments, and degree of kinship are all child
characteristics that may impact parental treatment.
In this paper, I study intrahousehold consumption inequality. Do parents allocate
a larger share of the household budget to certain types of children? This question is
difficult to answer as consumption data is collected at the household level and goods
are shared among family members. Existing work has used reduced-form methods
to identify the existence of discrimination, but not it’s extent. For example, Deaton
(1989) tests for gender discrimination by examining how expenditure on adult goods
varies with the number of boys and girls in the household. This approach is similar to
the Rothbarth method (Rothbarth (1943)) which also relies upon strong preference
stability assumptions across household compositions. In this paper, I develop a new
methodology using a structural model of intrahousehold resource allocation to iden-
tify the existence and extent of consumption inequality among children. I rely only
on standard household-level survey data and am able to identify the share of total
household resources allocated to each type of child within the household. I apply this
method to child fostering in Malawi, where many children live in households away
1
from both of their biological parents.
Following Chiappori (1988, 1992), I model households as a collection of individu-
als, each with their own utility function. I obtain a measure of individual-level con-
sumption by identifying resource shares, defined as the share of the total household
budget allocated to each household member. Dunbar et al. (2013) (DLP henceforth)
demonstrate that resource shares can be identified by observing how expenditure on
assignable goods vary with household income and size, where a good is assignable
if it is consumed exclusively by a particular type of person in the household (e.g.,
men’s clothing). DLP obtain identification by inverting Engel curves for the assignable
goods within the framework of a structural model. While the DLP identification re-
sults and related studies (Bargain and Donni (2012)) have allowed economists to
identify inequality between men, women, and children within the household, these
existing methods are often unable to uncover inequality among children within the
household. This limitation is due to the nature of consumption surveys, which include
expenditures on goods that can be assigned to children (clothing, shoes, toys), but
not goods that can be assigned to individual children.1
In this study, I overcome this common data limitation. I develop a new framework
to identify inequality among children using Engel curves for partially assignable goods.
A good is partially assignable if the researcher can, to a limited extent, determine
which individuals in the household consume it. For example, children’s clothing ex-
penditures are partially assignable to boys and girls, or foster and non-foster children.
Identification proceeds as follows: First, I note that children’s clothing expenditures
can be assigned exclusively to a specific type of child if the household only contains
that type of child, that is, children’s clothing expenditures are assignable to boys
if the household only has boys. It follows that in these households, I can use the
DLP methodology to separately identify resource shares for each child type. I next
move to households with both types of children (boys and girls, foster and non-foster
children, etc.), where children’s clothing expenditures are not assignable. The key
1There are a limited number of surveys that include individual-level consumption data, such as
the Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey and the China Health and Nutrition Survey.
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assumption is to impose a modest similarity restriction between the clothing Engel
curves in households with one type of child, which have already been identified, and
households with both types of children. With these similarity restrictions, resource
shares can now be identified.
In this framework, I maintain the key identifying assumptions of DLP: I assume
that resource shares are independent of household expenditure,2 and I impose one of
two semi-parametric restrictions on individual preferences for clothing. As in DLP,
the model parameters are identified by comparing the slopes of clothing Engel curves
across individuals or household sizes.
With this methodological contribution, I add to the growing literature that ex-
amines intrahousehold resource allocation using the collective household framework.
This strand of research, beginning with work by Chiappori (1988, 1992), Apps and
Rees (1988), and Browning et al. (1994) models households as a collection of indi-
viduals, each with their own distinct preferences. Within this field, my paper relates
mostly to work on the identification of the level of resource shares, such as Lewbel
and Pendakur (2008), Browning et al. (2013) (BCL), and DLP.3 I differ from this
literature in several ways. Unlike Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) and BCL, I am able
to identify resource shares for children, and unlike DLP, my identification method is
not dependent on the existence of assignable goods within the data. The identifica-
tion results of this paper can therefore be used to quantify inequality in variety of
contexts where assignable goods often do not exist, such as inequality between boys
and girls, first-born children and children of lower birth order, or inequality among
children with different prenatal endowments.4
In the empirical application, I study foster children in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
Foster children have become a population of increasing interest as economists have
come to recognise the variety of household structures that exist in SSA. Child fos-
tering is practiced across all of SSA and varies from 8 percent in Burkina Faso to
2I discuss the validity of this assumption in Section 3.
3A different approach places bounds on resource shares using revealed preference inequalities.
Cherchye et al. (2011) and Cherchye et al. (2015) are examples of these studies.
4See Almond and Mazumder (2013) for a review of the literature on the relationship between
prenatal endowments and parental investments in children.
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as high as 25 percent in Zimbabwe.5 In Malawi, 12 percent of children are fostered
and 17 percent of households have a foster child. While some of these children are
orphans, the majority are children who are voluntarily sent away by their parents to
live with close relatives.6 Children are fostered for a variety of reasons including child
labour, education, or to share risk across households.7 Because foster children live
away from their parents, they may be particularly vulnerable to unequal treatment
within the household. Existing work on foster child welfare has focused on educa-
tion (Case et al. (2004), Fafchamps and Wahba (2006), Ainsworth and Filmer (2006),
Evans and Miguel (2007)), but much less is known about consumption, which I study
in this paper. A notable exception is Case et al. (2000) who study how household food
expenditures vary by the fostering status of the household’s children. I build upon
Case et al. (2000) by using a structural model to estimate resource shares, which
allows for a clearer picture of the extent of inequality within the household.
I estimate the model using detailed household-level consumption and expenditure
data from Malawi. The resulting structural estimates allow me to quantify resource
shares separately for foster and non-foster children, and I find no evidence of inequal-
ity. I then divide foster children into two categories based on whether or not they are
orphaned. I find that orphaned foster children are particularly disadvantaged with
consumption that is 23 percent less than the consumption of non-orphaned foster
children. The results also suggest that foster children living in matrilineal villages
consume a larger share of the household budget relative to foster children living in
patrilineal villages. Gender does not appear to be a determinant of foster child treat-
ment. The results highlight the importance of orphanhood and kinship networks in
the wellbeing of foster children, which motivates future work investigating the mech-
anisms underlying this paper’s results.
I use the predicted resource shares to estimate foster and non-foster child poverty
5These figures are taken from Grant and Yeatman (2012) who use Demographic and Health
Survey data to compute foster rates for 14 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
6I use “orphan" to describe a child who has lost at least one parent. This is consistent with the
UNICEF and UNAIDS definition. In Malawi, 34 percent of foster children are orphans.
7Ainsworth (1995), Akresh (2009), and Serra (2009) examine the economic reasons children are
fostered.
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rates. Traditional measures of poverty implicitly assume an equal distribution of re-
sources across household members. I move away from the traditional approach by
using the predicted resource shares to determine each household member’s individ-
ual consumption. I show that using household-level poverty rates dramatically un-
derstates child poverty rates, which is in line with DLP and Brown et al. (2016).
Furthermore, I also find that orphaned foster child poverty is being miscalculated
at an even higher rate. This result is important for several reasons. First, coverage
of government programs is rarely universal, and policymakers must find ways to de-
termine who is poor. Different methods that are used to identify the poor, such as
proxy-means testing, use household-level measures. I demonstrate that these methods
are unsatisfactory, since poor individuals do not necessarily live in poor households.
My results suggest that anti-poverty programs that specifically target orphans, such
as the Kenya Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children program, would be
more effective. Furthermore, programs that improve the relative standing of children
in the household, such as cash transfer programs that are conditional on children
being enrolled in school, would also be beneficial.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the collec-
tive household model. Section 3 discusses the identification results. I then apply the
identification method to child fostering in Malawi in Section 4. Section 5 examines
the robustness of my results. I conclude in Section 6.
2 Collective Model of the Household
This section presents a structural model of Malawian households using the collective
framework of Browning et al. (2013). The household consists of four types of individu-
als denoted by t: adult men (m), adult women (w), foster children (a), and non-foster
children (b). Person types a and b could refer to boys and girls, or young and old chil-
dren and everything that follows would be exactly the same. I index household types
by the number of foster and non-foster children within the household, denoted by the
5
subscript s.8 Consistent with the standard characterization of collective households,
I make no assumptions about the bargaining process which determines how resources
are allocated across household members, only that the ultimate allocation is Pareto
efficient.9 I account for economies of scale in consumption using a Gorman (1976)
linear technology function.10 Individuals have caring preferences, in the sense that
they are allowed to get utility from the utility of other household members, though
not the consumption of specific goods by the other household members.
Households consume K types of goods at market prices p = (p1, ..., pK)′. Let
zs = (z
1
s , ..., z
K
s ) be theK - vectors of observed quantities purchased by the household.
The vector of unobserved quantities consumed by individuals within the household
is denoted by xt = (x1t , ..., xKt ). The household-level quantities are converted into
private good equivalents xt using a linear consumption technology as follows: zs =
A(sfxf +smxm+saxa+sbxb) where A is a K×K matrix which accounts for economies
of scale in consumption,11 and st denotes the number of each person type within the
household. If good xk is not shared, then what the household purchases is equal to
the sum of what individuals consume, and the element in the k’th row in the k’th
column of matrix A takes a value of one with all off-diagonal elements in that row
and column equal to zero. Goods that are shared have values along the diagonal of
matrix A that are less than one, as the sum of what individuals consume is greater
than what the household purchases.
Each individual member has a monotonically increasing, continuously twice dif-
ferentiable strictly quasi-concave utility function over a bundle of goods. Let Ut(xt)
8I occasionally denote household type by sab to explicitly indicate the number of foster and non-
foster children within the household. For example, s21 denotes a household with two foster children,
and one non-foster child.
9Pareto efficiency in household consumption allocations has been analysed in many different con-
texts and usually cannot be rejected. Notable papers that analyse this assumption include Browning
and Chiappori (1998), Bobonis (2009), and Attanasio and Lechene (2014). Pareto efficiency has at
times been rejected in the context of household agricultural production decisions, especially in West
Africa. See Udry (1996) for example.
10See Browning et al. (2013) for a detailed explanation of accounting for economies of scale and
sharing in collective households.
11The use of private good equivalents was introduced in Browning et al. (2013). This approach
differs from the Chiappori (1988, 1992) version of the collective model where goods are either purely
public or purely private; here goods can be purely public, purely private, or partially shared, and is
therefore a more general framework.
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be the utility of an individual of type t who consumes xt goods while living in the
household. This utility function is assumed to be separable from leisure, savings, or
any other goods not included in the commodity bundle. Individuals of the same type
are assumed to have the same utility function. For the empirical results, the utility
function for each person type is allowed to differ over observable characteristics such
as age and education.
Each household maximises the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, U˜ where
each individual’s utility function is discounted by the Pareto weights µt(p/y) where
y is total household expenditure:12
U˜(Um, Uf , Ua, Ub, p/y) =
∑
t{m,f,a,b}
µt(p/y)Ut (1.1)
The household then solves the following maximisation problem:
max
xm,xf ,xa,xb
U˜(Um, Uf , Ua, Ub, p/y) such that
zs = A(sfxf + smxm + saxa + sbxb)
y = z′sp
(1.2)
Solving this system results in bundles of private good equivalents. If these goods
are priced at within household prices A′p,13 I obtain the resource share ηts, which is
defined as the fraction of total expenditure that is allocated to each individual of type
t.14 By definition, resource shares for men, women, foster, and non-foster children sum
to one. I will ultimately compare resource shares of foster and non-foster children to
test for intrahousehold inequality.
With Pareto efficiency, I can reformulate the household’s problem as a two step
process using the second welfare theorem; In the first stage, resources are optimally
12The Pareto weights may also be a function of distribution factors. These are variables that
may affect bargaining power, but not preferences. Because distribution factors are not necessary for
identification, they are omitted.
13The within household price vector is different than the market prices faced by the household
since some goods are jointly consumed.
14Resource shares have a one-to-one correspondence with the Pareto weights, where the Pareto
weights are the marginal response of U˜ to Ut.
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allocated across household members. In the second stage, each individual chooses
xt to maximise their own personal utility function Ut subject to the shadow budget
constraint
∑
k Akp
kxkt = η
t
sy.
Identification of resource shares relies on observing Engel curves, where an Engel
curve is defined as a functional relationship between budget shares and total household
expenditure holding prices constant. I write the household-level demand for a certain
subset of goods whose properties substantially reduce the data requirements necessary
for identification. Define these goods as private assignable goods, which are goods that
are not shared across household member types (private), and that are consumed by
a person of known type t (assignable). Examples of private goods include food and
clothing; if the father drinks a glass of milk, the mother cannot consume that same
glass of milk. Food however is not assignable; my data provides information on the
total amount of food consumed, but not who in the household consumed it. On the
contrary, clothing is both private and assignable, in the sense that men’s clothing is
observable in the data, and can safely be assumed to be consumed only by men.15
The motivation for relying on private assignable goods is that the household-level
demand functions for these goods are substantially simpler than the demand func-
tions for non-private goods. Intuitively, household-level demand for men’s clothing
will behave fairly similarly to men’s demand for men’s clothing. On the other hand,
the household’s demand for non-private goods, such as gasoline, depends on the de-
gree to which gasoline is shared within the household, and also on each individual’s
preferences for gasoline.
Let W ts(y, p) be the share of household expenditure y spent on person type t’s
private assignable good in a household of type s. DLP derive the household demand
functions for the private assignable goods, which can be written as follows:16
W ts(y, p) = st η
t
s w
t
s(A
′p, ηtsy) (1.3)
15This is true for men and women, but children’s clothing is only partially assignable for foster
and non-foster children.
16See Section 1.B in the appendix for the details of the DLP derivation.
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where wts is the amount of the private assignable good that a person of type t living
in a household of type s would hypothetically demand had they lived alone with
income ηtsy facing price vector A′p. Note that the resource shares and the individual
demand functions are unobservable, and hence the system is not identified without
more assumptions (for each equation there are two unknowns).17 In what follows I
discuss how to identify the parameters of interest.
3 Identification
DLP demonstrate how resource shares can be identified by observing how budget
shares for assignable clothing vary with household expenditure and size. The key
data requirement for their identification strategy is household-level expenditure on
a private assignable good for each person type within the household. In this con-
text, that would mean separately observing expenditure on foster child clothing and
non-foster child clothing, neither of which are available in the data. Thus, a direct
application of the DLP methodology is infeasible. I work around this data limitation
by making use of expenditure on partially assignable goods, children’s clothing in
particular, which is partially assignable to both foster and non-foster children.18
I demonstrate two different sets of assumptions to identify resource shares in this
context. I begin in Section 3.1 by summarizing how DLP use private assignable goods
to identify resource shares. I then present two new approaches that identify resource
shares using expenditure on private partially assignable goods in Sections 3.2.1 and
3.2.2, respectively. Throughout this discussion I emphasize where and why I differ.
3.1 Identification with Private Assignable Goods
If foster and non-foster child clothing expenditures are observed separately, the DLP
method would identify resource shares using four separate Engel curves for assignable
17BCL achieve identification by assuming wts is “observed" using data from households that have
only men, or only women. In households with only single men, or only single women, the household
and individual demand functions are the same. This clearly does not work in a context where children
are present, as children do not live alone.
18Children’s clothing expenditure would also be partially assignable to boys and girls, for example.
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clothing. From Equation (1.3), this system can be written as follows:
Wms (y) = η
m
s w
m
s (η
m
s y)
W fs (y) = η
f
s w
f
s (η
f
s y) (1.4)
W as (y) = sa η
a
s w
a
s (η
a
sy)
W bs (y) = sb η
b
s w
b
s(η
b
sy)
The number of foster and non-foster children in the household is given by sa and sb,
and this determines the household type given by the subscript s. To simplify notation,
the household is assumed to have only one man (sm = 1) and one woman (sf = 1).
To achieve identification, resource shares are assumed to be independent of household
expenditure; this is the key identifying assumption.19 Resource shares can however
depend on variables highly correlated with expenditure, such as household member
wages, remittances, or wealth.
In the empirical application I assume individuals have preferences over clothing
given by Muelbauer’s PIGLOG indirect utility function, and this assumption facili-
tates a discussion of identification so it is used henceforth.20 The PIGLOG indirect
utility function takes the following functional form:
Vt(p, y) = bt(p)(ln y − at(p)) (1.5)
Using Roy’s identity, the budget share functions are written as follows:
wt(p, y) = δt(p) + βt(p) ln y (1.6)
where δt(p) is a function of at(p) and bt(p), and βt(p) is minus the price elasticity of
19Menon et al. (2012) show this assumption to be quite reasonable. They rely on a household
survey question that asked Italian parents what percentage of household expenditures they allocated
to children. Their answers did not vary considerably across expenditure levels. Cherchye et al. (2015)
use a revealed preference approach to place bounds on resource shares and also find that they do
not vary with household expenditure. Lastly, resource shares need to be independent of household
expenditure only at low levels of household expenditure.
20A more general functional form is used in the proof in the appendix. No preference restriction
is made on the other goods.
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bt(p) with respect to the price of person t’s assignable good. Substituting Equation
(1.6) into Equation (1.4) results in the system of Engel curves given below:
Wms = η
m
s [δ
m
s + β
m
s ln(η
m
s )] + η
m
s β
m
s ln y
W fs = η
f
s [δ
f
s + β
f
s ln(η
f
s )] + η
f
sβ
f
s ln y
W as = saη
a
s [δ
a
s + β
a
s ln(η
a
s )] + saη
a
sβ
a
s ln y
W bs = sbη
b
s [δ
b
s + β
b
s ln(η
b
s)] + sbη
b
sβ
b
s ln y
(1.7)
whereW ts are budget shares for the private assignable good for person type t in house-
hold s. I drop prices from Equation (1.7), as Engel curves describe the relationship
between budget shares and total expenditure holding prices fixed. DLP demonstrate
one of two additional assumptions are necessary for identification: (1) Preferences
for the assignable good are similar across household types (SAT), so βts = βt; or (2)
Preferences for the assignable good are similar across people (SAP), so βts = βs.21
The SAT restriction was first used in Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) and is equiv-
alent to assuming price differences across household types can be absorbed into an
income deflator. Under this restriction, identification is achieved by comparing Engel
curves across households of different sizes for a given individual type. To better un-
derstand what this restriction entails, consider the demand for a purely public good
such as housing. As the household size increases, the shadow price of rent decreases.
This change in the price of housing may have an effect on each person’s demand
for clothing. However, under SAT, this price change can only affect the demand for
clothing through a person-specific income deflator.
The SAP restriction is a more commonly used preference restriction in the de-
mand literature, and is a weaker version of shape-invariance (Pendakur (1999), Lewbel
(2010)). Under this restriction, identification is achieved by comparing Engel curves
across individuals for a given household type.
21A sufficient restriction on the indirect utility function for SAT to hold is that b(p) = b¯t(pt, p¯),
where pt is the price of the assignable good, and p¯ is the price of the private non-assignable goods.
In effect, b¯t(·) is assumed not to vary with the prices of the shared goods, and thus independent
of household size. A sufficient restriction on the indirect utility function for SAP to hold is that
bt(p) = b(p), and therefore does not vary across people.
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Assuming resource shares sum to one, the model parameters can then be identified
with either preference restriction by inverting the Engel curves. It is important to note
that the relative size of the budget shares for foster and non-foster child clothing does
not necessarily determine which child type has higher resource shares. It is entirely
possible for ηbs > ηas with W as > W bs , since preferences are allowed to be different
across individuals.
The key complication in both identification methods for my purposes is the ab-
sence of a separate private assignable good for foster and non-foster children in the
data; I do not observe the budget shares for foster and non-foster child clothing, W as
and W bs , but rather their sumW cs = W as +W bs , whereW cs is the budget share for child
clothing. This is a widespread data problem that is present in a variety of settings
where inequality among children is of interest; consumption surveys rarely contain
data on goods that are assignable to specific types of children. To work around the
lack of sufficient data, I now develop a new methodology to identify resource shares
in the absence of private assignable goods using private partially assignable goods.
3.2 Identification with Private Partially Assignable Goods
3.2.1 Approach 1: An Extension of SAT Identification
Without private assignable goods for foster and non-foster children, I rewrite the
Engel curves for foster and non-foster child clothing in system (1.7) as a single Engel
curve for children’s clothing, and I begin by using the SAT restriction (i.e., βts = βt):
Wms = η
m
s [δ
m
s + β
m ln(ηms )] + η
m
s β
m ln y
W fs = η
f
s [δ
f
s + β
f ln(ηfs )] + η
f
sβ
f ln y (1.8)
W cs = saη
a
s [δ
a
s + β
a ln(ηas )] + sbη
b
s [δ
b
s + β
b ln(ηbs)]
+ ln y (saη
a
sβ
a + sbη
b
sβ
b)
Here, the Engel curve for children’s clothing is given as the sum of the Engel curves for
foster and non-foster child clothing. I have simply taken the bottom two equations
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from system (1.7) and summed them together.22 As before, I allow preferences for
clothing to vary considerably by person type through both the intercept parameter
δts and the slope parameter βt.
The identification proof proceeds in two steps. First, I demonstrate that resource
shares are identified in one-child-type households, that is, households with only foster
children, or only non-foster children. This follows directly from DLP as children’s
clothing expenditures are fully assignable in these households. I then move to the
composite households, or households with both foster and non-foster children, where
children’s clothing expenditures are not assignable. The key new assumption is to
impose some similarity between the one-child-type households and the composite
households.
The identification proof starts with identifying resource shares in the one-child-
type households. Suppose there are four one-child-type households s  {s10, s20, s01, s02}
where, for example, s10 denotes a household with one foster child and no foster chil-
dren.23 I can use a simple counting exercise to show that the order condition is sat-
isfied. With three Engel curves for each household type, and four household types,
there are twelve Engel curves. Moreover, for each of the four household types resource
shares must sum to one. This results in a system of sixteen equations in total. In terms
of the number of unknowns, each Engel curve has one resource share ηts that needs
to be identified (twelve total), and there are four shape parameters βt that need to
be identified.24 This leads to sixteen unknowns, and with sixteen equations, the order
condition for identification is satisfied. A formal proof that the rank condition holds
for the one-child-type households is provided in the appendix.
I next move to the composite households, which is where the main contribution
of this paper lies. With SAT, preferences for clothing are similar across household
sizes. I modify this restriction by assuming that preferences are both similar across
22Implicit in summing the two Engel curves is the assumption that foster and non-foster children
do not share clothing. The validity of this assumption is analysed in Section 5.
23In the empirical application the sample includes households with as many as five children.
24It is necessary to identify the slope preference parameter βt to identify the resource shares,
however it is not necessary to identify the intercept preference parameter δts, and it is therefore
ignored.
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households sizes and across household compositions ; that is, preferences for cloth-
ing are similar across one-child-type and composite households. In words, the foster
child’s marginal propensity to consume clothing, as their expenditure increases, is
independent of the number of non-foster children present in the household, and vice
versa. I take βt from the one-child-type households, and assume it is the same in the
composite households. It follows that the resource shares for men and women can
be immediately recovered since the slope coefficients for their Engel curves (βmηms
and βfηfs ) are identified by a simple OLS-type regression of the budget shares on
log expenditure. Furthermore, the slope coefficient on the Engel curve for children’s
clothing (βaηas + βbηbs) is identified. This coefficient contains two unknowns. I can
then use that resource shares sum to one to identify the resource shares for foster
and non-foster children. A formal proof for composite households is provided in the
appendix in Section 1.D.1.
Figure 1.1: Children’s Clothing Engel Curves by Household Composition
(a) (b)
Notes: In Figure 1.1a, the slope of the children’s Engel curve in the composite household (1 F 1
NF) is more similar to the foster only household (2 F 0 NF) which suggests that in the composite
household, the foster child is allocated more of the budget. The opposite is true in Figure 1.1b.
The intuition for this method can be understood using the graphical example in
Figure 1.1, which presents children’s clothing Engel curves for three household types,
each with two children: (1) a foster only household “2 F 0 NF", (2) a non-foster
only household “0 F 2 NF", (3) a composite household “1 F 1 NF". The slope of the
children’s clothing Engel curve in the composite household (βaηa11+βbηb11) is identified
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and the parameters βa and βb are known from the one-child-type households. If this
slope is more similar to the slope of the children’s clothing Engel curve in the foster
only household (βaηa20) as opposed to the one in the non-foster household (βbηb02),
then that would suggest the parents are placing more weight on the foster child’s
preferences for clothing. Placing more weight on a specific child’s preferences for
clothing implies that that child is given a larger share of the budget. This case is
demonstrated in Figure 1.1a. If instead the children’s clothing Engel curve was more
similar to the children’s clothing Engel curve in the non-foster only household as in
Figure 1.1b, then the non-foster child is allocated more of the budget. This exercise
is possible since I assume preferences for clothing are similar across the household
compositions.
3.2.2 Approach 2: An Extension of SAP Identification
Without private assignable goods for foster and non-foster children, I again rewrite
the Engel curves for foster and non-foster child clothing in system (1.7) as a single
Engel curve for children’s clothing, and assume SAP (i.e., βts = βs):
Wms = η
m
s [δ
m
s + βs ln(η
m
s )] + η
m
s βs ln y
W fs = η
f
s [δ
f
s + βs ln(η
f
s )] + η
f
sβs ln y (1.9)
W cs = saη
a
s [δ
a
s + βs ln(η
a
s )] + sbη
b
s [δ
b
s + βs ln(η
b
s)]
+ ln y (saη
a
sβs + sbη
b
sβs)
This system of equations is identical to system (1.8) except now the shape parameter
β is allowed to vary with the household type s, but not the person type t. Resource
shares are still identified in the one-child-type households. To see how the order con-
dition is satisfied, note that for each household type there are three resource shares
(ηms , ηfs , and either ηas or ηbs) and a single preference parameter βs that need to be
identified. Moreover, there are four equations: three Engel curves, and the restriction
that resource shares sum to one. With four equations and four unknowns, resource
shares are identified for each one-child-type household.
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Moving to the composite households, it is easy to see how identification fails. For
each household type, there are five unknowns; four resource shares (both ηas and ηbs
are now nonzero) and again a single preference parameter βs. However, the number
of equations is still four, so the order condition is no longer satisfied. It is important
understand why the SAP restriction fails here, but the SAT restriction does not.
With the SAT restriction, as the number of household types increases, the number of
preference parameters βt does not change. However, with the SAP restriction, there
is a different βs for each household type, and therefore as the number of household
types increases, so too does the number of preference parameters that need to be
identified.
The SAP restriction is easier to estimate than the SAT restriction so I now intro-
duce several new model assumptions to make the SAP restriction employable. To do
this, I add structure to the model by introducing additional restrictions which limit
how foster and non-foster child resource shares vary by household type. Restriction 1
is given below:
ηasa0
ηasa+1,0
=
ηasab
ηasa+1,b
and
ηbs0b
ηbs0,b+1
=
ηbsab
ηbsa,b+1
(1.10)
where the household type is now given as sab to explicitly indicate the number of
foster and non-foster children present. In words, this restriction requires that (1) the
ratio of foster child resource shares in households with sa and sa+1 foster children
is independent of the number of non-foster children present; and (2) the ratio of
non-foster child resource shares in households with sb and sb+1 non-foster children is
independent of the number of foster children present. For both equations, the left-
hand-side is identified from the one-child-type households, which are used to identify
the composite households on the right-hand-side.
I do not restrict the levels of foster child resource shares to be a specific value,
only that the ratio of foster child resource shares in two different household types be
independent of the number of non-foster children present. This ratio is assumed to be
the same whether or not there are zero, one, or two, non-foster children are present,
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which greatly reduces the number of parameters that need to be identified.
Next, I make an additional assumption, Restriction 2, relating to composite house-
holds with one of each child type:
ηas10
ηas11
=
ηbs01
ηbs11
(1.11)
This restriction states that the degree of unequal treatment within a household with
one of each child type is proportional to the degree of unequal treatment across house-
holds with one foster child or one non-foster child. With both restrictions, I identify
how resource shares vary across household sizes in the one-child-type households,
and assume resource shares behave in a similar way in the composite households. I
comment on the validity of these restrictions in Section 5.
With these additional model restrictions, resource shares are now identified in
the composite households. I limit my attention to the following household types: s
 {s11, s21, s12, s22}. To see that the order condition is satisfied, note that with three
Engel curves for each household type and four household types, there are twelve Engel
curves in total. And again, for each household type resource shares sum to one. This
results in four additional equations. Finally, Restriction 1 generates four additional
equations and Restriction 2 leads to one additional equation, resulting in a system of
twenty-one equations in total. In terms of unknowns, with four household types, and
four resource shares for each household type, there are sixteen resource shares that
need to be identified. For each household type, there is a preference parameter βs
that needs to be identified (four total). This results in twenty unknowns, so the order
condition is satisfied.25 A proof of the rank condition is provided in the appendix in
Section 1.D.2.
In summary, both identification approaches use the one-child-type households to
help identify the model parameters in the composite households. In Approach 1,
preferences for clothing in the composite households are assumed to be similar to
25For the household type s22, I restrict both ηa22 =
ηa20×ηa12
ηa10
and ηb22 =
ηb02×ηb21
ηb01
, however only one
of these two ratios needs to be assumed for identification.
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preferences in the one-child-type households, but resource shares are allowed to vary
considerably across household types. On the other hand, in Approach 2, preferences
for clothing are allowed to vary flexibly across household types, but the way in which
resource shares vary across composite household types is restricted using what can
be identified from the one-child-type households.
4 Application: Child Fostering in Malawi
4.1 Background
Child fostering, or kinship care, is the practice of sending one’s biological children
to live with close relatives. I use a broader definition of foster children to include all
individuals age 14 and under who are living in households away from both of their
parents. This definition includes children in kinship care, but also orphans. Child
fostering rates vary by country and are highest in West African societies (Grant
and Yeatman (2012)). In Malawi, fostering is also quite common with 17 percent of
households having a foster child.26 Figure 1.2a presents the percentage of children
fostered by age in Malawi (the green solid line). Overall, 12.5 percent of children are
fostered (Malawi Integrated Panel Survey 2013), and fostering rates are increasing
with age. The red and blue lines show the number of children living away from their
father and mother, respectively.27 Figure 1.2b displays orphan rates by age. I use the
UNICEF definition of “orphan", defined as any child who has lost at least one parent.
A double orphan is a child who has lost both parents, and a maternal or paternal
orphan is a child who has lost either their mother or father. By definition, double
orphans are foster children. Comparing Figure 1.2a with Figure 1.2b demonstrates
that the majority of foster children are not double orphans, suggesting orphanhood
is not the primary cause of fostering.
The literature divides foster children into two categories: those who are fostered
for voluntary reasons, and those who are not (Serra (2009)). Non-voluntary, or crisis
26Grant and Yeatman (2012) use DHS data to examine the prevalence of fostering and orphanhood
across sub-Saharan African countries.
27Fathers are more likely than mothers to live away from their children, potentially due to migra-
tion for work, or the AIDS epidemic.
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fostering occurs when the child is orphaned, or has parents who are ill and unable to
care for their child. Non-voluntary fostering has become substantially more common
as a result of the AIDS epidemic. Voluntary, or purposive child fostering occurs when
the child’s parents voluntarily send the child to another household. There are a myriad
of reasons parents may choose to do this: to provide educational access for the child,
to strengthen kinship networks, to increase fertility, to reallocate child labour across
households, or due to agricultural shocks.28 Children are also often fostered as a result
of their parents divorce and subsequent remarriage (Grant and Yeatman (2014)). This
is especially prevalent in Malawi as almost half of all marriages end in divorce, with
remarriage rates being equally high (Reniers (2003)).
Figure 1.2: Foster and Orphan Status by Age
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Notes: Malawi Integrated Panel Survey 2013. The sample includes all children age 14 and under.
Foster children are individuals living in households away from both of their biological parents.
Figure 1.2a presents the mean number of children fostered by age. Figure 1.2b presents the mean
number of children orphaned by age.
Data limitations prevent me from examining in detail the reasons households fos-
ter children, as I only observe the receiving household. With additional data, I would
be able to analyse both how foster children are treated within the household, and
whether the reason for fostering affects foster child treatment. Without additional
data, I am unable to determine whether, for example, children fostered due to nega-
28See Ainsworth (1995), Akresh (2009), and Serra (2009) for a detailed analysis of why households
foster children.
19
tive agricultural shocks are treated differently than children fostered for child labour
related reasons. I can however differentiate between children who are involuntarily fos-
tered due to orphanhood and those who are not, and I find this distinction matters
for foster child treatment.
There are several reasons why foster children may be treated worse than non-foster
children. First, parents are likely to be more altruistic towards their own biological
children. This theory, known as Hamilton’s Rule (Hamilton (1964)), hypothesizes
that altruism is increasing in relatedness; parents care more for their children relative
to their nephews and nieces and they care more about their nephews and nieces
than their neighbor’s children. This theory has a basis in evolutionary biology and is
sometimes referred to as “inclusive fitness". Hamilton’s Rule has direct implications
in the context of child fostering since children who are more closely related to their
caregivers should experience better access to education, lower levels of child labour,
and a higher share of household consumption. I test the implications of Hamilton’s
Rule in this study. The second reason for unequal treatment is related to the parent’s
expectation of old age care. Specifically, parents may invest more in children that
they believe will care for them in old age (Becker (1992)). If adult children primarily
support their biological parents, then parents may be inclined to favor non-foster
children. Unfortunately, I am unable to test this hypothesis given the available data.
4.2 Data
I use the Malawi Integrated Households Survey (IHS3) and the Malawi Integrated
Panel Survey. The IHS3 consists of 12,288 households surveyed in 2010, of which,
4,000 were resurveyed in 2013. Both are nationally representative household surveys
and contain detailed information on individual education, employment, migration,
health, and other demographic characteristics as well as household-level expenditure
data. I rely primarily on the expenditure module in the estimation of the structural
model.
From the survey, I can determine whether or not each child’s parents are present
in the household, and if not, whether their parents are living or dead. This allows me
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to identify both foster children and orphans.
Identifying resource shares requires detailed household expenditure data, and in
particular, expenditure on men’s, women’s, and children’s clothing. In both surveys,
households are asked their expenditure on different categories (shirts, shoes, pants,
etc.) of men’s, women’s, children’s clothing, which I use to construct the corresponding
budget shares. Because the model is estimated using Engel curves, price data is not
necessary. I account for heterogeneity across households using data on the age, orphan
status, education, health status, and gender of the households men, women, foster, and
non-foster children. Other household-level variables include an indicator for whether
the household is located in an urban or rural area, an indicator for residence in a
matrilineal village, and region indicators.
From the data, I select a sample of 10,763 households. For ease of estimation, I
exclude households that have less than one or more than four men and women, or
less than one or more than five children. I also exclude households that are in the top
or bottom percentile of expenditure to eliminate outliers. Households are dropped if
they are missing information on any of the covariates listed in Table 1.1. Sample sizes
for each household type are provided in the appendix in Table 1.10.
Table 1.1 reports descriptive statistics for the estimation sample. Households have
on average 5.27 individuals. The average age of foster children (9.26) is significantly
higher than that of non-foster children (5.80). This is consistent with child labour
and education being reasons households foster children. Roughly 37 percent of foster
children have lost at least one parent, indicating a majority of foster children are
voluntarily sent away by their biological parents. Households in Malawi are very poor,
with the average real annual per capita household expenditure equal to 126,580 MWK
(approximately 1,147 US$).29 Lastly, households spend a large fraction of their income
on food (62 percent), which consistent with the high level of poverty in Malawi.
29The median per capita household expenditure is considerably lower at 871 US$.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sample Size
Household Characteristics
Household Size 5.273 1.712 3 13 10,763
Men 1.394 0.713 1 4 10,763
Women 1.344 0.646 1 4 10,763
Children 2.580 1.254 1 5 10,763
Non-Foster 2.305 1.370 0 5 10,763
Foster 0.275 0.696 0 5 10,763
Per Capita Total Expenditures (1000s MWK) 126.58 106.58 145.63 1,266.38 10,763
Men’s Clothing Budget Shares 0.006 0.014 0 0.142 10,763
Women’s Clothing Budget Shares 0.009 0.016 0 0.139 10,763
Child’s Clothing Budget Shares 0.009 0.017 0 0.149 10,763
Food Budget Shares 0.625 0.137 0.077 0.963 10,763
Preference Factors
Year=2010 0.744 0.436 0 1 10,763
Foster Child Age 9.255 3.343 0 14 1,933
non-Foster Child Age 5.803 3.397 0 14 9,864
Proportion Orphaned of Foster Children 0.376 0.467 0 1 1,933
Proportion One Parent Absent of Non-Foster Children 0.139 0.330 0 1 9,864
Proportion Female of non-Foster 0.502 0.365 0 1 9,864
Proportion Female of Foster 0.554 0.447 0 1 1,933
Average Age Women 30.560 10.831 15 99 10,763
Average Age Difference (Men-Women) 1.96 12.658 -77 60 10,763
Education Men 6.666 3.719 0 14 10,763
Education Women 5.180 3.646 0 14 10,763
Share Women Age 15-18 0.077 0.183 0 1 10,763
Share Men Age 15-18 0.114 0.247 0 1 10,763
Rural 0.804 0.397 0 1 10,763
Matrilineal Village 0.608 0.488 0 1 10,763
North 0.200 0.400 0 1 10,763
Central 0.369 0.483 0 1 10,763
South 0.431 0.495 0 1 10,763
Notes: Households with 1-4 men and women, and 1-5 children. Children are age 14 or younger. Malawi Third
Integrated Household Survey and Integrated Household Panel Survey.
4.3 Estimation
To estimate the model, I add an error term to the clothing Engel curves for men,
women, and children. Since the error terms of the Engel curves are likely to be corre-
lated across equations, the system is estimated using Non-linear Seemingly Unrelated
Regression. To match the data used in the empirical analysis, I now explicitly account
for households with multiple men and women with sf and sm denoting the number
of women and men, respectively.
Wms =smη
m
s [δ
m
s + β
m
s ln(η
m
s )] + smη
m
s β
m
s ln y + m
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W fs =sfη
f
s [δ
f
s + β
f
s ln(η
f
s )] + sfη
f
sβ
f
s ln y + f (1.12)
W cs =saη
a
s [δ
a
s + β
a
s ln(η
a
s )] + sbη
b
s[δ
b
s + β
b
s ln(η
b
s)]
+(saη
a
sβ
a
s + sbη
b
sβ
b
s) ln y + c
The objects of interest are the resource shares for foster and non-foster children, given
by ηas and ηbs, respectively. The estimation allows for considerable heterogeneity as each
parameter is a linear function of the household characteristics provided in Table 1.1.
To estimate how resource shares differ by household composition, I include indicator
variables for household types in the parameterization of the foster and non-foster
child resource share functions. I therefore omit constant terms, as those are already
captured by the household type indicators. Resource shares for foster children are
then parameterized as follows:
ηasab =
( 5∑
i=0
5∑
j=0
ηasijI{sab = sij}
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Household type indicators
+ X′γ, 1 ≤ i+ j ≤ 5 (1.13)
where the first set of terms are the indicators for household types. The vector of
household characteristics is given by X. Resource shares for non-foster children are
parameterized similarly. For men and women, I assume that their resource shares
increase linearly in the number of men, women, foster, and non-foster children in the
household.30
To identify resource shares, I must impose the parameter restrictions discussed in
either Approach 1 or 2. With Approach 1, the slope preference parameter is assumed
to be the same across household types (βts = βt). With Approach 2, the slope pref-
erence parameter is assumed to be similar across people (βts = βs), and Restrictions
30This assumption is for computational reasons. Determining household types by the number of
men and women in the household, in addition to the number of foster and non-foster children, would
result in a significant increase in the number of parameters needed to be estimated. Calvi (2016)
parameterizes resource shares for men, women, and children this way. For robustness, I include
indicators for the number of men and women in the parametrization of men’s and women’s resource
shares and the results are unaffected.
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1 and 2 are substituted directly into the resource share functions. The parameter
restrictions for foster child resource shares are provided below:
Restriction 1: ηa41 =
ηa40×ηa11
ηa10
, ηa31 =
ηa30×ηa11
ηa10
, ηa21 =
ηa20×ηa11
ηa10
, ηa22 =
ηa20×ηa12
ηa10
ηa32 =
ηa30×ηa12
ηa10
, ηa23 =
ηa20×ηa13
ηa10
Restriction 2: ηa11 =
ηb11×ηa10
ηb01
Restriction 1 is also imposed for non-foster children. While the above estimation
strategies are viable, both Approaches 1 and 2 have weaknesses in terms of precisely
identifying resource shares. In regards to the SAT restriction used in Approach 1,
DLP note that this preference restriction appears to perform considerably worse than
the SAP restriction because identification depends heavily on the assumption that
resource shares sum to one, as opposed to something like a log sum. In this context,
where I am further weakening the data requirements, the effectiveness of this approach
is unsatisfactory.31 However, using the second approach may also perform poorly as
there are many household types, and identifying a different preference parameter βs
for each household type is difficult. I therefore take an intermediate approach. I im-
pose SAT, while simultaneously restricting how resource shares vary across household
types using Restrictions 1 and 2.32 This combined approach has the benefit of being
empirically tractable, while not overly restrictive. This is the preferred specification
and the one used in the results that follow unless noted otherwise. For robustness,
I estimate other specifications that assume both SAT and SAP (βts = β), while also
imposing Restrictions 1 and 2 to strengthen identification.
Lastly, I would ideally like to estimate resource shares separately for orphaned
and non-orphaned foster children. However, given the small number of orphans in
the sample, this is infeasible. Instead, I include the proportion of foster children
who are orphaned as a covariate of the resource share functions. Moreover, in some
31See DLP for a more detailed discussion of the weaknesses of identification using the SAT re-
striction. See Tommasi and Wolf (2016) for a more general discussion of potential estimation com-
plications with the DLP identification method.
32To further improve precision I restrict βf = βm. I fail to reject the hypothesis that these
parameters are equal.
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specifications I interact the proportion of foster children who are orphaned with other
covariates, such as gender and an indicator for rural residence. This allows foster child
resource shares to vary somewhat flexibly with the share of foster children who are
orphaned.
4.4 Results
Figure 1.3 presents estimates for the predicted resource shares for foster and non-
foster children (ηˆas and ηˆbs). The resource shares are per child. The solid bars denote
foster child resource shares, and the line-patterned bars denote non-foster child re-
source shares.33 Each quadrant corresponds to a different household size, defined by
the number of children in the household. Within each quadrant, predicted resource
shares for foster and non-foster children are given by household composition, which is
determined by the number foster and non-foster children present, where for example,
“1 NF 0 F" indicates a household with 1 non-foster child and 0 foster children. The
motivation for this grouping of the results is that, if all children are treated equally,
then foster and non-foster child resource shares should not vary for a given household
size. The predictions are made for a reference household, which I define as a household
with one man, one woman, and all other covariates set to their median value.3435 The
brackets are the 95 percent confidence intervals of the predicted values.
Panel A of Figure 1.3 provides the predicted resource shares for reference house-
holds with one or two children. For households with one non-foster child, and zero fos-
ter children (“1 NF 0 F"), the non-foster child consumes 19.4 percent of the household
budget. Similarly, for households with one foster child, and zero non-foster children (“0
NF 1 F"), the foster child is allocated roughly 20.4 percent of the household budget.
This provides little evidence of discrimination. Panels B, C, and D present the results
for households with three, four, and five total children respectively, and again, the
33Resource shares for men and women are also estimated, but are omitted to facilitate the pre-
sentation of the more relevant results. See Figure 1.6 in the appendix for the results for men and
women.
34Instead of using the median value for foster and non-foster child age, I set both to seven to make
the predicted resource shares more comparable.
35Using mean values for the predictions instead of median values does not meaningfully affect the
results.
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Figure 1.3: Predicted Resource Shares: Reference Household
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(B) HHs with 3 Children
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(C) HHs with 4 Children
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Note: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey and Integrated Household Panel Survey. Robust standard errors.
The brackets are the 95 percent confidence intervals. Each quadrant presents non-foster and foster child resource
shares for a different household size defined by the number of children. Within each quadrant, foster, and non-foster
child resource shares are presented by household type which is defined by the number of foster and non-foster
children, respectively. A reference household is a household with 1 man, 1 woman, and all other covariates at their
median value, excluding foster and non-foster child age, which are both set to 7.
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results do not demonstrate a systematic pattern of discrimination against foster chil-
dren. It should be emphasized that this lack of discrimination is for households with
all covariates at their median value, and that the median foster child is non-orphaned.
I therefore examine how heterogeneity in these covariates, such as orphanhood, relate
to foster child treatment.
Table 1.2 presents the parameter estimates of the determinants of resource shares
for foster and non-foster children. I omit the coefficients on the household composition
variables as those are displayed in Figure 1.3.36 The results provide some evidence
that child resource shares are increasing in age, at least for foster children. Living in
a matrilineal village is beneficial to foster children, with foster child resource shares
being 3.2 percentage points higher if the majority of households in the village follow
matrilineal customs. Greater involvement of female matrilineal relatives in the child’s
upbringing could explain this finding. Lastly, the results provide no evidence of gender
discrimination among foster or non-foster children. This result is counter to what DLP
find.
Orphanhood does seem to matter considerably for child welfare, as the results sug-
gest that orphaned foster children are treated significantly worse than non-orphaned
foster children.37 Specifically, if all foster children are orphaned, foster child resource
shares are 4.2 percentage points lower than they would be if all foster children were
non-orphaned. This translates into orphaned children consuming roughly 76.9 percent
of what non-orphaned foster children consume.
To better illustrate the importance of orphanhood in foster child treatment, Fig-
ure 1.4 presents the predicted resource shares for households where the foster children
are orphaned. The earlier predicted resource shares in Figure 1.3 were for households
with non-orphaned foster children, as the median foster child is non-orphaned. To
facilitate a comparison between non-orphaned and orphaned foster children, I repro-
duce the results from Figure 1.3 for households with four children in panel (A) while
36The actual parameter estimates of the household type indicators are provided in the appendix
in Table 1.11. Because most of the covariates are demeaned, the indicators for the household type
variables are largely similar to the predicted values found in Figure 1.3.
37An orphaned foster child is a foster child who has lost at least one parent.
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Table 1.2: Determinants of Resource Shares
non-Foster Children Foster Children
(1) (2)
NLSUR NLSUR
North 0.0207 0.0347
(0.0212) (0.0226)
Central -0.00619 -0.00295
(0.0146) (0.0156)
Year=2010 -0.0242* -0.0166
(0.0143) (0.0137)
Average Age non-Foster 0.625 -0.0422
(0.774) (0.893)
Average Age non-Foster2 0.00965 0.0266
(0.0568) (0.0652)
Average Age Foster -1.333 2.618**
(1.686) (1.225)
Average Age Foster2 0.0864 -0.125*
(0.0947) (0.0759)
Proportion of Fostered Orphaned 0.0430 -0.0427**
(0.0278) (0.0206)
Proportion of Non-Fostered One Parent Absent 0.00529 -0.000158
(0.0233) (0.0208)
Fraction Female non-Foster -0.0292 0.0167
(0.0192) (0.0186)
Fraction Female Foster -0.0105 0.0270
(0.0260) (0.0280)
Average Age Women 0.488 0.0699
(0.331) (0.349)
Average Age Women2 -0.00725* -0.00300
(0.00431) (0.00388)
(Average Age Men - Average Age Women) 0.121 0.0360
(0.0759) (0.0810)
(Average Age Men - Average Age Women)2 0.000616 0.000789
(0.00234) (0.00164)
Average Education Men 0.00464** 0.00254
(0.00225) (0.00327)
Average Education Women -0.00472* -0.00310
(0.00253) (0.00264)
Rural -0.00775 -0.00306
(0.0172) (0.0149)
Share of Adult Women Age 15-18 0.0587 -0.0227
(0.0514) (0.0426)
Share of Adult Men Age 15-18 0.000428 0.00950
(0.0310) (0.0283)
Matrilineal Village 0.0151 0.0323*
(0.0163) (0.0174)
N 10,763
Log Likelihood 92,338
Notes: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey and Integrated Household Panel Survey.
The sample includes all households with 1-4 men and women, and 1-5 children. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Age variables are divided by 100 to ease computation. The
education and age variables are demeaned. South Malawi is the omitted region. Coefficients
on the household composition indicators are omitted for conciseness. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
in panel (B), I present the predicted resource shares for non-foster and orphaned fos-
ter children. The results illustrate a clear pattern of unequal treatment of orphaned
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Figure 1.4: Predicted Resource Shares by Presence of Orphans
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(A) HH with 4 Children: Non-orphan Foster
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Notes: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey and Integrated Household Panel Survey. Robust standard errors.
The brackets are the 95 percent confidence intervals. Panels A and B present predicted foster and non-foster child
resource shares for households with four children. In Panel A, all covariates are set to the median value of
households with no orphaned foster children present. Panel B sets all covariates to the median value of households
with orphaned foster children present. Predicted values are computed assuming households have one man and one
woman. Comparing panel A with panel B demonstrates differences in treatment for foster children by orphan status.
foster children relative to non-fostered children. For example, focusing on households
with two non-foster children and two foster children (“2 NF 2 F"), when the foster
children are non-orphaned, the predicted per child resource shares for non-foster and
foster children are 9.4 and 9.5 percent respectively. However, when the foster children
are orphaned, the predicted per child resource shares are now 11.6 and 7.7 percent
for non-foster and foster children. Similar differences are found across the different
household types.
The above results are estimated assuming preferences for assignable clothing are
similar across households types (Approach 1), and that the way in which resource
shares for foster children vary across household types is independent of the number
of non-foster children present, and vice vera (Restrictions 1 and 2). To examine the
robustness of these results, I estimate the model using several alternative identifi-
cation assumptions. Table 1.3 presents the results to each different specification. In
the interest of conciseness, I limit the displayed parameter estimates to several key
household characteristics and household type indicators. The four different combina-
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tions of assumptions are as follows: (1) SAT; (2) SAT and Restrictions 1 and 2 (this
specification is what is used in the main analysis); (3) SAP and Restrictions 1 and 2;
(4) SAT, SAP, and Restrictions 1 and 2. Columns (1a) - (4a) present the results for
non-foster children, and columns (1b) - (4b) do the same for foster children.
The results are reassuringly similar across specifications. As expected, estimating
the model assuming only SAT (Approach 1) leads to large standard errors. Moreover,
using this approach requires dropping several household types in order for the system
to converge. Across specifications, none of the parameter estimates on the household
type indicators are statistically different, and overall are quite similar to each other.
Looking at the household characteristics, the results are again for the most part
consistent. Orphanhood is only statistically significant when the SAP restriction is
not imposed, though the magnitude is again similar across all specifications.
Neither SAT or SAP on their own are rejected by the data. However, the preferred
results are presented in columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 1.3, in which I impose SAT and
Restrictions 1 and 2, but not SAP. This combination of assumptions has the advantage
being relatively flexible (preferences are allowed to be different across people), while
simultaneously having standard errors that are significantly more precise than the
results presented in columns (1a) and (1b) where Restrictions 1 and 2 are not imposed.
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I conduct several other robustness checks. First, I estimate a more flexible model
that allows for the relationship between orphanhood and foster child treatment to
vary with both gender and rural residence. These results are provided in Table 1.12.
For conciseness, I again limit the parameter estimates displayed in the table to several
preference factors and household type indicators. Columns (2a) and (2b) present the
results for non-foster and foster children respectively, whereas columns (1a) and (1b)
reproduce the main results as a point of comparison. The number of interactions
make a clean interpretation of the relationship between orphanhood and foster child
treatment difficult, however, the results still suggest the extent of unequal treatment
between foster and non-foster children increases with the presence of orphaned foster
children. I next limit the sample to only nuclear households with one man and one
woman who are married.38 Columns (3a) and (3b) or Table 1.12 display these results.
While several parameter estimate differ somewhat in magnitude, none are statistically
different.
4.5 Poverty Analysis
Resource shares are a desirable object to identify in part because they allow for
the estimation of individual-level consumption. I can therefore use the predicted re-
source shares to estimate foster and non-foster child poverty rates that account for
the unequal distribution of goods within the household. Importantly, everyone in
the household may not be poor; it is possible for the adults to be living above the
poverty line, but the children below it. Moreover, not all children need to be poor;
non-foster children may be above the poverty line with the foster children below it,
and vice versa. This analysis therefore differs from the more traditional approach to
estimating poverty which relies on household-level measures that ignore intrahouse-
hold inequality. In a setting where intrahousehold inequality is likely, accounting for
an unequal distribution of resources is essential, and highly relevant for accurately
targeting poverty programs.
38Only 54.7 percent of the estimation sample households consist of a single married couple with
no other adult men or women present. Because of the much smaller sample size I limit the number
of preference factors and household types, but the results are quantitatively similar.
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I classify adults as poor using a US $1.90 a day poverty line.39 For children, I
use several different poverty lines based on the average age of foster or non-foster
children in the household. Setting a single poverty line for children abstracts from
potential inequality as older children require more resources than younger children
to maintain the same standard of living, and foster children tend to be significantly
older than non-foster children. To determine these age-specific poverty lines, I assume
that the child poverty line is proportional to the calorie requirements for children of
that age relative to adults.40 So if a six-year-old child requires half as many calories
as an adult, their poverty line would be half of the adult poverty line, or US $0.95
a day. The choice of poverty line is arbitrary, however the results are still somewhat
comparable to DLP as the “average" child poverty line across all ages is roughly 60
percent of the adult poverty line, which is the child poverty line used by DLP for
children of all ages.
As a point of comparison, I calculate household-level poverty rates where I assume
an equal distribution of resources within the household. The household-level poverty
measures use the OECD adult equivalent scale, where the number of adult equivalents
in the household is given by 1 + 0.5×Nc + 0.7× (Na− 1), where Nc is the number of
children and Na is the number of adults. A household is poor if per adult equivalent
consumption is less than US $1.90 a day. Since the OECD equivalence scale is some-
what arbitrary, the main focus of the poverty analysis is to examine relative levels of
poverty across individuals, rather than levels of poverty.41
Table 1.4 presents poverty rates for individuals by household size, defined by the
number of children in the household. Columns (1) - (5) provide individual poverty
rates computed using the predicted resource shares. Column (6) presents the household-
39This is the World Bank 2011 extreme poverty line.
40I use the United States Department of Health and Human Services estimated daily calorie needs
by age. I abstract from gender differences for children and assume adults require 2400 calories per
day.
41Adult equivalence scales are used to account for economies of scale in household consumption.
Without estimating the consumption technology function (the A - Matrix in Section 2), the individ-
ual type-specific poverty estimates cannot account for economies of scale. While the consumption
technology function can in principle be identified, as in BCL, I lack sufficient price data to estimate
it. As a result the household and individual levels of poverty are not directly comparable.
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level poverty rates. Comparing column (6) to the individual-level poverty rates clearly
illustrates that traditional household-level measures fail to identify individuals who
are poor, particularly women and children. This result is consistent with DLP and re-
cent work on using health measures to analyse the ability of household-level measures
to capture individual-level poverty (Brown et al. (2016)). Moving to the individual
poverty rates, I separate orphaned from non-orphaned foster children to emphasize
differences in foster child treatment by orphan status. This choice is motivated by the
results in Section 4.4, and as expected, orphaned foster child poverty rates are greater
than non-orphaned foster child poverty. For example, comparing households with ei-
ther one non-orphaned foster child, or one orphaned foster child, I find that 29.7
percent of non-orphaned foster children are poor, whereas 49.4 percent of orphaned
foster children are poor.
Table 1.4: Estimated Poverty Rates by Household Size
Individual Poverty Rates
Number Sample Size:
of Children # Households Foster Non-Foster Men Women Assuming
Non-Orphaned Orphaned Equal Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 2,639 0.297 0.494 0.190 0.160 0.257 0.090
2 2,840 0.404 0.494 0.326 0.153 0.305 0.119
3 2,595 0.405 0.591 0.465 0.178 0.338 0.167
4 1,777 0.384 0.692 0.563 0.240 0.378 0.225
5 912 0.424 0.731 0.632 0.240 0.437 0.261
All Households 10,673 0.385 0.597 0.467 0.182 0.327 0.167
Notes: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey and Integrated Household Panel Survey. A household is poor if per adult
equivalent expenditures are less than $1.90 a day. Individual poverty rates measure consumption as the product of predicted
resource shares and total expenditure. The child poverty line is less than the adult poverty line and is determined based on
the average age of foster or non-foster children in the household. The exact child poverty line is proportional to the calorie
requirements for children of a given age relative to adults.
Comparing columns (1) and (3) of Table 1.4, the estimated poverty rates seem
to suggest that non-orphaned foster child poverty is mostly below non-foster child
poverty. However, these estimates on their own do not suggest foster children are
treated better than non-foster children, since households with non-orphaned foster
children tend to be wealthier. It is common for parents to foster out their children
due to negative income shocks, and send them to households with the financial means
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to take care of additional children (Akresh (2009)). Selection into wealthier house-
holds likely occurs more frequently for non-orphaned children as they are purposively
fostered. On the other hand, orphans are more likely to be involuntarily fostered into a
household that may not have the means to care for them. This could partially explain
why intrahousehold inequality is more prevalent among orphaned foster children.
Because household-level expenditure is correlated with both individual poverty
rates and the presence of foster children in the household, I present the results in
a different way. I plot individual poverty rates for non-foster, orphaned foster, and
non-orphaned foster children by percentiles of the per adult equivalent household
expenditure distribution. These results are displayed in Figure ??.42 As expected,
individual poverty rates decline as household expenditure increases. However, for
certain levels of household expenditure, orphaned foster child poverty (the blue dashed
line) is significantly higher than non-foster child poverty (the green solid line). This
result suggests orphaned foster children often live below the poverty line, despite living
in households that are not considered poor. In effect, household-level measures of
poverty are likely to misclassify orphaned foster children as non-poor more frequently
than both non-foster and non-orphaned foster children. Lastly, non-foster and non-
orphaned foster poverty rates are no longer as starkly different as the results in Table
1.4 would suggest.
It is important to note that I am not making welfare statements about child
fostering as an institution. Even if foster children sometimes receive a smaller share
of household resources relative to other household members, the counterfactual of
staying with their biological parents may result in a higher resource share, but lower
total resources due to a smaller household budget.
Existing work has demonstrated that women and children are often misclassified
as non-poor using household-level measures. I highlight a new population, orphaned-
foster children, who are even more frequently misclassified as non-poor. These results
demonstrate the importance of accounting for intrahousehold inequality when design-
42Figure ?? is analogous to Figure 2 in Brown et al. (2016) who plot different measures of under-
nutrition against percentiles of household wealth.
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Figure 1.5: Individual Poverty Rates by Household Expenditure Percentile
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
ov
er
ty
 R
at
e
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Expenditure per Adult Equivalent (Percentile)
Orphan Foster Non-Orphaned Foster
Non-Foster
Notes: The graph shows the proportion
of different child types who are poor at each per adult equivalent household expenditure percentile.
A lowess regression is used to fit the line.
ing policy. To efficiently target poverty programs, it is essential to accurately identify
poor individuals, not just poor households.
4.6 Why are Orphans Treated Worse?
The previous results suggest that non-orphaned foster children are treated equally to
non-foster children. However this lack of discrimination does not hold if the foster child
is orphaned. I next examine one potential explanation for this unequal treatment;
non-orphaned foster children have a better outside option. More specifically, since
both of their biological parents are alive, non-orphaned foster children can potentially
return to live with their parents. Foster children who have lost at least one parent,
on the other hand, do not have that same advantage. From the perspective of Nash
bargaining, non-orphaned foster children have a higher threat point. To determine
the plausibility of this hypothesis, I take advantage of the panel structure of the data
and compute the probability of a foster child in 2010 being in the same household
in 2013. If orphaned foster children are more likely to still be present, that suggests
their outside option is worse, as they are forced to remain in their current household.
I assign children into four mutually exclusive groups: non-orphaned non-foster (g=1);
orphaned non-foster (g=2); non-orphaned foster (g=3); orphaned foster (g=4). I then
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estimate the following probit regression:
Yihsg = α + γ1Oi + γ2Fi + γ3(Oi × Fi) + ψs +Xihδ + ihsg (1.14)
where Yihsg is an indicator for whether child i in household h in region s in orphan-
foster group g was present in the same household in 2013 as they were in 2010. Fi
and Oi are indicators for foster and orphan status respectively. I include a vector
of individual and household characteristics Xih that includes child age, age squared,
gender, household expenditure, residence in a rural area, and the number of men,
women, male, and female siblings.
Table 1.5: Probability of Staying in Same HH by Foster and Orphan Status
Foster Child Sample Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Orphaned Foster 0.0189 0.0244*** 0.0370** 0.0453***
(0.020) (0.009) (0.012) (0.017)
Non-Orphaned Non-Foster 0.0708*** 0.0713***
(0.014) (0.017)
Orphaned Non-Foster 0.0237 0.0285
(0.016) (0.283)
Mean Dependent Variable 0.871 0.871 0.915 0.915
Sample Size 746 746 6,076 6,076
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes
Notes: The sample includes all children age 0-11 in 2010. The dependent variable
is an indicator for whether or not the child in the 2010 sample was still in the
same household in 2013. The omitted category are non-orphaned foster children.
Standard errors are clustered at the region level. Individual controls include age
age2, and gender. Household controls include the number of male and female
siblings age 0-6 and 7-14, the number of adult men and women, log household
expenditure, and whether or not the household is in a rural area. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 1.5 presents the marginal effects of a probit regression of Equation (1.14).
The omitted category in each specification is group 3: non-orphaned foster children.43
In columns (1) and (2) the sample is restricted to only foster children, while columns
(3) and (4) include both foster and non-foster children. If orphaned foster children
43Equation (1.14) is modified so that this is the case.
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are more likely than non-orphaned foster children to remain in the same household
throughout the sample period, then γ3 should be positive. I limit the sample to chil-
dren age eleven and under in 2010.44 Column (1) shows no difference in the probability
of remaining in the same household, however once variation in household characteris-
tics is accounted for, the results suggest orphaned foster children are 2.44 percentage
points more likely than non-orphaned foster children to stay. Including non-foster
children in the analysis in columns (3) and (4) yields qualitatively similar estimates.
Table 1.15 in the appendix further divides orphaned foster children by whether they
are single orphans (maternal or paternal) or double orphans. As expected, the prob-
ability of remaining in the same household is significantly higher in magnitude for
double orphans. This finding suggests that double orphans have the worst outside
option of all children, which may weaken their standing withiin the household.
5 Robustness
5.1 Is Clothing a Private Good?
A key assumption of the model is that clothing is not shared across person types. This
assumption means that foster children cannot share clothes with non-foster children,
and vice versa.45 While this assumption may at first seem worrisome, there are several
reasons it is not too great of a concern. First, clothing includes both shoes and school
uniforms, both of which can be reasonably assumed to not be shared. Secondly, foster
children are typically different ages than the non-foster children within the household.
Fostering is often used to balance the demographic structure of the household, both
in terms of child age and gender, in order to maximise household production (Akresh
(2009)). As a result, it is somewhat rare to have a foster and non-foster child of the
same age and gender in a given household.
44The consumption analysis defines children as anyone fourteen and under. Therefore I restrict
the sample to children age fourteen and under in 2013, or eleven and under in 2010. Using different
age thresholds does not meaningfully affect the results.
45Hand-me-down clothing is not considered shared clothing. I define children’s clothing expendi-
tures to be the amount the household spends on children’s clothing within the past year. Hand-me-
down clothing is therefore not considered in the analysis and does not factor in to whether clothing
is shared or not. It is assumed to be separable from purchased clothing.
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To examine the merit of this assumption, I conduct two tests. First, I include a
covariate for the age difference between foster and non-foster children in the resource
share equation. If this parameter is positive, then that suggests that clothing is shared,
since differently aged children would need more resources. This parameter proves to
not be statistically different from zero. To be even more cautious, I drop all households
with both foster and non-foster children within the following age groups from the
sample: 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, and 12-14. Since foster and non-foster children in different age
groups are unlikely to share clothing, I can confidently assume clothing is private in
this restricted sample. The results from the restricted sample are qualitatively similar
to the main results, which suggests that the privateness of clothing does not interfere
with the findings of this paper. Table 1.13 in the appendix presents these results.
5.2 Are the Restrictions Valid?
In Section 3.2.2, I take the “Similar Across People" assumption on individual prefer-
ences from DLP, and demonstrate that if we restrict the way in which resource shares
vary across household types, resource shares can be recovered using expenditure on
private partially assignable goods. In particular, I first restrict the way in which foster
child resource shares vary across household types to be independent of the number
of non-foster children present, and vice versa (Restriction 1). Secondly, I assume the
extent of discrimination in a composite household with one child of each type to be
the same as the extent of the discrimination across two one-child-type households,
each with one foster or non-foster child (Restriction 2). Whether or not these two
assumptions hold is important to the reliability of this identification method.
To test the validity of these restrictions, I estimate the model assuming preferences
are similar across household types (SAT), and test whether or not the estimated
resource shares are consistent with the ratios implied by Restriction’s 1 and 2. As
discussed in Section 3.2.1, if I make the SAT restriction, I do not need to restrict
how resource shares vary across household types. This allows for a direct test of
the second approach to identification. Specifically, I test the following null hypotheses
which are assumed to hold by Restriction 1: ηa21 =
ηa11η
a
20
ηa10
, ηa31 =
ηa11η
a
30
ηa10
, ηb12 =
ηb11η
b
02
ηb01
; and
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Restriction 2: ηb11 =
ηa11η
b
01
ηa10
. I omit several household types because they have too few
observations.46 Overall, I consistently fail to reject the hypothesis that the restrictions
hold. While the resource shares are not estimated that precisely and therefore the
hypotheses are difficult to reject, the restrictions are still largely consistent with the
estimated resource shares. The estimation results are presented in the appendix in
Table 1.14.47
I next examine these restrictions in a more indirect way. Since Restriction 1 re-
quires that resource shares vary across household types independently of the the
number of foster and non-foster children present, I next ask, are household charac-
teristics independent of the number of foster and non-foster children present? Stated
differently, are one-child-type and composite households similar? To answer this ques-
tion, I compute sample means of different household characteristics for one-child-type
and composite households. If households with only foster (or non-foster) children dif-
fer from composite households over observable characteristics, that may suggest they
differ in unobservable ways, which would limit the validity of the restrictions. Ta-
ble 1.16 presents sample means for several household characteristics by the different
household compositions.
The results are mixed; encouragingly, foster and non-foster child characteristics,
such as age and gender, do not seem to vary much between one-child-type and com-
posite households. Unfortunately, adult characteristics, such as age and education,
differ substantially across one-child-type foster households and the composite house-
holds. The underlying reason for this is that households that have only foster children
tend to be households where the foster children are cared for by grandparents, while
in composite households foster children are typically cared for by their aunt and uncle,
who have their own non-foster (biological) children. Table 1.18 presents the percent-
age of foster children cared for by different relatives in households with only foster
children, and in households with both foster and non-foster children.
Since one-child-type and composite households do seem to differ across the entire
46This is one reason why identification with the SAT assumption without Restrictions 1 and 2
(Approach 1) is less than satisfactory in this context.
47Other results from this estimation were presented previously in Table 1.3, columns (1) and (5).
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sample, I next examine if there is at least some amount of overlap among subsamples
of the different household types. To do this, I select two subsamples of one-child-type
households (foster only and non-foster only) that are most similar to the composite
households using a propensity score matching procedure.48 The results are presented
in Table 1.17. Columns (1) and (2) compare households with only non-foster chil-
dren to households with both non-foster and foster children. I do the same for foster
one-child-type households in columns (3) and (4). None of the estimated means are
statistically different across the matched subsamples. Then since the model does al-
low for observable heterogeneity in the resource share parameters, concerns regarding
potential violations due to differences in composite and one-child-type households are
likely minimal.
Each of the above tests of the restrictions is meant to examine the extent to
which resource shares are well-behaved; do they vary across household types in a
predictable way? The above results suggest that resource shares mostly do behave in
such a way. Lastly, it is useful to note that in principle, these restrictions are testable
with additional data. If I observed assignable goods for foster and non-foster children,
I could precisely estimate the model without Restrictions 1 and 2 and compare those
results to the findings recovered in this paper without having to make the additional
restrictions. I leave that for future work.
5.3 Is There Selection Bias?
Foster and non-foster children are not randomly assigned into households. The deci-
sion to foster one’s children, and the decision to receive a foster child is a complicated
process. Furthermore, households that decide to accept a foster child may be differ-
ent from households without foster children in unobservable ways that are correlated
with the treatment of foster and non-foster children. For example, a household with
non-foster children that refuses to take in a foster child may do so because they prefer
48I use nearest neighbor propensity score matching, where households are selected based on the
covariates listed in Table 1.1. In comparing non-foster one-child-type households with composite
households, I drop one-child-type households and match them with the full sample of composite
households. When I compare foster one-child-type households with composite households, I select a
subsample of similar one-child-type foster households and composite households.
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to devote more resources to their own biological children.
In this paper, I do not model the fostering decision as others have done (Ainsworth
(1995), Akresh (2009), Serra (2009)), but instead analyse child welfare conditional on
being in a given household. In other words, I do not analyse the causal effect of living
in a foster household on child treatment. Nevertheless, I briefly examine whether or
not selection of children into different household types affects foster and non-foster
child treatment. The primary concern is that there is a subset of one-child-type, non-
foster households who are driving the results, and that these households are different
in unobservable ways from the composite households. If this were true, I should not
be imposing any similarity between these different household types. To determine the
severity of this concern, I attempt to drop these “problem" households. I conduct a
matching exercise to select a subsample of one-child-type, non-foster households that
are most similar to the composite households using nearest neighbor propensity score
matching.49 I estimate the model on the subsample of one-child-type households and
compare these results to the main results from Section 4.4 in Table (1.19). Columns
(1) and (2) display the predicted per non-foster child resource shares for a reference
household.50 Column (1) presents the results for the full sample, while column (2)
does the same for the restricted sample. Overall, there are no statistical differences
between the results, suggesting that for non-foster children, selection bias is not too
great of a concern.51
6 Conclusion
The household is in many ways a black box to economists. Understanding the inner
workings of households is difficult and measuring the treatment of children within the
household is far from straightforward. I build upon recent work by DLP to demon-
strate how resource shares can be identified using expenditure on partially assignable
49See Table 1.17 columns (1) and (2).
50As before, I define a reference household to be a household with all covariates at their median
value.
51I lack a sufficient number of households to proceed with a similar analysis of one-child-type
foster households.
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clothing. Like DLP, I rely on observing how clothing budget shares vary with house-
hold expenditure to identify resource shares. I differ in that I weaken the data re-
quirements necessary for identification. Future work can use this methodology in
other contexts where intrahousehold inequality is of interest, but assignable goods
are not present in the data.
I use this new approach to measure inequality among children. While the unequal
treatment of children is present in a variety of contexts, I focus on foster children
in Malawi who live in situations that may leave them particularly susceptible to
impoverishment. The findings of this paper demonstrate that for the most part, foster
children are treated the same as other children and that extended family members
are capable caretakers. However, the results suggest orphaned foster children are
disadvantaged. I find orphaned foster child poverty is being substantially understated
by poverty measures that rely on household-level measures of consumption. This
result emphasizes the importance of designing government programs that target not
just poor households, but also orphaned children, regardless of the poverty level of the
household. Future work should connect the findings of this paper with past research
on why children are fostered (Ainsworth (1995), Akresh (2009)). Bridging these two
areas of study will help determine the underlying mechanisms that influence foster
children treatment, and ultimately allow for better policy design.
The weaknesses of the unitary household framework are well known (Attanasio
and Lechene (2002), Duflo (2003), Bobonis (2009)). This study adds to the growing
literature that stresses the importance of thinking about individuals within the house-
hold, as opposed to the household as a single economic agent. This distinction is even
more relevant where intrahousehold inequality may be present, as the results of this
paper demonstrate in regards to child fostering. This project identifies a second, less
emphasized, limitation of household-level studies, in that they typically ignore kin-
ship networks. Individuals within a kinship network interact along many dimensions,
with child fostering being a central component. The finding that non-orphaned foster
children are treated better than orphaned foster children suggests kinship networks
play a role in child welfare; having living parents in another household influences how
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foster children are treated. Recognising the role of extended families in child welfare is
therefore critical to designing policies that help children. Future work should analyse
in more depth the relationship between different types of kinship systems (matrilin-
eal vs. patrilineal), as well as the role of different types of relatives (grandparents vs.
aunts and uncles) in foster and non-foster child treatment.
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APPENDIX
1.A School Enrollment and Child labor
To provide context to the consumption results, I examine intrahousehold inequality
among foster and non-foster children along two other dimensions of welfare: education
and child labor. As discussed in Section 4.1, education and child labor are centrally
linked to why parents foster their children. In terms of education, if the household
does not live close to a school, or if the nearby school is low quality, parents may send
their children to live with a relative who lives in a village with better educational
access. Moreover, households may be more amenable to accepting foster children if
the foster children work. For example, a household with a newborn child benefits from
fostering in a young teenage girl who can care for the newborn. Alternatively, if a
household has a stronger than normal harvest, they may foster in children to help
with the farm work. This suggests child labor may be higher among foster children.
1.A.1 Empirical Strategy
Unlike consumption, both school enrollment and work hours are observable at the
individual level using standard household-level survey data. This facilitates a direct
comparison of enrollment rates and child labor between foster and non-foster children.
I begin by assigning children to two mutually exclusive groups: both biological par-
ents absent (g=1); at least one parent present (g=2). Children in group 1 are foster
children, while children in group 2 are non-foster children. I am therefore ignoring
orphan status for now.
For a child i age 6-14 living in household h, living in region r in year t, I estimate
the following regression,
Yihst = α + γFi + pih + ψst +Xiδ + ihst (1.15)
where Yihst is an indicator for school enrollment or some measure of child labor, and Fi
is an indicator variable equal to one if the child is fostered. The parameter of interest
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is γ, which captures the effect of the absence of a child’s parents on the various
outcomes of interest. The omitted category is children with at least one biological
parent present. In some specifications I include household fixed effects to control for
any unobserved heterogeneity that does not vary over time. Household fixed effects
allow for the direct examination of unequal treatment between foster and non-foster
children, as I am relying only on within household variation. Lastly, I include region-
year fixed effects to account for any region specific year effects that are common
across foster status and households. There are four years of data and three regions so
I cluster standard errors at the region-year level.
The consumption results suggest orphanhood is an important factor in how chil-
dren are treated. I modify the above estimation to account for orphan status in order
to examine whether a similar pattern emerges here. I now assign children into four
mutually exclusive groups consistent with the consumption analysis: non-orphaned
non-foster (g=1); orphaned non-foster (g=2); non-orphaned foster (g=3); orphaned
foster (g=4). I estimate the following specification:
Yihstg = α + γ1Oi + γ2Fi + γ3(Oi × Fi) + pih + ψst +Xiδ + ihstg (1.16)
where Fi and Oi are indicators for foster and orphan status respectively. The pa-
rameters of interest are now γg, which captures the differential effects of the child’s
foster and orphan status on school enrollment or child labor. The omitted category
is non-orphaned children with at least one biological parent present. I again use the
Malawi Integrated Households Survey (IHS3) 2010 and the Malawi Integrated Panel
Survey 2013. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.20 in the appendix.
1.A.2 Results
I begin by analyzing the difference in school enrollment rates between foster and non-
foster children. I estimate Equation (3.21) and present the results in Table 1.6. The
coefficient of interest γ describes the difference in treatment for foster and non-foster
children. Column 1 provides an estimate of differences in means by foster status,
controlling for child age and gender. This specification ignores any household charac-
teristics that may be associated with both school enrollment rates and the types of
households that foster in children. Columns 2 and 3 attempt to uncover evidence of
intrahousehold discrimination of foster children. In column 2, I account for observable
household characteristics, including the education, age, and gender of the household
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head, household composition measures, and log per capita household expenditure.
In column 3, I include household fixed effects, which accounts for any unobservable
household characteristics that do not vary across time. The results provide no ev-
idence of discrimination based on foster status. This is largely consistent with the
consumption analysis.
Table 1.6: School Enrollment by Foster Status
OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foster Child -0.029 -0.020 -0.047 -0.023
(0.013) (0.019) (0.036) (0.019)
Sample Size 20,371 20,371 20,371 20,371
Region-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes
Notes: The sample includes all children age 6-14. The omitted fostering cate-
gory are children with at least one biological parent present. Standard errors
are clustered at the region-year level. Individual controls include age age2,
and gender. Household controls include the number of male and female sib-
lings age 0-6 and 7-14, the number of adult men and women, log household
expenditure, and demographic characteristics of the household head. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The consumption results imply orphans are particularly mistreated within the
household. To examine whether this pattern holds for education, I estimate Equa-
tion (1.16) with four foster categories that account for orphanhood. The results are
presented in Table 1.7. The results provide evidence orphanhood matters greatly for
foster child treatment; Each specification demonstrates that foster children who are
orphans have enrollment rates that are statistically lower than children whose bio-
logical parents are present in the household. Column (1), which reports differences
in means between orphan-foster groups controlling for child age and gender shows
that on average, orphaned foster children have school enrollment rates that are 4 per-
centage points lower than non-orphaned, non-foster children. The results in column
(2) are lower in magnitude than the results in column (1) at 2.7 percentage points,
suggesting the lower school enrollment rates are partially due to differences in observ-
able household characteristics. However the difference in school enrollment rates is
still statistically significant. Once I account for household fixed effects in column (3),
the estimated coefficient is negative and significant, suggesting that orphaned foster
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children are subject to intrahousehold discrimination.
Table 1.7: School Enrollment by Foster Status (Detailed Categories)
OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fostering Categories
Non-Orphaned Foster -0.025 -0.019 -0.053 -0.024
(0.022) (0.028) (0.054) (0.031)
Orphaned Foster -0.040*** -0.027** -0.033*** -0.031***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Orphaned Non-Foster -0.022 -0.013 0.016 -0.014
(0.013) (0.012) (0.029) (0.010)
Sample Size 20,371 20,371 20,371 20,371
Region-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes
Notes: The sample includes all children age 6-14. The omitted fostering category are
non-orphaned children with at least one biological parent present. Standard errors are
clustered at the region-year level. Individual controls include age age2, and gender.
Household controls include the number of male and female siblings age 0-6 and 7-14,
the number of adult men and women, log household expenditure, and demographic
characteristics of the household head. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 1.8 provides the child labor results. In columns 1 to 3, I examine the rela-
tionship between foster status and hours worked doing chores,52 while columns 4 to 6
focus on hours worked for a household farm, household enterprise, or wage work out-
side the household. I add controls moving from left to right. The results again provide
little evidence that work around the house differs substantially between foster and
non-foster children, which is contrary to what the literature suggests (Serra (2009)).
This lack of any effect is partially due to the limited definition of chores (only fetch-
ing wood and water), and possible measurement error in the data, as parents may
be unwilling to reveal that their children work. The same lack of an association is
apparent in examining the relationship foster status on work hours in columns 4 to 6.
Table 1.9 accounts for orphanhood when examining the effect of foster status on child
labor. The results demonstrate little difference by foster or orphan status in terms of
child labor, which again is likely due to data issues.
52Chores include fetching wood and fetching water.
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Table 1.8: Weekly Hours Worked by Fostering Status
Chores Work Outside HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fostering Categories
Foster Child 0.077 0.007 -0.215 0.134 -0.163 -0.070
(0.085) (0.095) (0.095) (0.141) (0.087) (0.201)
Sample Size 20,371 20,371 20,371 20,371 20,371 20,371
Region-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Notes: The sample includes all children age 6-14. The omitted fostering category are
children with both biological parents present. Standard errors are clustered at the region-
year level. Individual controls include age age2, and gender. Household controls include
the number of male and female siblings age 0-6 and 7-14, the number of adult men and
women, log household expenditure, and demographic characteristics of the household
head. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 1.9: Weekly Hours Worked by Fostering Status (Detailed Categories)
Chores Work Outside HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fostering Categories
Non-Orphaned Foster -0.041 -0.140 -0.334* 0.034 -0.298 -0.068
(0.099) (0.100) (0.114) (0.187) (0.137) (0.294)
Orphaned Foster 0.253 0.211 -0.089 0.325* 0.018 -0.068
(0.093) (0.115) (0.134) (0.094) (0.058) (0.227)
Orphaned Non-Foster -0.033 -0.032 -0.100 0.113 -0.097 -0.028
(0.084) (0.051) (0.068) (0.057) (0.119) (0.430)
Sample Size 20,371 20,371 20,371 20,371 20,371 20,371
Region-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Notes: The sample includes all children age 6-14. The omitted fostering category are non-
orphaned children with at least one parent present. Standard errors are clustered at the
region-year level. Individual controls include age age2, and gender. Household controls
include the number of male and female siblings age 0-6 and 7-14, the number of adult men
and women, log household expenditure, and demographic characteristics of the household
head. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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1.B Fully Specified Model
The estimation in this study identifies resource shares from Engel curves for assignable
clothing. In this section, I follow DLP and write a fully specified household demand
model consistent with the restrictions contained in the clothing Engel curves. In
particular, Engel curves for clothing are required to be linear in log expenditure, and
resource shares must be independent of household expenditure.
Let y be household expenditure, and p˜ be the price vector of all goods aside
from men’s, women’s, and children’s clothing, which is denoted by p. While more
general formulations are possible, I start with assuming individuals have subutil-
ity over clothing given by Muellbauer’s Price Independent Generalized Logarithmic
(PIGLOG) functional form.
lnVt(p, y) = ln[ln(
y
Gt(pt, p˜)
)] + pte
−a′ ln p˜ (1.17)
where Gt is some function that is nonzero, differentiable, and homogeneous of degree
one, and some constant vector a with elements ak summing to one. Each member of
the same type is assumed to have the same utility function. This assumption could be
dropped with a data set that has goods that are assignable at a more detailed level.
The household weights individual utilities using the following Bergson-Samuelson
social welfare function:
U˜s(Uf , Um, UaUb, p/y) =
∑
t{m,f,a,b}
ωt(p)[Ut + ρt(p)] (1.18)
where ωt(p) are the Pareto weight functions and ρt(p) are the externality functions.
Individuals are allowed to receive utility from another person’s utility, but not from
another person’s consumption of a specific good. This can be considered a form of
restricted altruism.
The household’s problem is to maximize the social welfare function subject to a
budget constraint, and a consumption technology constraint.
max
xm,xf ,xa,xb,zs
ω(p) +
∑
t{m,f,a,b}
ωt(p)Ut
s.t y = z′sp and
zks = A
k
s(x
k
m + x
k
f + sax
k
a + sbx
k
b ) for each good k
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where the household type is given by s, or the number of foster and non-foster chil-
dren present in the household and ω(p) =
∑
t{m,f,a,b} ωt(p)ρt(p). Matrix As is the
consumption technology function. It is a k × k diagonal matrix and determines the
relative publicness or privateness of good k. If good k is private, then the k,k’th ele-
ment is equal to one, and what the household purchases is exactly equal to individual
consumption.
By Pareto efficiency, the household maximisation can be decomposed into two
step process; In the first stage, resource shares are optimally allocated, and in the
second stage, each individual maximizes their individual utility subject to the budget
constraint Akspkxkt = ηtsy. Resource shares can then be defined as ηts = xtAsp/y =∑
k A
k
sp
kxkt /y evaluated at the optimized level of expenditures xt. The optimal utility
level is given by the individual’s indirect utility function V t evaluated at Lindahl
prices, Vt(A′sp, ηts, y).
Using the functional form assumptions regarding individual indirect utility func-
tions, the household problem can again be rewritten:
max
ηms ,η
f
s ,ηas ,η
b
s
ω(p) +
∑
t{m,f,a,b}
ω˜ts(p) ln(
ηtsy
Gt(A′sp)
)
s.t ηms + η
f
s + saη
a
s + sbη
b
s = 1 (1.19)
where ω˜(p) = ωt exp(Atpte−a
′(ln p˜+ln A˜s))
The first order conditions from this maximisation problem are as follows:
ω˜ms (p)
ηms
=
ω˜fs (p)
ηfs
=
ω˜as (p)
saηas
=
ω˜bs(p)
sbηbs
, and
∑
t{m,f,a,b}
stη
t
s = 1 (1.20)
Solving for person specific resource shares gives the following equations:
ηts(p) =
ω˜ts(p)
ω˜ms + ω˜
f
s + ω˜as + ω˜
b
s
for t  {m, f} (1.21)
ηts(p) =
ω˜ts(p)/st
ω˜ms + ω˜
f
s + ω˜as + ω˜
b
s
for t  {a, b} (1.22)
With each person now allocated their share of household resources, each person can
then maximize there own utility, subject to their own personal budget constraint.
In particular, individuals choose xt to maximize Ut(xt) subject to ηtsy =
∑
k A
k
spkx
k
t .
Individual demand functions can be derived using Roy’s Identify on the indirect
utility functions given in Equation (1.33), where individual income is used ηtsy and
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individuals face the Lindahl price vector Asp.
hkt (η
t
sy, Asp) =
ηtsy
Gt
∂Gt
∂Aspk
− ∂(Ap
ke−a
′ ln p˜)
∂Apk
[ln ηtsy − lnGt]ηtsy (1.23)
for any good k for person of type t. This can be written more concisely:
hkt (η
t
sy, A
′
sp) = δ˜
k
t (A
′
sp)η
t
sy − ψkt (A′sp)ηtsy ln(ηtsy) (1.24)
Using the individual demand functions, household demand for good k is written in
general terms as follows accounting for the consumption technology function:
zks = As
∑
t{m,f,a,b}
hkt (A
′
sp, η
t
s(p)y) (1.25)
Dividing the individual demand functions by income produces the budget share equa-
tions:
hkt (η
t
sy, A
′
sp)
y
= δ˜kt (A
′
sp)η
t
s − ψkt (A′sp)ηts ln(ηtsy) (1.26)
The analysis in this paper uses Engel curves for private goods, which simplifies the
above equation even further. First, Engel curves demonstrate how budget shares vary
with income holding prices constant. Thus prices can be dropped from the above
equation. Secondly, the consumption technology drops out for private goods, as the
element in the A matrix takes a value of 1 for private goods. The Engel curves are
then written as follows:
W ts(y) =
hts(y)
y
= ηtsδ
t
s + η
t
sβ
t
s(ln y + ln η
t
s) (1.27)
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1.B.1 Additional Tables
Table 1.10: Household Structure
# Foster
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 480 234 107 55 23
1 2,159 283 79 22 18 0
# Non-Foster 2 2,323 242 57 23 0 0
3 2,167 170 41 0 0 0
4 1,473 99 0 0 0 0
5 708 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey
and Integrated Household Panel Survey. Households
with 1-4 men and women, and 1-5 children.
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Figure 1.6: Predicted Men’s and Women’s Resource Shares: Reference Household
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(B) HHs with 3 Children
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(C) HHs with 4 Children
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(D) HHs with 5 Children
Men Women
Note: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey and Integrated Household Panel Survey. Robust standard errors.
The brackets are the 95 percent confidence intervals. Each quadrant presents men’s and women’s resource shares for
a different household size defined by the number of children. Within each quadrant, men’s and women’s resource
shares are presented by household type which is defined by the number of foster and non-foster children,
respectively. A reference household is a household with 1 man, 1 woman, and all other covariates at their median
value, excluding foster and non-foster child age, which are both set to 7.
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Table 1.11: Determinants of Resource Shares: Household Type Indicators
non-Foster Children Foster Children
(1) (2)
NLSUR NLSUR
1 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.224***
(0.0469)
2 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.296***
(0.0522)
3 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.336***
(0.0567)
4 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.379***
(0.0622)
5 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.424***
(0.0685)
0 non-Foster 1 Foster 0.178***
(0.0489)
1 non-Foster 1 Foster 0.147*** 0.117***
(0.0366) (0.0349)
2 non-Foster 1 Foster 0.194*** 0.121***
(0.0425) (0.0343)
3 non-Foster 1 Foster 0.221*** 0.109***
(0.0469) (0.0365)
4 non-Foster 1 Foster 0.248*** 0.127***
(0.0519) (0.0410)
0 non-Foster 2 Foster 0.242***
(0.0584)
1 non-Foster 2 Foster 0.167*** 0.159***
(0.0417) (0.0429)
2 non-Foster 2 Foster 0.220*** 0.164***
(0.0489) (0.0430)
3 non-Foster 2 Foster 0.250*** 0.121***
(0.0539) (0.0418)
0 non-Foster 3 Foster 0.270***
(0.0697)
1 non-Foster 3 Foster 0.162*** 0.177***
(0.0447) (0.0516)
2 non-Foster 3 Foster 0.214*** 0.183***
(0.0538) (0.0520)
0 non-Foster 4 Foster 0.356***
(0.0897)
1 non-Foster 4 Foster 0.241*** 0.233***
(0.0600) (0.0667)
0 non-Foster 5 Foster 0.373***
(0.106)
No. Men 0.00475 -0.00369
(0.00926) (0.00935)
No. Women -0.0183 0.00255
(0.0112) (0.0118)
N 10,763
Log Likelihood 92294.57811
Notes: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey and Integrated Household
Panel Survey. The sample includes all households with 1-4 men and women, and
1-5 children. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Age variables are divided by
100 to ease computation. The education and age variables are demeaned. Coef-
ficients on the covariates (age, education, etc.) are omitted for conciseness. The
parameter estimates are not per child, but rather the total resources allocated to
foster or non-foster children. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.12: Determinants of Resource Shares: Orphan Interactions and Nuclear Households
Non-Foster Children Foster Children
Main Orphan Nuclear Main Orphan Nuclear
Results Interactions Households Results Interactions Households
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
Household Type
Indicators
3 Non-Foster 0 Foster 0.336*** 0.332*** 0.255***
(0.0567) (0.0609) (0.0522)
2 Non-Foster 1 Foster 0.194*** 0.199*** 0.158*** 0.121*** 0.130*** 0.0690*
(0.0425) (0.0454) (0.0403) (0.0343) (0.0399) (0.0404)
1 Non-Foster 2 Foster 0.167*** 0.176*** 0.0923*** 0.159*** 0.186*** 0.157***
(0.0417) (0.0454) (0.0350) (0.0429) (0.0502) (0.0588)
0 Non-Foster 3 Foster 0.270*** 0.306*** 0.281***
(0.0697) (0.0825) (0.106)
Covariates
Average Age non-Foster 0.625 0.517 2.230*** -0.0422 0.0727 1.462
(0.774) (0.771) (0.760) (0.893) (0.936) (1.104)
Average Age non-Foster2 0.00965 0.0251 -0.135** 0.0266 0.0131 -0.0624
(0.0568) (0.0541) (0.0527) (0.0652) (0.0674) (0.0822)
Average Age Foster -1.333 -1.522 -1.501 2.618** 2.858 1.478
(1.686) (1.855) (2.142) (1.225) (1.769) (1.852)
Average Age Foster2 0.0864 0.0989 0.0765 -0.125* -0.143 -0.0619
(0.0947) (0.103) (0.117) (0.0759) (0.102) (0.105)
Proportion Non-Foster Female -0.0292 -0.0294 0.0254 0.0167 0.0244 -0.0224
(0.0192) (0.0183) (0.0180) (0.0186) (0.0208) (0.0250)
Proportion Foster Female -0.0105 0.00522 0.00863 0.0270 -0.0178 0.0156
(0.0260) (0.0342) (0.0300) (0.0280) (0.0411) (0.0331)
Rural -0.00775 -0.0123 -0.0388* -0.00306 -0.0123 0.00627
(0.0172) (0.0181) (0.0229) (0.0149) (0.0181) (0.0187)
Matrilineal Village 0.0151 0.0134 0.0119 0.0323* 0.0306* 0.0235
(0.0163) (0.0158) (0.0171) (0.0174) (0.0180) (0.0200)
Proportion of 0.0430 0.0401 0.0276 -0.0427** -0.0567 -0.0601*
Fostered Orphaned (0.0278) (0.0600) (0.0349) (0.0206) (0.0441) (0.0341)
Proportion of Fostered Orphaned × 0.000358 0.0462
Proportion Female Foster (0.0621) (0.0484)
Proportion of Fostered Orphaned × -0.0178 0.00520
Rural (0.0459) (0.0349)
N 10,763 10,763 5,850 10,763 10,763 5,850
Log Likelihood 92,338 92,378 49,077 92,338 92,378 49,077
Notes: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey and Integrated Household Panel Survey. The sample includes all households
with 1-4 men and women, and 1-5 children. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Age variables are divided by 100 to ease
computation. Estimates for certain household types and preferences factors are omitted for conciseness. The parameters
on the household type indicators are not per child, but the total allocation to all foster or non-foster children within the
household. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.13: Determinants of Resource Shares: Age-Restricted Sample
Non-Foster Children Foster Children
Estimation Age-Restricted Estimation Age-Restricted
Sample Sample Sample Sample
(1a) (2a) (1b) (2b)
Household Type
Indicators
3 Non-Foster 0 Foster 0.336*** 0.350***
(0.0567) (0.0802)
2 Non-Foster 1 Foster 0.194*** 0.202*** 0.121*** 0.110**
(0.0425) (0.0583) (0.0343) (0.0522)
1 Non-Foster 2 Foster 0.167*** 0.174*** 0.159*** 0.174***
(0.0417) (0.0587) (0.0429) (0.0667)
0 Non-Foster 3 Foster 0.270*** 0.301***
(0.0697) (0.111)
Covariates
Average Age non-Foster 0.625 -0.0347 -0.0422 0.570
(0.774) (0.866) (0.893) (1.016)
Average Age non-Foster2 0.00965 0.0410 0.0266 -0.0191
(0.0568) (0.0615) (0.0652) (0.0841)
Average Age Foster -1.333 -2.373 2.618** 3.886
(1.686) (2.901) (1.225) (3.185)
Average Age Foster2 0.0864 0.157 -0.125* -0.204
(0.0947) (0.154) (0.0759) (0.193)
Matrilineal Village 0.0151 0.0103 0.0323* 0.0284
(0.0163) (0.0179) (0.0174) (0.0226)
Proportion of 0.0430 0.0274 -0.0427** -0.0484
Fostered Orphaned (0.0278) (0.0299) (0.0206) (0.0372)
N 10,763 10,368 10,763 10,368
LL 92,338 88,701 92,338 88,701
Notes: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey and Integrated Household Panel Sur-
vey. The sample includes all households with 1-4 men and women, and 1-5 children. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. Age variables are divided by 100 to ease computation.
Estimates for certain household types and preferences factors are omitted for conciseness.
The parameters on the household type indicators are not per child, but the total alloca-
tion to all foster or non-foster children within the household. The Age-Restricted Sample
drops households with both foster and non-foster children in any of the following age
groups: 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, and 12-14. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.14: Determinants of Resource Shares: Estimation with SAT Restriction
non-Foster Children Foster Children
(1) (2)
NLSUR NLSUR
1 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.188***
(0.0465)
2 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.260***
(0.0532)
3 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.299***
(0.0581)
4 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.335***
(0.0638)
5 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.376***
(0.0705)
0 non-Foster 1 Foster 0.122**
(0.0537)
1 non-Foster 1 Foster 0.142** 0.0722
(0.0571) (0.0559)
2 non-Foster 1 Foster 0.134** 0.160
(0.0564) (0.100)
3 non-Foster 1 Foster 0.138* 0.193**
(0.0714) (0.0802)
0 non-Foster 2 Foster 0.205***
(0.0715)
1 non-Foster 2 Foster 0.139 0.161***
(0.0931) (0.0588)
0 non-Foster 3 Foster 0.255***
(0.0893)
No. Men 0.000230 0.00480
(0.00861) (0.00940)
No. Women -0.00609 0.00820
(0.0128) (0.0148)
N 10,443
No. Parameters 211
Log Likelihood 92294.57811
Notes: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey and Integrated Household
Panel Survey. The sample includes all households with 1-4 men and women, and
1-5 children. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Age variables are divided by
100 to ease computation. Coefficients on the covariates (age, education, etc.) are
omitted for conciseness. Several household types are dropped from the sample due
to too few observations. The parameter estimates are not per child, but rather
the total resources allocated to foster or non-foster children. Restrictions 1 and 2
are NOT imposed in the estimation. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.15: Probability of Staying in Same HH by Foster and Orphan Status (Double vs. Single)
Foster Child Sample Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Double-Orphaned Foster 0.0307* 0.0309*** 0.0573*** 0.0622***
(0.0167) (0.009) (0.006) (0.016)
Single-Orphaned Foster 0.0118 0.0201 0.0254 0.0355**
(0.025) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Non-Orphaned Non-Foster 0.0708*** 0.0713***
(0.014) (0.017)
Orphaned Non-Foster 0.0237 0.0285
(0.016) (0.283)
Mean Dependent Variable 0.871 0.871 0.915 0.915
Sample Size 746 746 6,076 6,076
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes
Notes: The sample includes all children age 0-11 in 2010. The dependent variable
is an indicator for whether or not the child in the 2010 sample was still in the
same household in 2013. The omitted category are non-orphaned foster children.
Standard errors are clustered at the region level. Individual controls include age
age2, and gender. Household controls include the number of male and female
siblings age 0-6 and 7-14, the number of adult men and women, log household
expenditure, and whether or not the household is in a rural area. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.16: Sample Means by Household Composition
One-Child-Type Composite
Only Non-Foster Only Foster
(1) (2) (3)
Men 1.353 1.527 1.621
Women 1.303 1.474 1.578
Non-Foster 2.575 2.007
Foster 1.784 1.310
Log Expenditure per Person 11.490 11.607 11.572
North 0.194 0.192 0.255
Central 0.375 0.326 0.362
Year=2010 0.753 0.720 0.691
Average Age Non-Foster 5.721 6.506
Average Age Foster 9.228 9.282
Proportion Female Non-Foster 0.504 0.487
Proportion Female Foster 0.552 0.555
Proportion Orphaned Foster 0.339 0.409
Average Age Women 28.789 47.126 31.327
Average Age Men 31.744 40.582 32.070
Average Education Women 5.216 3.749 6.094
Average Education Men 6.642 5.939 7.491
Rural 0.813 0.806 0.730
Proportion Female Adults Age 15-18 0.071 0.102 0.107
Proportion Male Adults Age 15-18 0.098 0.209 0.163
Matrilineal Village 0.608 0.640 0.574
Sample Size 8,830 899 1,034
Notes: Out of all households with 1-4 men and women, and 1-5 children. Malawi Third Inte-
grated Household Survey and Integrated Household Panel Survey. One-child-type households
contain either only non-foster children or only foster children. Composite households contain
both foster and non-foster children.
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Table 1.17: Sample Means by Household Composition
Matched Sample Matched Sample
Non-Foster Only Composite Foster Only Composite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men 1.625 1.621 1.648 1.634
Women 1.572 1.578 1.661 1.691
Non-Foster 1.979 2.007 1.763
Foster 1.310 1.528 1.544
Log Expenditure per Person 11.590 11.572 11.631 11.706
North 0.248 0.255 0.219 0.252
Central 0.349 0.362 0.323 0.325
Year=2010 0.693 0.691 0.706 0.685
Average Age Non-Foster 6.518 6.506 7.919
Average Age Foster 9.282 8.929 8.920
Proportion Female Non-Foster 0.495 0.487 0.483
Proportion Female Foster 0.555 0.532 0.546
Proportion Orphaned Foster 0.409 0.334 0.324
Average Age Women 31.031 31.327 37.741 37.756
Average Age Men 31.963 32.070 35.822 35.786
Average Education Women 6.181 6.094 5.131 5.246
Average Education Men 7.614 7.491 6.933 6.915
Rural 0.727 0.730 0.744 0.726
Proportion Female Adults Age 15-18 0.116 0.107 0.138 0.143
Proportion Male Adults Age 15-18 0.157 0.163 0.198 0.195
Matrilineal Village 0.571 0.574 0.607 0.595
Sample Size 1,034 1,034 489 489
Notes: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey and Integrated Household Panel Survey. One-
child-type households contain either only non-foster children or only foster children. Composite
households contain both foster and non-foster children. Matched samples are selected using propen-
sity score matching. In total, there are 1,034 composite households that are matched with a corre-
sponding one-child-type non-foster household. There are 899 households with only foster children,
and out of those households I select 489 to match with the most similar composite households.
None of the variables are statistically different at the 5% level across one-child-type and composite
households.
Table 1.18: Distribution of Foster Caretakers by Household Composition
All Foster Households With Both Foster Households With
Households and Non-Foster Children Only Foster Children
(1) (2) (3)
Foster Caretaker
Grandparent(s) and Uncle/Aunt 34.27 37.71 31.12
Uncle/Aunt Only 14.16 21.38 7.55
Grandparent(s) Only 25.26 5.72 43.14
Adopted 14.00 16.50 11.71
Other∗ 12.31 18.69 6.47
Observations 1,243 594 649
Notes: Malawi Integrated Household Panel Survey 2013. The sample includes all foster children. ∗Other
includes children living with an older sibling, other relatives, or other non-relatives.
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Table 1.19: Predicted Resource Shares: Households with Only Non-Foster Children
Household Type Full Sample Restricted Sample
(1) (2)
1 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.194*** 0.204***
(0.0403) (0.0892)
2 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.133*** 0.132***
(0.0224) (0.0510)
3 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.102*** 0.104***
(0.0163) (0.0383)
4 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.087*** 0.0933***
(0.0136) (0.0327)
5 non-Foster 0 Foster 0.079*** 0.0902***
(0.0121) (0.0311)
Sample Size 10,763 1,034
Log Likelihood 92,338 8,933
Notes: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey and Integrated
Household Panel Survey. The full sample includes all households with
1-4 men and women, and 1-5 children. The restricted sample is se-
lected using nearest neighbor propensity score matching. In total,
there are 1,034 composite households which are matched with one-
child-type non-foster households. These matched households comprise
the restricted sample Robust standard errors in parentheses. The pre-
dicted resource shares are per-child. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.20: Descriptive Statistics: Education and Child Labour
Mean SD Min Max Sample Size
Foster Status
Both Parents Present 0.622 0.485 0 1 20371
Father Present Mother Absent and Alive 0.013 0.115 0 1 20371
Father Present Maternal Orphan 0.009 0.092 0 1 20371
Mother Present Father Absent and Alive 0.116 0.320 0 1 20371
Mother Present Paternal Orphan 0.058 0.234 0 1 20371
Both Absent and Alive 0.107 0.309 0 1 20371
Double Orphan 0.027 0.163 0 1 20371
Both Absent Paternal Orphan 0.026 0.158 0 1 20371
Both Absent Maternal Orphan 0.022 0.146 0 1 20371
Individual and Household Characteristics
Enrolled in School 0.880 0.325 0 1 20371
Hours Worked in Chores Past Week 1.825 5.674 0 96 20371
Hours Worked (Excluding Chores) Past Week 2.166 4.021 0 49 20371
Expenditure per Capita (1000s MWK) 115.992 136.494 6.896 2,976.659 20371
Remmitances Per Capita (1000s MWK) 1.943 15.409 0 1,751.6 20371
North 0.207 0.405 0 1 20371
Central 0.362 0.481 0 1 20371
South 0.432 0.495 0 1 20371
Year = 2010 0.739 0.439 0 1 20371
Male Sibling Age 0-6 0.613 0.762 0 5 20371
Female Siblings Age 0-6 0.621 0.759 0 4 20371
Male Siblings Age 7-14 0.656 0.784 0 6 20371
Female Siblings Age 7-14 0.662 0.788 0 6 20371
Men in HH 1.370 0.958 0 9 20371
Women in HH 1.485 0.810 0 7 20371
Age 9.694 2.596 6 14 20371
Female 0.508 0.500 0 1 20371
Rural 0.825 0.380 0 1 20371
Age Household Head 44.032 12.999 16 104 20371
Female Household Head 0.174 0.379 0 1 20371
Education of Household Head 5.530 4.123 0 14 20371
Notes: Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey and Integrated Household Panel Survey.
All children age 6-14.
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1.C Identification Theorems
What follows are extended versions of the identification theorems in DLP. Theorem 1
demonstrates how resource shares can be identified using the SAT restriction, while
Theorem 2 does the same using the SAP restriction. Parts of both theorems and their
respective proofs are similar to what is found in DLP, and I will therefore point out
the parts where I differ.
Let hkt (p, y) be the Marshallian demand function for good k and let the utility
function of person t be defined as Ut(xt). Individual t chooses xt to maximize Ut(xt)
under the budget constraint p′xt = y with xt = ht(p, y) for all goods k. Define the
indirect utility function Vt(p, y) = Ut(ht(p, y)) where ht(p, y) is the vector of demand
functions for all goods k.
The household solves the following maximisation problem where each individual
person type has their own utility function:53
max
xm,xf ,xa,xb
U˜sab [Um(xm), Uf (xf ), Ua(xa), Ub(xb), p/y] such that
zsab = Asab [xm + xf + saxa + sbxb] and (1.28)
y = z′p
The household demand functions are given by Hksab(p, y). Let A
k
sab
be the row vector
given by the k’th row of the linear technology function Asab . Each individual faces the
shadow budget constraint defined by the Lindahl price vector A′sabp and individual
income ηtsaby. Then household demand can be written as follows:
zksab = H
k
sab
(p, y) = Aksab
[ ∑
t{m,f,a,b}
stht(A
′
sab
p, ηtsaby)
]
(1.29)
where ηtsab are the resource shares of person t in a household with sa foster children
and sb non-foster children. Resource shares by construction must sum to one.
ηmsab + η
f
sab
+ saη
a
sab
+ sbη
b
sab
= 1 (1.30)
ASSUMPTION A1: Equations (1.28), (1.29), and (1.30) hold with resource shares
ηtsab that do not depend on y.
Resource shares being independent of household expenditure is the key identify-
53For simplicity, I have assumed there are one man and one woman in each household.
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ing assumption. Resource shares can still depend on other variables correlated with
household expenditure such as the individual wages for men and women.
DEFINITION: A good k is a private good if, for any household size sab, the matrix
Asab , has a one in position k, k and has all other elements in row k and column k
equal to zero.
DEFINITION: A good k is an assignable good if it only appears in one of the
utility functions Um, Uf , Ua, and Ub.
Men’s and women’s clothing expenditures are examples of private assignable goods.
These goods are central to identification in DLP and they are here as well. What
makes private assignable goods unique and especially useful for identification is that
by definition, the quantities that the household purchases are equivalent to what in-
dividuals in the household consume. In other words, there are no economies of scale
or sharing for these goods making household-level consumption in some sense equiv-
alent to individual-level consumption. However, because I lack a private assignable
good for foster and non-foster children, I must make use of partially assignable goods.
DEFINITION: A good k is a partially assignable good if it only appears in two of
the utility functions Um, Uf , Ua, and Ub.
An example of a partially assignable good is children’s clothing expenditures,
which are partially assignable to foster and non-foster children. Specifically, children’s
clothing only appears in the utility functions for foster and non-foster children, Ua and
Ub. In other contexts, children’s clothing expenditures can be classified as partially
assignable to boys and girls, or potentially to young and old children. Other examples
of partially assignable goods commonly found in household survey data include alcohol
and tobacco, which are assignable to adults, but only partially assignable to adult
men and women.
The distinction between assignable and partially assignable goods is in some ways
determined by the question the researcher is interested in answering. For example,
DLP are interested in estimating intrahousehold inequality between men, women, and
children within the household, and are therefore less interested in understanding in-
equality among children within the household, as I am in this context. They assume
all children have the same utility function, Uc, or that Ua = Ub.54 As a result, chil-
54All utility functions are allowed to vary by observable household characteristics, such as age,
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dren’s clothing expenditures are assignable, as they only appear in Uc. In my context,
where I allow foster and non-foster children to have different utility functions and
ultimately different resource shares, children’s clothing expenditures now appear in
both Ua and Ub and are therefore no longer assignable.
ASSUMPTION A2: Assume that the demand functions include a private assignable
good for men and women, denoted as goods m and f . Assume that the demand func-
tions include a private partially assignable good for foster and non-foster children,
denoted as good c.
The household demand functions for the private assignable goods for men and
women can be written as follows:
zksab = H
k
sab
= hk(A′sabp, η
k
sab
(p)y) for k  {m, f} (1.31)
For the foster and non-foster children, household demand functions for the private
partially assignable good can be written as follows:
zcsab = H
c
sab
= sah
a(A′sabp, η
a
sab
(p)y) + sbh
b(A′sabp, η
b
sab
(p)y) (1.32)
In practice, I take the household demand functions for foster child clothing, and non-
foster child clothing, and sum them together. Taking this action is possible since the
goods are private. In the empirical application, this means that I assume clothing is
not shared across child types.
Define pm and pf to be the prices of the private assignable goods and define pc
to be the price of the private partially assignable good. Define p¯ to be the vector of
prices for all private goods excluding pm, pf , and pc. Assume p¯ is nonempty.
ASSUMPTION A3: Each person t  {m, f, a, b} has the following indirect utility
function:55
Vt(p, y) = ψt
[
ut
( y
Gt(p˜)
,
p¯
pt
)
, p˜
]
(1.33)
where Gt is some function that is nonzero, differentiable, and homogeneous of degree
education, and gender.
55As discussed in DLP, the indirect utility function only has to take this form for low levels of
expenditure. For simplicity, I assume the indirect utility function is the same across all expenditure
levels.
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one, ψt and ut are strictly positive, differentiable, and strictly monotonically increasing
in their first arguments, and differentiable and homogenous of degree zero in their
remaining elements.56
By Roy’s identity, the demand functions for the private assignable goods k 
{m, f, a, b} can be written as follows:
hk(y, p) =
∂uk
(
y
Gk(p˜)
, p¯
pk
)′
∂(p¯/pk)
p¯
p2k
Gk(p˜)
u
′
k
(
y
Gk(p˜)
, p¯
pk
) = f˜k( y
Gk(p˜)
, pk, p¯
)
y
Since pk and p¯ do not change when replaced by A′sabp, substituting the above
equation into Equation (1.31) gives the household demand functions for the assignable
goods:
Hksab(y, p) = f˜k
( ηksab(p)y
Gk(A˜′sab p˜)
, pk, p¯
)
ηksab(p)y
The Engel curve by definition holds price constant, and can then be written as:
Hksab(y) = f˜k
(ηksaby
Gksab
)
ηksaby (1.34)
However, because there are no private assignable goods for foster and non-foster
children, I write the Engel curve for the private partially assignable good for children
in place of Hasab and H
b
sab
as follows:
Hcsab(y) = f˜a
(ηasaby
Gasab
)
saη
a
sab
y + f˜b
(ηbsaby
Gbsab
)
sbη
b
sab
y (1.35)
Define the matrix Ω′ by
Ω
′
=

ηm10
ηm20
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
η
f
10
η
f
20
−1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
ηm01
ηm02
−1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
η
f
01
η
f
02
−1
0 −1 0 0 0 η
m
10
ηm01
0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 η
f
10
η
f
01
ηm10
ηm20
− η
a
10
ηa20
0
η
f
10
η
f
20
− η
a
10
ηa20
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
ηm01
ηm02
− η
b
01
ηb02
0
η
f
01
η
f
02
− η
b
01
ηb02
0

ASSUMPTION A4: The matrix Ω′ is finite and nonsingular. fk(0) 6= 0 for k 
56Asssumption A3 is a modified version of Assumption B3 in DLP.
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{m, f, a, b}.
Finiteness of Ω′ requires that resource shares are never zero. The matrix is non-
singular provided resource shares are not equal across household sizes. An example of
a potential violation would be if parents in households with one fostered child have
the exact same resource shares as parents in households with two fostered children,
which is unlikely.
The condition that fk(0) 6= 0 requires that the Engel curves for the private
assignable and partially assignable goods are continuous and bounded away from zero.
DEFINITION: A composite household is a household that contains at least one
foster and one non-foster child, or more concisely (sa > 0 and sb > 0).
DEFINITION: A one-child-type household is a household that has children, but
is not a composite household, or more concisely (sa > 0 and sb = 0) or (sa = 0 and
sb > 0) .
ASSUMPTION A5: Assume households with either only foster children, or only
non-foster children are observed. With four different person types, there must be at
least four different one-child-type households in the data.
For Assumption A5 to hold in this context, it is necessary to observe both one-
child-type households with one or two foster children (s10 and s20), and also one-child-
type households with one or two non-foster children (s01 and s02). This requirement
is easily met but may be more difficult in other contexts. For example, if one was
interested in analyzing intrahousehold inequality between widows and non-widow
adult women, it is rare to have multiple widows in the same household. In this case,
identification could be achieved by observing a one-child-type household with only
a widow present, and three different household types with only non-widowed adult
women present.
Using one-child-type and composite households in some sense mirrors the central
identification assumption of Browning et al. (2013). They use households with single
men or single women (“one-person-type households") to identify preferences in house-
holds with married couples (“composite households"). Similarly, I use the one-child-
type households to impose structure on the composite households. I would however
argue that my use of one-child-type households is much weaker than their use of sin-
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gle person households as married men and women likely have different preferences
than single men and women, while it is not obvious why foster and non-foster child
preferences should differ significantly across one-child-type and composite households.
ASSUMPTION A6: Preferences for clothing for foster and non-foster children are
not identical. That is, fa(0) 6= f b(0).
Resource shares will be identified by determining whether preferences for children’s
clothing in the composite households look more like the foster only households, or the
non-foster only households. If those preferences are identical, then this method will
not work.
Theorem 1. Let Assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and A6 hold for all household sizes
sab in some set S, with one-child-type households sab  {s01, s10, s02, s20}, and composite
households sab.57 Assume the household’s Engel curves for the private, assignable good
H tsab(y) for t  {m, f} and sab  S are identified. Assume the household’s Engel curve
for the private, partially assignable good Hcsab for sab  S is identified. Then resource
shares ηtsab for all household members t  {m, f, a, b} in household sizes sab  S are
identified.
The above theorem is a generalization of the DLP identification strategy using
the SAT restriction. I next show how resource shares can be recovered using the SAP
restriction. This theorem is an extension of Theorem 1 in DLP.
Define pm and pf to be the prices of the private assignable goods. Define pc to
be the price of the private partially assignable goods. The price of all other goods is
given by p˜. As in DLP, define the square matrix A˜sab such that the set of prices given
by A′sab includes the private and partially assignable good prices, pm, pf , and pc, as
well as all other prices, given by A′sab .
ASSUMPTION B3: Assume each person t  {m, f, a, b} faces the budget con-
straint defined by (y, p) and has preferences over the private assignable and partially
assignable goods, k  {m, f, c} given by the following indirect utility function:
Vt(p, y) = ψt
[
ν(
y
Gt(p)
) + F t(p), p˜
]
(1.36)
57Resource shares are identified for any composite household provided there is a sufficient number
of one-child-type households. In the empirical application, there are ten such households.
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for some some functions ψt, F , and Gt where Gt is nonzero, differentiable, and ho-
mogenous of degree one, ν is differentiable and strictly monotonically increasing, F t(p)
is differentiable, homogenous of degree zero, and is such that ∂F t(p)/∂pt = φ(p) 6= 0.
Lastly, ψt is differentiable and strictly monotonically increasing in its arguments, and
differentiable and homogenous of degree zero in the remaining arguments.
ASSUMPTION B4: For foster and non-foster children, the person-specific expen-
diture deflators are equal. That is, Ga = Gb = Gc, where Gc denotes the expenditure
deflator for children.
By Roy’s identity the demand functions for private assignable goods are as follows:
hk(y, p) =
v
′
( y
Gk(p)
) y
Gk2 (p)
∂Gk(p)
∂pk
+ ∂F
k(p)
∂pk
v′( y
Gk(p)
) 1
Gk(p)
=
y
Gk(p)
∂Gk(p)
∂pk
+
φ(p)
v′( y
Gk(p)
)
y
y/Gk(p)
= δk(p)y + g
( y
Gk(p)
, p
)
y
Adding the demand functions for foster and non-foster child assignable goods
results in the following equation:
ha(y, p) + hb(y, p) =
(
δa(p) + δb(p)
)
y + g
( y
Gc(p)
, p
)
y
For the private assignable goods for adults, I derive the following household-level
demand function.
Hk(y, p) = δk(A′sabp)η
k
sab
(p)y + g
( ηksab(p)y
Gk(A′sabp)
, p
)
ηksab(p)y
Let ηc = saηasab + sbη
b
sab
. Then the household-level demand functions for children’s
clothing is given by:
Hc(y, p) =
(
δa(A′sabp) + δ
b(A′sabp)
)
ηcsab(p)y + g
(ηcsab(p)y/(sa + sb)
Gc(A′sabp)
)
ηcsab(p)y
The Engel curves for adults (k  {m, f}) and children are then as follows:
Hksab(y) = δ
k
sab
ηksaby + gsab
(ηksaby
Gksab
)
ηksaby (1.37)
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and
Hcsab(y) =
(
δasab + δ
b
sab
)
ηcsaby + g
(ηcsaby/(sa + sb)
Gcsab
)
ηcsaby (1.38)
ASSUMPTION B5:58 The function gsab is twice differentiable. Let g
′
sab
(y) and
g
′′
sab
(y) be the first and second derivatives of gsab . Assume either that λsab = limy→0[yζg
′′
sab
(y)/g
′
sab
]
1
1−ζ
is finite and nonzero for some constant ζ 6= 1 or that gsab is a polynomial in ln y.
Assumption B5 requires that there be some nonlinearity in the demand function
so that g′′ is not zero.
ASSUMPTION B6: The ratio of foster and non-foster child resource shares in
households with sa and sa′ , and sb and sb′ foster and non-foster children is constant
across household sizes.
ηasa0
ηasa+1,0
=
ηasab
ηasa+1,b
and
ηbs0b
ηbs0,b+1
=
ηbsab
ηbsa,b+1
(1.39)
for sa and sb  {1, 2}.
This assumption restricts the way in which resource shares vary across household
types. In effect, it imposes that resource shares for foster and non-foster children in
one-child-type and composite households behave in a similar fashion. Stated differ-
ently, this is an independence assumption: the ratio of foster child resource shares
in a households with sa and sa+1 foster children is independent of the number of
non-foster children present in those households, and vice versa.
Other studies using the DLP identification strategy have imposed similar restric-
tions to improve precision in the estimation, but not for identification reasons. For
example, Calvi (2016) parametrizes resource shares in such a way that per person re-
source shares decrease linearly in the number of household members. In the notation
of this study, that would mean assuming ηasa,0−ηasa+1,0 = ηasab−ηasa+1,b . On the contrary,
I impose that the percent decline is constant, as opposed to the absolute decline. In
several specifications, DLP make a similar restriction that per child resource shares
decrease linearly in the number of children.
ASSUMPTION B7: The degree of unequal treatment within a household with one
of each child type is proportional to the degree of unequal treatment across households
58This is Assumption A4 from DLP.
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with one foster child or one non-foster child.
ηas10
ηbs01
=
ηas11
ηbs11
(1.40)
Similar to Assumption B6, this restriction assumes households with only foster on
non-foster children are similar to households with both types of children. To better
understand this restriction, consider the following example given below:
Household sa sb ηasab η
b
sab
Assumption B6
A 1 0 24 0
B 0 1 0 21
C 1 1 16 14 24
21
=
ηa10
ηb01
=
ηa11
ηb11
= 16
14
Here, Household’s A and B are one-child-type, whereas Household C is a composite
household. Assumption B6 requires that foster and non-foster child resource shares
in Household C, ηa11and ηb11, are proportional to foster and non-foster child resource
shares in Household’s A and B. In particular, if ηa10 = 24, and ηb01 = 21, then
ηa11
ηb11
= 24
21
.
Importantly, this restriction directly applies to only a single composite household type.
Define the matrix Ω′′ by
Ω
′′′′
=

ηm11
ηa11
+
η
f
11
ηa11
+ 1
ηm11
ηb11
+
η
f
11
ηb11
+ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2(
ηm21
ηa21
+
η
f
21
ηa21
+ 1)
ηm21
ηb21
+
η
f
21
ηb21
+ 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
ηm12
ηa12
+
η
f
12
ηa12
+ 1 2(
ηm12
ηb12
+
η
f
12
ηb12
+ 1) 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
ηm22
ηa22
+
η
f
22
ηa22
+ 1
ηm22
ηb22
+
η
f
22
ηb22
+ 1
−1 0 η
a
10
ηa20
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 η
a
10
ηa20
0
0 −1 0 0 0 η
b
01
ηb02
0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 η
b
01
ηb02
1
ηa10
−1
ηb01
0 0 0 0 0 0

ASSUMPTION B8: The matrix Ω′′ is finite and nonsinuglar.
This is true as long as resource shares are nonzero.
Theorem 2. Let Assumptions A1, A2, A5, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, and B8 hold for
all household sizes sab in some set S, with sab  {s01, s10, s02, s20, s11, s12, s21, s22}.
Assume the household’s Engel curves for the private, assignable good Hksab(y) for k 
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{m, f} for sab  S are identified. Assume the household’s Engel curve for the private,
partially assignable good Hcsab for sab  S is identified. Then resource shares η
t
sab
for
all household members t  {m, f, a, b} in household sizes sab  S are identified.
1.D Identification Proofs
1.D.1 Proof of Theorem 1
This proof follows the proof of Theorem 2 in DLP, and extends it to identify resource
shares in the absence of assignable goods for each person type. The proof proceeds
in two steps. In the first step, I demonstrate resource shares are identified in the one-
child-type households; this follows directly from DLP. In the second step, I extend
DLP to demonstrate how resource shares can be identified in the absence of private
assignable goods.
By Assumption A3, the Engel curve functions for the assignable and partially
assignable goods are given by Equations (1.34) and (1.35). Let sab  {s10, s20, s01, s02}
be the different one-child-type households. Then since the functions Hk and Hc are
identified, ζk20, ζk02, and ζk01 defined as ζk20 = limy→0Hk10(y)/Hk20(y), ζk02 = limy→0Hk10(y)/Hk02(y),
and ζk01 = limy→0Hk10(y)/Hk01(y) can all be identified for k  {m, f}. Moreover,
ζa20 = limy→0H
a
10(y)/H
a
20(y) and ζb02 = limy→0Hb01(y)/Hb02(y) can be identified for
foster and non-foster children, respectively.
Then for k  {m, f}:
ζk20 =
fk(0)ηk10
fk(0)ηk20
=
ηk10
ηk20
and ζk02 =
fk(0)ηk01
fk(0)ηk02
=
ηk01
ηk02
and ζk01 =
fk(0)ηk10
fk(0)ηk01
=
ηk10
ηk01
The same ratio for foster and non-foster children in households with only one child
type can be identified:
ζa20 =
(fa(0)ηa10 + 0× f b(0)ηb10)
(2fa(0)ηa20 + 0× f b(0)ηb20)
=
ηa10
2ηa20
and ζb02 =
(0× fa(0)ηa01 + f b(0)ηb01)
(0× fa(0)ηa02 + 2f b(0)ηb02)
=
ηb01
2ηb02
Using that resource shares must sum to one, the following equations can be written,
first for households with only non-foster children:
ζms20η
m
s20
+ ζfs20η
f
s20
+ ζas20saη
a
s20
= ηm10 + η
f
10 + η
a
10 = 1
ζms20η
m
s20
+ ζfs20η
f
s20
+ ζas20(1− ηms20 − ηfs20) = 1
(ζms20 − ζas20)ηms20 + (ζfs20 − ζas20)ηfs20 = 1− ζas20
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and then for households with only foster children:
ζms02η
m
s02
+ ζfs02η
f
s02
+ ζbs02sbη
b
s02
= ηm01 + η
f
01 + η
b
01 = 1
ζms02η
m
s02
+ ζfs02η
f
s02
+ ζbs02(1− ηms02 − ηfs02) = 1
(ζms02 − ζbs02)ηms02 + (ζfs02 − ζbs02)ηfs02 = 1− ζbs02
These above equations for t  {m, f}, give the matrix equation

ζm20 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ζ
f
20 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 ζm02 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ζ
f
02 −1
0 −1 0 0 0 ζm01 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 ζf01
ζm20 − ζa20 0 ζf20 − ζa20 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 ζm02 − ζb02 0 ζf02 − ζb02 0

×

ηm20
ηm10
η
f
20
η
f
10
ηm02
ηm01
η
f
02
η
f
01

=

0
0
0
0
0
0
1− ζa20
1− ζb02

The 8 × 8 matrix in this equation equals the previously defined matrix Ω′ which
was assumed to be nonsingular. Therefore the system can be solved for ηmsa0 , η
m
s0b
, ηfsa0 ,
and ηfs0b . Non-foster child resource shares and foster child resource shares can then
be identified for one-child-type only households by ηasa0 = (1 − ηmsa0 − ηfsa0)/sa and
ηbs0b = (1− ηms0b − ηfs0b)/sb.
I now show resource shares are identified in any given composite household. Recall
that the functions Hk are identified for k  {m, f}. It follows that for any household
type sab, ζksab defined as ζ
k
sab
= limy→0Hk10(y)/H
k
sab
(y) can be identified.
Then for k  {m, f}:
ζksab =
fk(0)ηk10
fk(0)ηksab
=
ηk10
ηksab
With ηk10 already identified, resource shares for men and women in the composite
household types can be recovered. This is a simple extension of DLP where there are
more household types than individual types.
I now aim to separately identify non-foster and foster child resource shares in
households with both types of children. Define ζasab as follows: ζ
a
sab
= limy→0Hcsab(y)/H
c
10(y).
Moreover, define ζb01 = limy→0Hc01(y)/Hc10(y). Then we can write:
ζasab =
fa(0)ηasab + f
b(0)ηbsab
fa(0)ηa10
=
ηasab
ηa10
+
f b(0)ηbsab
fa(0)ηa10
(1.41)
Furthermore,
ζb01 =
f b(0)ηb01
fa(0)ηa10
→ f
b(0)
fa(0)
=
ζb01η
a
10
ηb01
= κ
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where ηa10 and ηb01 have already been identified. Thus, the ratio f b(0)/fa(0) = κ is
identified. Substituting κ into equation (1.41) results in the following expression:
ζasab =
ηasab
ηa10
+ κ
ηbsab
ηa10
(1.42)
where only ηasab and η
b
sab
are unknown. Then since resource shares for men and women
have already been identified for households of type sab, and because resource shares
sum to one, we can solve for ηasab and η
b
sab
. This has a unique solution following
Assumption A6.
1.D.2 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof proceeds in two steps. In the first step, I demonstrate resource shares are
identified in the one-child-type households; this follows directly from DLP. In the
second step, I extend DLP to demonstrate how resource shares can be identified in
the absence of private assignable goods.
By Assumption B3, Engel curves for the private assignable goods for men and
women are given by Equation (1.37) and by Assumptions B3 and B4, the Engel
curve for the private partially assignable good is given by Equation (1.38). Define
h˜ksab(y) = ∂[H
k
sab
(y)/y]∂y and λsab = limy→0[yζg
′′
sab
(y)/g
′
sab
]
1
1−ζ , where ζ 6= 1 (the log
polynomial case, where ζ = 1 is considered in the second case).
Case 1: gsab is not a polynomial in logarithms.
Let sc = sa + sb be the total number of children. Then since Hksab(y) are identified
for k  {m, f, c}, we can identify κksab for men and women defined as follows:
κksab =
(
yζ
∂h˜ksab(y)/∂y
h˜ksab(y)
) 1
1−ζ
=
(( ηksab
Gksab
)−ζ(ηksaby
Gksab
)ζ[
g
′′
sab
(ηksaby
Gksab
) ηk3sab
Gk2sab
]
/
[
g
′
sab
(ηksaby
Gksab
) ηk2sab
Gksab
]) 11−ζ
=
ηksab
Gksab
(
yζk,sab
g
′′
sab
(yk,sab)
g′sab(yk,sab)
) 1
1−ζ
and for children:
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κcsab =
(
yζ
∂h˜csab(y)/∂y
h˜csab(y)
) 1
1−ζ
=
(( ηcsab
Gcsabsc
)−ζ( ηcsaby
Gcsabsc
)ζ[
g
′′
sab
( ηcsaby
Gcsabsc
) ηc3sab
Gc2sabs
2
c
]
/
[
g
′
sab
( ηcsaby
Gcsabsc
) ηc2sab
Gcsabsc
]) 11−ζ
=
ηcsab
Gcsabsc
(
yζc,sab
g
′′
sab
(yc,sab)
g′sab(yc,sab)
) 1
1−ζ
Then for k  {m, f}, κksab(0) =
ηksab
Gksab
λsab , and we can identify ρksab(y) defined as:
ρksab(y) =
h˜ksab(y/κ
k
sab
(0))
κksab(0)
= g
′
sab
( y
λsab
)ηksab
λsab
and for k = c, κcsab(0) =
ηcsab
Gcsab
sc
λsab , and we can identify ρcsab(y) defined as:
ρcsab(y) =
h˜csab
(
y/κcsab(0)
)
κcsab(0)
= g
′
sab
( y
λsab
)ηcsab
λsab
and we can write γksab for k  {m, f}:
γksab =
ρ˜ksab
ρ˜csab
=
(
g
′
sab
( y
λsab
)ηksab
λsab
)
/
(
g
′
sab
( y
λsab
)ηcsab
λsab
)
=
ηksab
(saηasab + sbη
b
sab
)
(1.43)
Case 2: Before proceeding with the proof, I examine the case where gsab is a
polynomial in logarithms (the end result will be Equation (1.43) and I will proceed
with both cases simultaneously afterwards). Suppose gsab is a polynomial of degree λ
in logarithms. Then
gsab
(ηksaby
Gk
)
=
λ∑
l=0
(
ln
( ηksab
Gksab
)
+ ln(y)
)l
csab,l
Then for k  {m, f}:
γksab =
(∂λ[Hksab(y)/y]
∂(ln y)λ
)
/
(∂λ[Hcsab(y)/y]
∂(ln y)λ
)
=
csab,λη
k
sab
csab,λ(saη
a
sab
+ sbηbsab)
=
ηksab
(saηasab + sbη
b
sab
)
(1.44)
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which is the same as Equation (1.43). Then since resource shares must sum to one:
γmsab(saη
a
sab
+ sbη
b
sab
) + γfsab(saη
a
sab
+ sbη
b
sab
) + saη
a
sab
+ sbη
b
sab
=
ηmsab + η
f
sab
+ saη
a
sab
+ sbη
b
sab
= 1
saη
a
sab
(γmsab + γ
f
sab
+ 1) + sbη
b
sab
(γmsab + γ
f
sab
+ 1) = 1 (1.45)
For one-child-type households, sa or sb equals zero, and Equation (1.45) simplifies
significantly. For households that only have foster children, Equation (1.45) can be
written as follows:
saη
a
sab
(γmsab + γ
f
sab
+ 1) = 1
which can be solved for ηasab =
1
sa(γmsab
+γfsab+1)
. Similarly, ηbsab =
1
sb(γmsab
+γfsab+1)
.
With resource shares for foster and non-foster children identified, resource shares
for men and women in the one-child-type households can then be solved for since
ηtsab = γ
t
sab
(saη
a
sab
+ sbη
b
sab
) for t  {m, f}.
I next move to the composite households sab  {s11, s21, s12, s22}. Note that now,
for each household type, resource shares for both foster and non-foster children need
to be identified (ηa and ηb). For the one-child-type households, one of those two
parameters was zero. From Equation (1.45) I can write the following four equations:

1 + γm11 + γ
f
11 1 + γ
m
11 + γ
f
11 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2(1 + γm21 + γ
f
21) 1 + γ
m
21 + γ
f
21 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 + γm12 + γ
f
12 2(1 + γ
m
12 + γ
f
12) 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 + γm22 + γ
f
22 1 + γ
m
22 + γ
f
22
×

ηa11
ηb11
ηa21
ηb21
ηa12
ηb12
ηa22
ηb22

=

1
1
1
1
2

Clearly the above system is underidentified as there are eight unknowns and only
four equations. I now impose Assumptions B6 and B7, which add an additional five
equations to the system. Note that the resource shares for the one-child-type house-
holds have already been identified (i.e. ηa10 is known at this point). This results in the
following system of nine equations
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
1 + γm11 + γ
f
11 1 + γ
m
11 + γ
f
11 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2(1 + γm21 + γ
f
21) 1 + γ
m
21 + γ
f
21 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 + γm12 + γ
f
12 2(1 + γ
m
12 + γ
f
12) 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 + γm22 + γ
f
22 1 + γ
m
22 + γ
f
22
−1 0 η
a
10
ηa20
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 η
a
10
ηa20
0
0 −1 0 0 0 η
b
01
ηb02
0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 η
b
01
ηb02
1
ηa10
−1
ηb01
0 0 0 0 0 0

×

ηa11
ηb11
ηa21
ηb21
ηa12
ηb12
ηa22
ηb22

=

1
1
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
0

This eight by nine matrix is equal to the matrix Ω′′ defined earlier with γtsab =
ηmsab
saηasab
+sbηbsab
, which is nonsingular by Assumption B8. The system can therefore be
solved for ηasab and η
b
sab
. Resource shares for men and women can then be solved for
since ηtsab = γ
t
sab
(saη
a
sab
+ sbη
b
sab
) for t  {m, f}.
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CHAPTER 2
CHILD LABOR LAWS AND HOUSEHOLD FERTILITY DECISIONS:
EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIA
1 Introduction
What is the effect of child labor laws on child employment? Do child labor laws affect
household fertility decisions? Despite the prevalence of these laws, there is limited
empirical evidence on their effectiveness in reducing child labor. Moreover, little is
known about how a child labor law, through its effect on the economic value of
children, affects fertility rates. In this study, I analyze both questions in the context
of Nigeria by examining the effect of the Nigerian Child Rights Act of 2003 (CRA)
on child employment and household fertility decisions.
Nigeria provides an ideal setting for this analysis. First, child labor is widespread,
with UNICEF reporting as many as one third of all Nigerian children currently work-
ing (MICS 2011). Furthermore, fertility rates in Nigeria are some of the highest in
the world with the average woman having more than 5 children over the course of
her lifetime (DHS 2013).1 Consequently, Nigeria’s population is expected to triple
by 2050 and is expected become the third largest country in the world.2 Reducing
child labor and fertility rates are thus both goals of the current Nigerian government
and whether or not the CRA succeeded in achieving these goals is what I aim to
determine.
I begin my analysis by examining the child employment effects of the CRA at
both the intensive and extensive margins of employment. To my knowledge, no pre-
1As a point of comparison the total fertility rate in India is 2.3 (SRS 2013).
2Pew Center Research Report http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/01/30/attitudes-about-aging-a-
global-perspective.
79
vious study has examined the employment effects of child labor laws at the intensive
margin using hourly employment data. For identification, I rely on yearly variation
in when each Nigerian state adopted the law, and from the age restrictions that de-
termined to whom the child labor law applied. The results suggest that the CRA
increased child employment levels at both the intensive and extensive margins. In
particular, work outside the household by children age 6-11 increased by an average
of 0.337 hours per week. This result is consistent with recent empirical evidence on
the employment effects of the Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986
in India (Bharadwaj et al. (2013)).
The theoretical foundation for this counterintuitive result can be understood as
follows: The CRA, in practice, acts as a tax on firms for employing children, which
results in lower child labor demand. Moreover, children have been shown to have
negatively sloped labor supply curves (Bhalotra (2007)); parents do not want their
children to work, but may be forced to in order to reach some subsistence level
of consumption. If child wages decrease due to lower demand, then households are
poorer, and farther below the subsistence threshold. To make up for the lost income,
children need to work more hours.3
Lower child wages due to the CRA are likely to not only affect child employment,
but also household fertility decisions as well. In particular, if household demand for
children is a positive function of child wages, and the CRA lowered child wages,
then fertility rates may have decreased as a result. To make the relationship more
concrete, I present a simple model of household fertility decisions based on Rosenzweig
and Evenson (1977). I then empirically analyze this relationship by examining how
the CRA affected fertility rates. In order to determine how this law impacted fertility
rates, I would ideally study how household fertility decisions are impacted by child
wages, as that is the hypothesized mechanism. However, given that I do not observe
child wages, I attempt a more indirect approach.4 I first take my previous results
that show that child employment levels increased, and I interpret these changes in
3See Basu and Van (1998) and Bharadwaj et al. (2013) for a more detailed discussion.
4Children often work in the informal sector and are typically paid in kind or not at all. As a
result they rarely receive an easily measurable wage.
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employment as suggestive evidence that child wages decreased. After establishing the
CRA lowered child wages, I next measure the effect of the CRA on fertility and find
that it had little to no impact.
This paper relates to two strands of literature; first to studies on the employment
effects of child labor laws, and secondly, to research in the growth literature that
seeks to understand the causes of the demographic transition. Key empirical studies
on the effects of child labor laws on child employment include Moehling (1999) and
Bharadwaj et al. (2013). Moehling (1999) examines the effect of U.S. state child
labor laws and finds that the laws resulted in a minimal, if any, change in child
employment rates. Bharadwaj et al. (2013) analyze the 1986 Child Labor (Prohibition
and Regulation) Act in India, and finds that the law increased child employment rates
and decreased child wages. The authors extend the child labor model of Basu and Van
(1998) to a two sector labor market to account for the fact that the Indian child labor
law did not apply to agricultural workers. A similar partial ban was implemented in
Nigeria and as in Bharadwaj et al. (2013), labor market frictions play a central role
in how the child labor ban impacted sector specific employment levels.
More recently, Piza and Souza (2016) analyze a child labor ban in Brazil and
find it reduced child employment rates for boys, with the effects mostly concentrated
in the informal sector. Piza and Souza (2016) use a difference-in-difference strategy
that relies on variation in the minimum age of child work across time. Their results
could be driven by age-group specific time trends that would violate the parallel
trends assumption. Specifically, if employment for children below the age threshold in
Brazil was trending downward at a faster rate than it was for children above the age
threshold, then differences-in-differences would not accurately measure the effect of
the child labor law. My study avoids this potential source of bias by using variation in
not just the minimum age of child work across time, but also variation in the timing
of adoption of the law across Nigerian states.
Overall, there is little empirical evidence that child labor laws reduce child labor,
and some (Bharadwaj et al. (2013)) that it increases it. My study contributes to
the literature on the effects of child labor laws by using hourly employment data.
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While previous work has focused on the extensive margin, the hourly employment
data allows me to examine both the extensive and intensive margins and therefore I
can more clearly understand changes in employment as a result of the CRA.
The second strand of literature I contribute to is research on the causes of the
demographic transition. The economic growth literature has discussed in great detail
the relationship between the demographic transition, the demand for human capital,
and the quantity-quality tradeoff (Galor and Weil (2000), Hazan and Berdugo (2002),
Doepke and Zilibotti (2005)). Moreover, growth economists have also recognized that
in the past, declines in fertility rates have typically coincided with falling child em-
ployment rates. As a result, they have suggested that child labor laws can theoretically
speed the demographic transition. For example, Doepke (2004) calibrates a model of
economic growth and fertility decline focusing specifically on the effects of child labor
and compulsory schooling laws and finds that countries that require children to at-
tend school and ban child labor go through the demographic transition sooner than
countries that do not enact these policies. Doepke (2004) achieves these results by
incorporating the quantity-quality tradeoff into a model of economic growth. I build
off his results by empirically analyzing the relationship between child labor laws and
fertility using household-level data, which to the best of my knowledge, has not been
done. This paper is therefore the first to provide a causal analysis of a relationship
that is potentially relevant to both population and child welfare policy.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, I describe in detail the CRA. In
Section 3, I then provide a brief motivating model that illustrates the relationship
between the economic value of children, child labor laws, and household fertility deci-
sions. Section 4 summarizes the data. I then discuss my empirical strategy in Section
5, before moving to the results in Section 6. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of
my results in Section 7.
2 The 2003 Child Rights Act
In 2003, the Nigerian legislature passed the CRA. The law was the culmination of
years of effort to bring Nigeria in line with international standards on child rights.
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While Nigeria had previously adopted the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) in 1991 and the African Union Charter on the Rights and Welfare
of the Child (CRCW) in 2001, the enforcement of these treaties was nonexistent.5 This
lack of enforcement generated political pressure to enact a law designed to implement
the principles and laws established in these international treaties, and in response,
the Nigerian National Assembly passed the CRA in July, 2003.
The CRA covers many topics related to child welfare, including child trafficking,
adoption, conscription, corporal punishment, and child marriage. For the purposes of
this study, the key provisions of the CRA are the sections regarding child labor. While
Nigeria had previously enacted the Labour Act of 1990 which set the minimum age
of work to 12, the monetary penalty for violating the law was only 100 Naira (∼20
USD) and there was no criminal penalty. The CRA increased the fine to as much as
50,000 Naira (∼466 USD) and a prison term of up to five years.6 Overall, the CRA
left much of the Labour Act in place, but dramatically increased the penalties for
employing children. The relevant clauses of Sections 28.2-28.3 of the CRA are given
below:
No child shall be...employed to work in any capacity except where he is em-
ployed by a member of a family on light work of an agricultural, horticultural
or domestic character...Any person who [violates the child labor regulations] is
liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand Naira or imprisonment
for a term of five years or to both such a fine and imprisonment. (pg. 6)
Furthermore, the CRA specifies that the “provisions relating to young persons in
Sections 58, 59, 60, 61, 62 and 63 of the Labour Act shall apply to children under
this Act." These sections define different age thresholds for different types of works;
Children age 14 and under are prohibited from being employed unless they work
on a “day-to-day basis" with a “daily wage" and “return each night to the place of
residence of his parents or guardian" at a reasonable time. Children age 15 and under
5See Nwapi (2011).
6In 1990 prices, the CRA fine is roughly 2,500 Naira.
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are prohibited from doing any “industrial undertaking."7
The CRA is written is such a way that there is some ambiguity over the minimum
age of work. While the Labour Act defines a child to be anyone under age 12, the
CRA classifies children as individuals under the age of 18. However, this does not
mean the minimum age of work is 18; The CRA explicitly states that certain clauses
from the Labour Act that specify various age thresholds below age 18 apply to the
CRA. Discussions with various policymakers familiar with the CRA confirm that the
age thresholds are determined by the Labour Act. The reason children are defined as
individuals below age 18 is related to other provisions of the CRA, especially those
governing conscription and child marriage.
Nigeria has a federal system of government similar to the United States. For
legislation impacting child rights, the federal government passes laws, but it is the
responsibility of the 36 Nigerian States to adopt and enforce them.8 As of 2013, only
23 states had adopted the law.9 Table 2.1 shows which states of adopted the CRA and
provides the timing of the adoption. The variation in when each state has adopted
the law is central to this study’s identification strategy. Importantly, the decision of
each state to adopt the CRA was primarily related to popular views of child marriage
and therefore likely independent of the state’s view of child labor.10 Non-adopting
CRA states also opposed sections dealing with child adoption and family courts.
These issues are discussed extensively in the Nigerian legal literature.11 To assuage
any potential concern that states decided not to adopt the CRA due to their views on
child labor, I use several specifications where the analysis is conducted solely using
a sample of states that did adopt the law, and rely on variation in the timing of
adoption to identify its effect.
As in other developing countries, enforcement of employment laws is far from per-
7What constitutes an industrial undertaking is left undefined.
8The capital territory, FCT-Abuja, automatically adopts any law passed by the federal govern-
ment.
9In 2014 Jigawa, which had previously adopted the CRA, put the law “under review".
10The predominantly Muslim states in the north follow sharia law in family and sometimes criminal
legal matters. According to Sharia law, girls are allowed to be married at age 12, which drastically
conflicts with the minimum age of marriage set in the CRA of 18.
11See Akinwumi (2010), Ogunniran (2010), Kawu and Abdur-Rahman (2014) for example.
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fect. Government statistics on the number of child labor violations and convictions
are difficult to find. This is especially hard when evaluating the CRA because enforce-
ment is at the state-level and thus require state-level statistics. What is clear is that
enforcement of the CRA is limited as children still work at high rates. There is, how-
ever, circumstantial evidence that the law is at least being partially enforced. This is
supported by the significant effort NGOs in Nigeria, and in particular UNICEF, have
made in lobbying all states to adopt the CRA. For the purposes of this study, the law
only has to be partially enforced to have some effect on child labor and fertility.
3 Model
This section presents a model to formalize the potential relationship between child
labor laws and household fertility decisions. I describe a simple household that makes
a static decision regarding child labor, child education, and fertility that closely follows
Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977). The goal is to show how a child labor law, through
its effect on child wages, can decrease the demand for children.
The household is modeled using the household production framework of Becker
(1965). Parents are altruistic and derive utility from the number of children they have,
the level of education and leisure of their children, and some composite commodity
representing the household’s standard of living. Children are therefore considered
normal goods as in Becker and Lewis (1974). The household’s utility is given below:
U = U(Zn, Ze, Zl, Zs)
where Zn is the number of children, Ze is the level of schooling, Zl is child leisure, and
Zs is a composite commodity representing the household’s standard of living. Each
good is produced using a linear homogenous production function.
Consider a nuclear household with a husband, a wife, and Zn children. The hus-
band and wife work Tmh and Tmw units of time in market work at wages Wh and Ww
respectively. The wife can also spend time producing children Tnw or the composite
commodity Tsw . Each child works Tmc units of time in market work at wage Wc and
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also spends time producing their own education Tec and leisure Tlc .12
The production functions of each good are given below:
Ze = γe(Xe, Tec), Zl = γl(Xl, Tlc)
Zn = γn(Xn, Tnw), Zs = γs(Xs, Tsw)
Here, aggregated bundles of goods are given by Xi and are purchased at market price
Pi, i = n, e, l, s.
Each child has Tc units of total time to allocate between market work, education,
and leisure. For simplicity the husband is assumed to spend all his time Th in market
work. The wife has Tw units of time to allocate between market work, producing
children, and producing the composite household commodity. The household budget
constraint can then be written as follows:
WcTcZn +WwTw +WhTh =Zn(pnxn + tnaWw) + ZnZe(pexe + tecWc)+
Zs(psxs + tsaWw) + ZnZl(plxl + tlcWc)
where xj and tji are the marginal price and input coefficients.
Maximizing the utility function subject to the budget and time constraints gives
the following shadow prices:
pin =pnxn + tnaWw − tmcWc + Zepexe + Zlplxl
pie =Zn(pexe + tecWc)
pil =Zn(plxl + tlcWc)
pis =psxs + tsaWw
The shadow price of children, pin, is therefore a negative function of child wages,
which is the key mechanism through which the CRA affects fertility rates.
12Including adult leisure would not change the model implications and are therefore ignored for
simplicity.
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Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) show that the uncompensated substitution elas-
ticity of the number of children with respect to child wages is given as follows:
ηNWc = η˜
N
Wc +
WcZNTmc
F
N (2.1)
where η˜NWc is the compensated substitution elasticity of the number of children
with respect to child wages, F is full income, and N is the pure income elasticity of
N . Then ηNWc is unambiguously postive since an increase in child wages would decrease
the relative price of child quantity and increase household income. Ultimately I will
qualify this implication by noting that female wages also enter the shadow price of
children, and that changes in the female wage as a result of the CRA can potentially
also impact fertility rates. In the following section I describe in more detail how a
child labor law affects fertility rates.
3.1 Adding a Child Labor Law
Following Basu (2005), I interpret a child labor law as a tax on child labor. More specif-
ically, with some probability p, each firm is fined F dollars for employing children.
pF can be interpreted as the expected fine a firm faces when employing children. The
expected cost of employing children is Wc + pF . An increase in the expected fine will
then result in an increase in the marginal cost of employing children. Labor demand
for children will then decrease in response to an increase in pF . With labor demand
shifting down, equilibrium child wages will also decrease. Equation (2.1) implies that
this decrease in child wages results in households demanding fewer children.
The model therefore suggests the CRA should lead to a reduction in fertility
rates. A potential complication to this reasoning is that the CRA could impact the
adult labor market in addition to the child labor market. The effect on the adult
labor market can be understood as follows: children are now working more as a
result of lower wages,13 giving firms the ability to substitute child labor for adult
labor, therefore decreasing the demand for adult workers.14 With decreased adult
13Recall children have backwards bending labor supply curves.
14This assumes adults and children are substitutes in the production process, which is consistent
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labor demand, equilibrium adult wages are now lower. The shadow price of producing
children is an increasing function of female wages, and therefore a decrease in adult
wages lowers the opportunity cost for women to have children. Thus, changes in adult
wages as a result of the CRA may offset the fertility effect of changes in child wages.
4 Data
To examine the effect of the CRA on child labor, I use the third and fourth rounds
of the Nigeria Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) which took place in 2007
and 2011, respectively.15 I take advantage of the detailed information on child employ-
ment; parents are asked whether their children work for anyone outside the household,
and if so, for how many hours. Similar questions are asked about work for household
enterprises or household farms, and household chores.16 With this data, I can examine
the impact of the CRA on employment at both the intensive and extensive margin.
The data also includes demographic and socioeconomic information on the house-
hold including, parent’s education, religion, household size, urban or rural status, the
household composition, and a computed wealth index.
Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics from the third and fourth waves of the
MICS. Among children age 6-11, 14 percent do some work outside the household and
23 percent of children work on a household farm or household enterprise. The amount
of time per week these children work varies considerably. The majority however work
less than 7 hours a week which is consistent with children working and attending
school at the same time.
To examine the effect of the CRA on fertility, I use the first four rounds of the
Nigeria Demographic and Healthy Survey17 (DHS) which took place in 1990,18 2003,
2008, and 2013. The DHS is a national sample survey that provides detailed infor-
with recent empirical evidence (Doran (2013)). This assumption is central to the Basu and Van
(1998) and Bharadwaj et al. (2013) models of child labor.
15The first and second waves do not include sufficiently detailed child labor data.
16Chores include fetching wood, fetching water, childcare, cooking, and cleaning.
17While many DHS surveys include information on child labor, the Nigeria DHS unfortunately
does not.
1818 of Nigeria’s 36 states were created after 1990. I therefore use DHS GPS data to convert each
woman’s 1990 state of residence to their 2013 state of residence.
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mation on female wellbeing, including topics ranging from fertility and marriage to
child health and domestic violence. To study the effects of the CRA on fertility, I
exploit the birth history information in the DHS. Specifically, I know in any given
year whether a woman gave birth. This allows me to construct a woman-year panel
of each woman’s birth history. I focus on married women age 19-49 to alleviate any
concerns about changes in minimum age of marriage laws affecting the analysis.
Table 2.3 demonstrates the high birth rates in Nigeria. In 2013 for example, 18
percent of women age 15-49 had given birth in the prior year. The total fertility rate
has not fallen considerably since 1990. Lastly, most of the observations come from
the 2008 and 2013 waves which is useful given that that is the period with the most
variation in state adoption of the CRA.
Figures 1 and 2 use an event study framework to illustrate graphically how trends
in birth rates have changed as a result of the CRA. I regress a measure of fertility on
time relative to adoption of the CRA, while controlling for age, age squared, wealth,
education, year, and age of first marriage. In Figure 1, I plot the coefficients on time
relative to adoption, where I use an indicator for whether the woman gave birth as
the dependent variable. Similarly, Figure 2 uses the same framework, except with the
number of living children as the dependent variable. In both figures, there is little
change consistent with what is found in the empirical results. The rise towards the
end of the figure is due to the composition of states that are in the treatment group
changing over time.
5 Empirical Strategy
5.1 Employment Effects of CRA
To estimate the effect of the CRA on child employment, I use a difference-in-difference-
in-differences (DDD) empirical strategy. I compare hours worked for children under
12 to children 12 and older in states that have adopted the CRA to states that have
not, before and after the CRA was enacted. I rely on variation in which states adopted
the law, the timing of the adoption, and the age group to which the law applied. As
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stated earlier, the CRA penalizes firms for employing children only if the child is
younger than 12 years old. I am therefore following the same technique employed by
Moehling (1999).
For this estimation strategy, the traditional DD empirical strategy using state and
time differences is modified to include a separate treatment and control group within
each treated state. The assumptions for estimation of DDD are weaker than for DD.
For DD, the key identifying assumption is that in the absence of the adoption of the
CRA, the differences in employment rates for children under 12 in treatment and
control states would be the same in period t as in period t + 1, or what is known in
the literature as the parallel trends assumption. This is likely to be violated given
that Nigerian states differ in their industry structure and there is a strong geographic
relationship between which states have and have not adopted the CRA.
With DDD instead, any time trend specific to the treated states is differenced out.
Here, the key identifying assumption is that any time trend specific to the treated
states is the same for children under 12 as it is for children 12 and over. Possible
violations of this assumption are significantly more difficult to find, and thus I use
DDD to identify the parameters of interest.
The following regression is then used:
Yistg = βDDD(Treatst × Y oungAgeg)
+Postt × φs + ψsg + γgt +Xiδ + istg
(2.2)
where Yistg is an indicator for whether child i in state s in year t of age group
g is employed. In other specifications it is a measure of hours worked. Treatst is an
indicator equal to 1 if the state had passed the law prior to year t. I allow the year
effects to vary by state with Postt × φs, where Postt is an indicator equal to 1 if the
year is 2011. This variable accounts for any state specific year effects that are common
across age groups. I also include state-age group and age group-year fixed effects, ψsg,
and γgt, which account for any age group specific state effects common across time, and
any age group specific time effects that are common across states. Y oungAgeg is an
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indicator for whether the child is in the treated age group (i.e. under age 12). In other
specifications, I interact Treatst with age dummies. I include a vector of covariates Xi
which consists of age, religion, household wealth, parental characteristics, and gender.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level with 37 total clusters.19 The parameter
of interest is βDDD which represents the average treatment effect on the treated.
One modification to the above estimation strategy that is likely to lead to more
robust results is to exclude states that have never adopted the CRA. These states
are almost exclusively located in Nigeria’s northern region, and are poorer and sig-
nificantly more Muslim than the mostly Christian south. The difference in religion is
key, as the mainly Muslim states implemented Sharia law in 2000 and are under a
different legal system. Therefore, omitting these states and using only states that have
adopted the CRA by 2007 as a control group could lessen concerns about different
time trends unique to certain age groups in the northern states.20
5.2 Fertility Effects of CRA
To examine the effect of the CRA on fertility I again exploit the quasi-experimental
nature of the law’s implementation. I begin by constructing a woman-year panel of
birth histories using four waves of the DHS (1990, 2003, 2008, 2013). Using this data,
I know for each woman in any given year both her number of living children and
whether or not she gave birth in the previous year. I use variation in which states
adopted the CRA, and in the timing of the adoption, to estimate a difference-in-
differences model. This allows me to identify the effect of the CRA on fertility rates
provided treatment and control states would follow the same time trend in the absence
of the treatment. While making this assumption is not ideal, I am able to weaken this
assumption by including state specific time trends.
The following specification is used to identify the effect of the CRA on total
fertility:
Yist = α + γt + λs + φs × t+ βDDTreats,t−1 +Wiδ + ist (2.3)
19There are 36 Nigerian states and the Federal Capital Territory.
20The data is from 2007 and 2011, and 14 states adopted the CRA between 2003 and 2007, while
10 did so between 2007 and 2011.
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where Yist is the number of living children for woman i in state s in year t.
Treats,t−1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the woman is living in a state that
adopted the CRA in the previous year. This accounts for the fact that childbirth
takes nine months. Lastly, I include a vector of covariates Wi which includes age,
age squared, age at first marriage, years of education, household wealth, religion, and
whether the woman lives in an urban area.
As noted earlier, the CRA also raised the minimum age of marriage to 18. This
change could also affect fertility rates. To account for this potential bias, I exclude
women younger than 19 from the analysis, and control for age of first marriage.
To determine if the length of exposure to the CRA impacts fertility rates, I interact
Treats,t−1 with the number of years exposed to the law. In principle, women who have
lived in a CRA state for longer should have fewer children relative to those who have
done so for a shorter amount of time. I therefore modify equation (3.12) as follows:
Yist = α + γt + λs + φs × t+ βDD(Treats,t−1 × Exposures,t−1) +Wiδ + ist (2.4)
where Exposures,t−1 is the number of years since state s adopted the CRA in year
t− 1.
For robustness, I modify the estimation strategy following Güneş (2016) by re-
stricting the sample to women above age 25 at the time of the survey, and using
the number of children born by age 25 as the dependent variable. This is due to the
fact that the fertility history of women in the DHS is censored in the sense that I
do not observe completed fertility for the majority of the women in the sample. The
treatment variable for this specification is therefore the number of years woman i was
exposed to the CRA prior to the woman’s 25th birthday.21
21Using alternative age thresholds yielded qualitatively similar results.
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6 Results
6.1 Child Employment
To examine the effect of the CRA on child labor, I study changes in employment at
both the extensive and intensive margins, and look at three different types of work;
(1) household chores, (2) work for a household farm or enterprise, or (3) work outside
the household. As discussed in Section 2, the CRA penalized firms and individuals
for employing children outside their household.
Table 2.4 reports the DDD coefficients from specification (3.11). Here, any time
trend specific to the treatment states is differenced out. The key identifying assump-
tion is that any treatment state specific trend is the same for children under 12,
and children 12 and older. The results show the effect of the CRA on weekly hours
in work outside the household, chores, and for a household enterprise or farm. Odd
numbered columns include separate state and year fixed effects, while in even num-
bered columns, state-year fixed effects are included as well. The sample includes all
children age 6-15. The object of interest is found in the first row, which corresponds
to βDDD in equation (3.11). The results here suggest work outside the household in-
creased in response to the CRA. More specifically, the results in column (2) suggest
that on average, children age 6-11 are working 0.343 hours more per week outside the
household, which is equivalent to a 24 percent increase above the pretreatment control
group mean. This seemingly counterintuitive result is consistent with the Basu and
Van (1998) model of child labor. A plausible explanation for this result is that the
CRA lowered child wages, resulting in families falling further below some subsistence
level of consumption. To compensate for the lost income, households responded by
sending their children to work for longer hours.
Furthermore, columns (3) and (4) show that child hours worked in chores increased
roughly 2 hours per week. What explains this large increase? A ban on work outside
the household lowers wages in that sector, and therefore impacts the benefits of work-
ing outside the household relative to participating in work in chores, or for household
enterprises or farms. Children should then reallocate their labor to chores and work
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in household enterprises or farms until wages equalize in all sectors.22 Secondly, the
CRA only applied to work outside the household, making this transition in sectors
more likely. The lack of any impact of the CRA on work in household enterprises or
farms, and the fact that work outside the household increased, suggests that there
are likely labor market frictions preventing this reallocation.
Table 2.5 presents a similar specification to what is found in Table 2.4, except now
the treatment variable is interacted with age dummies, as opposed to an indicator for
whether the child is below age 12. The reference category is the interaction between
treatment and children age 12. The results demonstrate that most of the effect of the
law is concentrated among the youngest children. In particular, the results suggest
that on average, children age 6 are working 0.571 more hours outside the household
per week after the implementation of the CRA after differencing out time effects and
changes in hours worked among 12 year olds in treated states. On the other hand,
the CRA seems to have had little effect on the difference in hours worked between 11
and 12 year olds in treated and untreated states. This could be because labor hours
for the younger children were so low to begin with that they had more room to grow.
Alternatively, this could simply be because children age 11 look similar to 12 year old
children, and therefore the law did not affect differences in treatment between them.
Table 2.6, like Table 2.4, presents results from specification (3.11). However, the
sample is now limited to states that have at any point adopted the CRA, and the
results rely on variation in the timing of adoption. The treated states are defined as
any state that adopted the law between 2007 and 2010, while control states consist of
any state that adopted the CRA prior to 2007. The motivation behind this subsample
analysis is to eliminate any unobserved differences between the treated and never
treated states specific to different age groups. The results here are mostly consistent
with the results presented in Table 2.4; on average, children age 6-11 are working
0.369 hours more per week outside the household, which is nearly identical to the
corresponding estimate in Table 4. The magnitude of the effect on chores is slightly
smaller, with children age 6-11 working 1.723 hours more per week as a result of the
22For a formal model and analyses of these mechanisms see Bharadwaj et al. (2013)
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CRA.
Moving to the extensive margin of employment, Table 2.7 presents probit esti-
mates of equation (3.11) where the dependent variables are indicators for whether
the child did any of the three types of work during the previous week. The given
coefficients represent the marginal effects on the binary employment outcomes. The
results again suggest that the CRA increased work outside the household. In partic-
ular, employment outside of the household is increased by 4.1 percentage points for
children under age 12 who were exposed to the CRA. Why might children who were
not previously working now begin working after a decrease in child wages? Imagine
a 9 year old child with an employed 11 year old sibling. Now that the older sibling
has lower wages, the household decides to both increase the 11 year olds hours, and
send the 9 year old to work as well. Studies without hourly employment data have
relied on this mechanism to analyze the employment effects of child labor laws. For
example, Bharadwaj et al. (2013) examines the 1986 Child Labor (Prohibition and
Regulation) Act in India using National Sample Survey employment data, which only
contains information on whether or not the child works (in addition to child wages).
Their model suggests that child employment will change as a result of changes in sib-
ling wages. Thus, they categorize a child as treated if the child has a sibling under the
minimum age of work, and see how this law affects child employment at the extensive
margin. My results are consistent with their findings.
6.2 Fertility
The results from the previous subsection suggest that the CRA resulted in a small
increase in employment levels. In effect, the CRA functions as a negative shift in the
demand for child labor, which together with a negatively sloped child labor supply
curve results in increased child employment. These results therefore provide circum-
stantial evidence that child wages decreased as well following the passage of the law.
Given that the model discussed in Section (3) suggests child wages are an input in
household fertility decisions, I expect there to potentially be a corresponding effect
of the CRA on fertility.
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Table 2.8 presents results from specifications (3.12) and (3.13). Here the dependent
variable is the number of children woman i has given birth to by year t. I am therefore
examining the effect of the CRA on total fertility. Columns (1) and (2) restrict the
effect of the CRA to be independent of the length of exposure to the law, while
columns (3) and (4) allow the treatment effect to vary by the duration of exposure.
The object of interest is found in the first row, which corresponds to βDD in equations
(3) and (4). In column (1), the results suggest that the CRA caused a reduction of
0.298 in the number of children born to a woman in a treated state. However, after
accounting for state specific time trends, this effect disappears. Columns (3) and (4)
follow a similar pattern.
For robustness, I restrict the sample to women age 25 and over and use total
children born by age 25 as the dependent variable. This accounts for any issues arising
due to total fertility being censored for most women in the sample. The results for
this specification are presented in Table 2.9. Again there is negative effect on total
fertility when state specific time trends are unaccounted for, but no effect when they
are included. Overall, the results suggest that the CRA had little impact on fertility
rates.
7 Discussion
The CRA seems to have resulted in increased child employment, clearly contrary to
the intended purpose of the law. This suggests that the CRA did have some effect on
child wages, which should have an impact on household fertility. However, the data
provide no statistical evidence of any effect of the CRA on fertility rates. There are
a myriad of possible reasons for this. First, the change in child wages may have been
fairly small, and therefore any corresponding effect on fertility would also be low in
magnitude. Secondly, the effect of the law on fertility rates may not be immediate.
Implementation of the CRA is a slow process and the infrastructure needed to enforce
such a wide ranging law takes time to establish. For this reason, meaningful fertility
effects may not become evident until several years after the passing of the law. Un-
fortunately, it is not easy to identify long term effects of the CRA at this time given
96
the data available.
Another reason fertility may not have declined as a result of the CRA, and dis-
cussed in Section 3, involves the adult labor market. With the quantity of child labor
increasing, firms now demand fewer adult workers, which lowers adult wages. The
opportunity cost for women of having children is now lower, and therefore they have
more children.
Lastly, the CRA may not have impacted fertility rates is that women simple lack
the means of easily reducing their fertility. As of 2013, only 26 percent of married
women of child bearing age who did not want children within the next two years used
any contraceptive method (DHS 2013).
8 Conclusion
This study examines the impact of the Nigerian Child Rights Act of 2003 on both
child labor and fertility rates. The CRA was a landmark piece of legislation that sig-
nificantly increased the penalty for employing children under age 12. The theoretical
model presented in Section 3 suggests that such a child labor law should impact fer-
tility rates as a result of changes in the economic value of children. The results are
not conclusive. I find the CRA likely resulted in increased child employment outside
the household consistent with the Basu and Van (1998) and Bharadwaj et al. (2013)
models of child labor. However, the empirical evidence does not suggest there is a
corresponding effect on fertility rates. This could be due to offsetting effects that I
am unable to disentangle.
This paper contributes to the existing empirical literature on the employment
effects of child labor laws. Moreover, it is the first to analyze child employment at
the intensive margin. This study also focuses on Nigeria, an understudied country of
growing global importance. Secondly, this is the first paper to empirically study the
relationship between child labor laws and fertility rates using household level data.
While the results provide no clear answer to the relationship between child labor and
fertility rates, it is an important first step in understanding a relationship that is
central to models of economic growth and the demographic transition.
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Figure 2.1: Effect of CRA on Probability of Giving Birth
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Notes: This figure plots the βk coefficients from the following regression, with
the year of adoption of the CRA as the omitted year: Yist =
∑5
k=−9 βk ∗ 1[Y eart =
k] +Wiδ+ γt + ist. Yist is an indicator for giving birth for woman i in state s in year
t. 95% confidence intervals. The above figures are for treated states only.
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Table 2.1: Timing of CRA Adoption
CRA States Non-CRA States
State Year of Adoption State
FCT-Abuja 2003 Adamawa
Anambra 2004 Bauchi
Ebonyi 2004 Borno
Imo 2004 Enugu
Ogun 2004 Gombe
Abia 2007 Kaduna
Bayelsa 2007 Kano
Jigawa 2007 Katsina
Kwara 2007 Kebbi
Nasarawa 2007 Sokoto
Ondo 2007 Yobe
Plateau 2007 Zamfara
Rivers 2007
Taraba 2007
Akwa Ibom 2008
Edo 2008
Lagos 2008
Oyo 2008
Benue 2010
Cross River 2010
Delta 2010
Kogi 2010
Niger 2010
Osun 2010
Notes: No single source contained all years of adop-
tion. The timing of adoption was collected from var-
ious ILO, UNICEF, and World Bank documents.
FCT-Abuja, the capital city, automatically adopted
the CRA following the National Assembly’s passing
of the CRA in July 2003. Jigawa is no longer abid-
ing by the CRA as the state legislature put the CRA
“under review" in 2013.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics (MICS)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Employment
Outside Household 0.14 0.35 0 1
Chores 0.72 0.45 0 1
Household Enterprise or Farm 0.23 0.42 0 1
Weekly Hours Conditional
on Working
Outside Household 6.22 7.56 1 76
Chores 8.01 7.81 1 80
Household Enterprise or Farm 7.17 7.40 1 77
Enrolled in School 0.71 0.45 0 1
Household Characteristics
Muslim 0.54 0.50 0 1
Father’s Education 0.89 0.88 0 2
Mother’s Education 0.73 0.84 0 2
Urban 0.29 0.46 0 1
Female 0.49 0.50 0 1
Notes: Children age 6-11. MICS 2007 and 2011
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics (DHS)
Survey Year 1990 2003 2008 2013
Gave Birtht−1 18.63 17.44 17.73 18.07
Living Children 2.62 2.37 2.47 2.54
Marital Status
Single 20.61 28.81 25.38 26.68
Monogamously Married 49.64 47.38 50.35 50.58
Polygamously Married 29.75 23.82 24.28 22.74
Religion
Muslim 48.62 47.26 46.28 47.70
Education Level
No Education 51.70 39.44 39.66 35.28
Primary 24.05 21.86 19.74 18.24
Secondary 21.76 32.31 32.66 36.99
Higher 2.48 6.39 7.93 9.49
Residence
Rural 59.80 59.88 68.58 60.09
Sample Size 8,781 7,620 33,385 38,948
Notes: All values are percents. Sample includes all
women age 15-49. DHS 1990, 2003, 2008, and 2013
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Table 2.4: Effect of CRA on Hours Worked
Dependent Variable Outside HH Chores HH Enterpriseor HH Farm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatst × Y oungAgeg = 1 0.393*** 0.343*** 1.873** 2.139*** 0.385 0.346
(0.095) (0.088) (0.557) (0.618) (0.221) (0.210)
Postt × Y oungAgeg = 1 -0.332*** -0.281*** -1.578*** -1.631*** 0.156 0.116
(0.084) (0.079) (0.255) (0.251) (0.139) (0.144)
Treatst -0.103 -5.422*** -2.063***
(0.245) (1.232) (0.413)
Sample Size 56,628 56,628 56,628 56,628 56,628 56,628
Pretreatment Control Group Mean 1.439 1.439 3.685 3.685 1.613 1.613
State-Age Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Notes: Treatst is an indicator equal to 1 if the year=2007 and the
state was treated prior to 2007 or if the year=2011 and the state was ever treated. Y oungAgeg is an
indicator equal to one if the child is age 6-11, 0 if the child is age 12-15. Standard errors clustered
at the state-year level. Covariates include gender, age, mother’s education, religion, wealth, household
composition controls, and whether the respondent lives in an urban area.
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Table 2.5: Effect of CRA on Hours Worked by Age
Dependent Variable Outside HH Chores HH Enterpriseor HH Farm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatst × Age = 6 0.642*** 0.642*** 2.900** 2.900** 0.482 0.482
(0.161) (0.161) (0.957) (0.957) (0.544) (0.544)
Treatst × Age = 7 0.430** 0.430** 2.111** 2.111** 0.236 0.236
(0.152) (0.152) (0.696) (0.696) (0.518) (0.518)
Treatst × Age = 8 0.343* 0.343* 1.170 1.170 -0.302 -0.302
(0.137) (0.137) (0.624) (0.624) (0.469) (0.469)
Treatst × Age = 9 0.160 0.160 1.952** 1.952** -0.765 -0.765
(0.190) (0.190) (0.678) (0.678) (0.583) (0.583)
Treatst × Age = 10 0.150 0.150 0.379 0.379 -0.206 -0.206
(0.146) (0.146) (0.499) (0.499) (0.530) (0.530)
Treatst × Age = 11 -0.081 -0.081 1.022 1.022 0.196 0.196
(0.306) (0.306) (0.849) (0.849) (0.600) (0.600)
Treatst × Age = 13 -0.079 -0.079 -0.225 -0.225 -1.333 -1.333
(0.241) (0.241) (0.435) (0.435) (0.735) (0.735)
Treatst × Age = 14 0.082 0.082 -0.253 -0.253 -0.342 -0.342
(0.179) (0.179) (0.654) (0.654) (0.720) (0.720)
Treatst × Age = 15 -0.370 -0.370 -0.174 -0.174 -0.556 -0.556
(0.251) (0.251) (0.716) (0.716) (0.568) (0.568)
Sample Size 56,628 56,628 56,628 56,628 56,628 56,628
Pretreatment Control Group Mean 1.439 1.439 3.685 3.685 1.613 1.613
State-Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Notes: Treatst is an indicator equal to 1 if the year=2007
and the state was treated prior to 2007 or if the year=2011 and the state was ever treated. The
omitted age group is children age 12. Coefficients represent marginal effects. Standard errors
clustered at the state-year level. Covariates include gender, age, mother’s education, religion,
wealth, household composition controls, and whether the respondent lives in an urban area.
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Table 2.6: Effect of CRA on Hours Worked Treated State Subsample
Dependent Variable Outside HH Chores HH Enterpriseor HH Farm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatst × Y oungAgeg = 1 0.434** 0.369** 1.491* 1.723* 0.316 0.283
(0.132) (0.115) (0.690) (0.749) (0.309) (0.308)
Postt × Y oungAgeg = 1 -0.375** -0.312** -1.173* -1.187* 0.229 0.188
(0.122) (0.107) (0.477) (0.486) (0.254) (0.266)
Treatst -0.645** -4.221** -1.761***
(0.208) (1.372) (0.439)
Sample Size 28,590 28,590 28,590 28,590 28,590 28,590
Pretreatment Control Group Mean 0.723 0.723 5.182 5.182 1.842 1.842
State-Age Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Notes: Treatst is an indicator equal to 1 if the year=2007 and the
state was treated prior to 2007 or if the year=2011 and the state was ever treated. Y oungAgeg is an
indicator equal to one if the child is age 6-11, 0 if the child is age 12-15. Standard errors clustered at
the state-year level. Covariates include gender, age, mother’s education, religion, wealth, household
composition controls, household composition controls, and whether the respondent lives in an urban
area. I exclude all states that have never passed the CRA.
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Table 2.7: Effect of CRA on Employment (Probit)
Dependent Variable Outside HH Chores HH Enterpriseor HH Farm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatst × Y oungAgeg = 1 0.054** 0.041** 0.001 -0.006 -0.028 -0.018
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.0178) (0.020) (0.019)
Postt × Y oungAgeg = 1 -0.022* -0.019 -0.071*** -0.059*** 0.006 0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
Treatst 0.025 0.011 -0.035
(0.033) (0.034) (0.039)
Sample Size 56,587 56,587 56,587 56,587 56,587 56,587
Pretreatment Control Group Mean 0.148 0.148 0.668 0.668 0.246 0.246
State-Age Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Notes: Treatst is an indicator equal to 1 if the year=2007 and the
state was treated prior to 2007 or if the year=2011 and the state was ever treated. Y oungAgeg is an
indicator equal to one if the child is age 6-11, 0 if the child is age 12-15. Standard errors clustered at
the state-year level. Covariates include gender, age, mother’s education, religion, wealth, household
composition controls, and whether the respondent lives in an urban area.
Table 2.8: Effect of CRA on Number of Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatst -0.298** 0.054
(0.084) (0.055)
Treatst × Exposurest -0.067** -0.003
(0.019) (0.015)
Sample Size 61,170 61,170 61,170 61,170
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Specific Time Trends Yes Yes
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Notes: The dependent variable
of children born. Columns (1) and (2) correspond to specification
(3.12) while Columns (3) and (4) correspond to specification (3.13).
Standard errors clustered at the state level. The sample includes all
married women age 19-49. Covariates include age, age2, age of first
marriage, education, household wealth, religion, and whether the
respondent lives in an urban area.
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Table 2.9: Effect of CRA on Number of Children at Age 25
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatst -0.164* -0.072
(0.070) (0.053)
Treatst × Exposurest -0.040* -0.017
(0.017) (0.014)
Sample Size 46,315 46,315 46,315 46,315
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Specific Time Trends Yes Yes
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Notes: The dependent vari-
able of children born by age 25. Columns (1) and (2) correspond
to specification (3.12) while Columns (3) and (4) correspond to
specification (3.13). Standard errors clustered at the state level.
The sample includes all married women age 25-49. Covariates in-
clude age, age2, age of first marriage, education, household wealth,
religion, and whether the respondent lives in an urban area.
Figure 2.2: Effect of CRA on Number of Living Children
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Notes: This figure plots the βk coefficients from the following regression, with
the year of adoption of the CRA as the omitted year: Yist =
∑5
k=−9 βk ∗ 1[Y eart =
k] +Wiδ+γt + ist. Yist is the number of living children for woman i in state s in year
t. 95% confidence intervals. The above figures are for treated states only.
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CHAPTER 3
IDENTIFYING RESOURCE SHARES USING MULTIPLE PRIVATE
ASSIGNABLE GOODS (WITH CAITLIN BROWN AND ROSSELLA CALVI)
1 Introduction
A major focus for government and international development organizations is mea-
suring poverty. This task is complicated for a variety of reasons, but especially in
developing countries due to difficulties in measuring income and consumption. One
challenge that has received more attention recently are the consequences of measur-
ing household-level poverty as opposed to individual-level poverty (e.g., Brown et al.
(2016)). Because surveys are typically conducted at the household level, the resulting
poverty rates are by necessity also at the household level. The underlying assumption
in this action is that either everyone in the household is poor, or everyone is not poor.
While this may seem like an unavoidable part of measuring poverty, there are poten-
tial consequences to using household-level measures in the presence of substantial
intra-household inequality. Mainly, poverty rates for specific groups that may have
less power within the household (e.g., women and children) are likely underestimated.
Fundamentally, there is an identification problem. Standard consumption data is
at the household level, but we are interested in consumption differences across indi-
viduals within the household. Because of these data limitations our analysis requires a
structural model. In this paper, we develop a new identification method using a struc-
tural model of intra-household resource allocation to identify the share of household
resources allocated to each household member.
The starting point of our analysis the collective household model of Chiappori
(1988). The central assumption of this model is that the household reaches a Pareto
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efficient allocation of goods. While this is a fairly weak assumption, it is still not
sufficient to identify how resources are allocated within the household. A large body
of research within this field has demonstrated this non-identification result (Browning
et al. (1994), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Vermeulen (2002), and Chiappori and
Ekeland (2009))).
In response, a growing literature has sought to solve this identification problem by
adding more structure to the model. There are several approaches. Browning et al.
(2013) demonstrate that if we assume some preference similarity across household
compositions (single men, single women, and married couples) we can identify the
sharing rule, and also economies of scale in consumption. Other studies using this type
of identification restriction include Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), Bargain and Donni
(2012), and Lise and Seitz (2011). Because these preference stability assumptions are
somewhat unattractive, other studies have tried to place bounds on the sharing rule,
as opposed to point identifying it. Cherchye et al. (2011), and Cherchye et al. (2015)
place bounds on the sharing rule using revealed preference inequalities.
A different strand of research that closely relates to our approach uses an Engel
curve framework. The key assumption in this literature is that resource shares are
independent of total household expenditure. This restriction is quite powerful, and
requires only modest additional assumptions to identify resource shares. Dunbar et al.
(2013) use this assumption along with semi-parametric restrictions on individual pref-
erences for a single assignable good to identify resource shares. No price variation is
required and the only data requirement is an assignable good for each person type
within the household. Because of its simplicity and small data requirements it has be-
come one of the more popular approaches.1 Dunbar et al. (2017) slightly modify this
approach and show that the preference restrictions of DLP are no longer necessary if
there are a sufficient number of distribution factors in the data.2
Our approach extends this recent literature. Like DLP and DLP2, we require
that resource shares be independent of household expenditure. We differ in several
1See Calvi (2017), Calvi et al. (2017), and Penglase (2018).
2In some ways, a distribution factor can be thought of as a preference restriction, in that these
variables are required to not affect preferences.
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ways. First, we impose significantly weaker preference restrictions than DLP in that
preferences for the assignable goods are allowed to differ quite flexibly across people
and household sizes. Second, unlike DLP2, we do not require distribution factors,
which are often difficult to find in the data. Third, we require multiple assignable
goods, which are commonly found in data sets with assignable goods. For example,
data with assignable clothing often also includes assignable shoes.
2 Model
Let households consist of J types of individuals, indexed by j. Denote the number of
each person type within the household by σj  {σ1, ..., σJ}. Let household composition
be given by the subscript s, which is determined by the number of each person type
within the household. The household purchases a vector of goods z = (z1, z2, ..., zK)
at market prices p = (p1, p2, ..., pK). The vector of quantities consumed by individual
j within the household is given by xj = (x1j , x2j , ..., xKj ), where z = A(
∑J
j=1 σjxj). The
matrix A accounts for economies of scale of consumption, which converts what the
household purchases into “private good equivalents". The private good equivalents are
then divided among household members. The sum of the private good equivalents is
weakly larger than what the household purchases due to the sharing of goods.
Each person type has there own utility function Uj(xj). Following BCL and stan-
dard characterizations of the collective model, we assume the household reaches a
Pareto efficient allocation of goods. Using standard results in the collective household
literature, we can write the household’s problem as follows:
max
x1,...,xJ
U˜s[ U1(x1), .... , UJ(xJ), p/y ]
such that
y = z
′
sp and zs = As[
J∑
j=1
σjxj ]
(3.1)
Solving this problem results in bundles of private good equivalents. If we price
these goods at within household prices A′sp, we can calculate resource shares ηjs.
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We can derive household-level demand functions for each good the household
purchases. The key insight of DLP is that we can focus on a subset of these goods
that have a variety of simplifying properties, that is, private assignable goods. A good
is private if it is not shared, and it is assignable if from the survey we can determine
who consumed it. Because we observe individual-level food consumption, we have
several assignable goods to choose from.
DLP derive the following household-level demand functions for the private assignable
good k .
W kjs(y, p) = ηjs(y, p) ω
k
js(ηjs(y, p)y, A
′
sp)
where W kjs is the budget share for good k and ω is the individual-level demand func-
tion. Our identification approach relies on Engel curves, so we rewrite the household-
level demand function as follows:
W kjs(y) = ηjs(y) ω
k
js(ηjs(y)y) (3.2)
The central identification problem is that both resource shares and individual-level
preferences are unknown.
3 Identification
The goal of the model is to identify resource shares. We follow the methodology of
DLP who identify resource shares by comparing Engel curves for private assignable
goods across either people, or household sizes. DLP make two key assumptions for
identification. First, they assume that resource shares are independent of household
expenditure and secondly, they impose one of two semi-parametric restrictions on
individual preferences for the assignable good. While DLP require only a single private
assignable good, we make use of our detailed data which contain multiple private
assignable goods. This additional data allows us to extend DLP by weakening the
model assumptions.
Let p = [pj, p¯, p˜] for j  {1, ..., J} where pj are the prices of the private assignable
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goods for each person type j. For our identification strategy, we require at least
two such goods (k = 1, 2) for each person type, with prices denoted by p1j , and p2j ,
respectively. We define p¯ to correspond to the subvector of private non-assignable
good prices, and p˜ to correspond to the subvector of shared good prices.
We assume individuals have PIGLOG preferences over the private assignable
goods in the empirical section and this functional form facilitates a discussion of
identification so we use it henceforth. We show identification with a more general
functional form in the appendix. The standard PIGLOG indirect utility function
takes the following form:
Vj(p, y) = dj(p)
(
ln y − ln aj(p)
)
By Roy’s Identity, the budget share functions are written as follows:
wj(y, p) = αj(p) + γj(p) ln y
where the budget share functions are linear in ln y.
DLP obtain identification by making one of two semi-parametric restrictions on
the shape parameter γj(p): either preferences are similar across people (SAP), so
γj(p) = γ(p),3 or preferences are similar across household types (SAT), so γj(p) =
γ¯j(pj, p¯).4 With SAP, the shape preference parameter does not vary across people
since γ(p) lacks a j subscript, and with SAT, the shape preference parameter does
not vary across household types since γ¯j(pj, p¯) is not a function of the prices of shared
goods p˜, and therefore does not vary with household size.5
3The indirect utility function for SAP takes the following form: Vj(p, y) = d(p)
(
ln y − ln aj(p)
)
.
This is a weaker form of shape invariance. See Pendakur (1999) for details.
4The indirect utility function for SAT takes the following form: Vj(p, y) = d¯j(pj , p¯)
(
ln y −
ln aj(p)
)
. SAT is a restriction on how the prices of shared goods enters the utility function. In
effect, it restricts changes in the prices of shared goods to have a pure income effect on the demand
for the private, assignable goods.
5A second way to identify resource shares within this framework is to use distribution factors d
in place of semi-parametric restrictions on the assignable goods, as in DLP2. Identification comes
from observing that resource shares must some to one for different values of the distribution factor.
This results in additional equations in the model and allows DLP2 to obtain identification without
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Under the SAT restriction, the household-level Engel curves for person j’s assignable
good is given by:
Wjs = ηjs[αjs + γj ln ηjs] + γjηjs ln y (3.3)
and with SAP:
Wjs = ηjs[αjs + γj ln ηjs] + γsηjs ln y (3.4)
With these restrictions, DLP show that resource shares can be identified with a
single private assignable good for each person type. Since we observe multiple private
assignable goods for each person type, we develop two new approaches that employ
this additional data.
3.1 D-SAT
In the first approach, we demonstrate that the SAT restriction of DLP can be sub-
stantially weakened by using multiple private assignable goods. Unlike DLP, we do
not assume that preferences for the assignable goods are similar across household
sizes, but rather, we allow preferences to differ considerably across household sizes,
but require them to do so in the same way across two different private assignable
goods.6 Because of this, we call our approach “Differenced Similar Across Types", or
“D-SAT".
We illustrate this method using a PIGLOG indirect utility function Vj(p, y) =
eFj(p)(ln y − ln aj(p)). Our assumption requires that
∂Fj(p)
∂p1j
− ∂Fj(p)
∂p2j
= θj(p
1
j , p
2
j , p¯) (3.5)
where θj(p1j , p2j , p¯) does not vary across household sizes.7
D-SAT holds if Fj(p) takes the following form: Fj(p) = bj(p1j + p2j , p¯, p˜) +
rj(p
1
j , p
2
j , p¯), where rj(·) does not depend on the prices of shared goods, and therefore
restricting the preference parameter γj(p).
6Having a third assignable good would not meaningfully reduce the assumptions necessary for
identification.
7DLP impose a stronger version of this with ∂Fj(p)/∂p1j = θ˜j(p1j , p¯).
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does not vary by household size. Moreover, p1j and p2j are additively separable in bj(·)
which results in preferences that differ across households sizes in the same way across
goods.
We can use Roy’s Identity to derive the budget share functions for goods k  {1, 2}:
hkj (p, y)
y
=
(∂bj(p1j + p2j , p¯, p˜)
∂pkj
+
∂rj(p
1
j , p
2
j , p¯)
∂pkj
)
ln y + αkj (p) (3.6)
The household-level Engel curves for person j’s two assignable goods can then be
written as follows:
W 1js =ηjs[α
1
js + γ
1
j ln ηjs] + (βjs + γ
1
j )ηjs ln y
W 2js =ηjs[α
2
js + γ
2
j ln ηjs] + (βjs + γ
2
j )ηjs ln y
(3.7)
If we compare equations (3.3) and (3.7), we can see how we weaken the SAT
restriction. As in DLP, preferences for the assignable goods are allowed to differ
across people, both in αkjs and in γj. Unlike DLP, we also allow preferences to differ
across household sizes in the slope parameter βjs.8 However, we restrict preferences
to differ across household sizes in the same way across goods, that is, βjs is the same
for both goods. SAT is therefore a special case of D-SAT with βjs = 0.
To better understand our assumptions, consider the following example. Suppose
we observe assignable cereals and proteins (meat, dairy, and fish) for men, women,
and children in a sample of nuclear households with one to three children. The SAT
restriction would require that the man’s marginal propensity to consume cereals be the
same regardless of the number of children in the household. With D-SAT, we allow
his marginal propensity to consume cereals to differ considerably across household
sizes. However, we require that the difference in the man’s preferences for cereals
across household sizes be similar to the difference in his preferences for proteins across
household sizes. The same must be true for women and children.
Our identification assumption can be understood a different way by rewriting
8DLP do not require preferences for the assignable good to be identical across household size, as
the intercept parameter αjs does vary with household size.
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equation (3.7); let ψ1js = βjs+γ1j and ψ2js = βjs+γ2j be the shape preference parameters
for goods 1 and 2, respectively. With the SAT restriction, DLP implicitly assume
that ψ1js − ψ1j,s+1 = 0. Our alternative restriction allows this quantity to be nonzero,
however, it has to be the same for both goods. Stated differently: ψ1js − ψ1j,s+1 =
ψ2js−ψ2j,s+1. Preferences for these goods should differ in the same way across household
sizes.
To show that resource shares are identified, first let λjs = βjs+γ1j and κj = γ2j−γ1j .
Then we can rewrite system (3.7) as follows for j  {1, ...., J}:
W 1js = . . . + ηjs λjs ln y
W 2js = . . . + ηjs (λjs + κj) ln y
If we then subtract person j’s budget share function for good 2 from their budget
share function for good 1, we are left with a set of equations that are identical to the
SAT system of equations from DLP with j  {1, ...., J}:
W 1js −W 2js = . . . + ηjs κj ln y
An OLS-type regression of the observable budget shares on log expenditure identifies
the slope coefficient for each person type j. Comparing the slopes of the Engel curves
across household sizes, and assuming resource shares sum to one allows us to recover
the resource share parameters.
The order condition is satisfied with J household types. To see this, first note that
there are J Engel curves for each of the J household types, resulting in J2 equations.
Moreover, for each household type resource shares must sum to one. This results in
J(J + 1) equations in total. In terms of unknowns, there are J2 resource shares, and
J preference parameters (κj), or J(J + 1) unknowns in total. A proof of the rank
condition can be found in the appendix.
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3.2 D-SAP
In the second approach, we demonstrate that the SAP restriction of DLP can also be
substantially weakened by using multiple private assignable goods. Unlike DLP, we
do not assume that preferences for the assignable goods are similar across people, but
rather, we allow preferences to differ considerably across people, but require them to
do so in the same way across two different private assignable goods. Here, we call our
assumption “Differenced Similar Across People", or “D-SAP".
Again, we demonstrate identification using a PIGLOG indirect utility function
Vj(p, y) = e
Fj(p)(ln y − ln aj(p)). Our second assumption requires that
∂Fj(p)
∂p1j
− ∂Fj(p)
∂p2j
= θ(p) (3.8)
where θ(p) does not vary across people.9
Our assumption holds if Fj(p) takes the following form: Fj(p) = bj(p1j +p2j , p¯, p˜)+
r(p), where r(p) does not vary across people. Moreover, p1j and p2j are again additively
separable in bj(·) which results in preferences that differ across people in the same
way across goods.
We again use Roy’s Identity to derive the budget share function for goods k 
{1, 2}:
hkj (p, y)
y
=
(∂bj(p1j + p2j , p¯, p˜)
∂pkj
+
∂r(p)
∂pkj
)
ln y + αkj (p) (3.9)
The household-level Engel curves for person j’s two assignable goods can then be
written as follows:
W 1js =ηjs[α
1
js + γ
1
s ln ηjs] + (βjs + γ
1
s )ηjs ln y
W 2js =ηjs[α
2
js + γ
2
s ln ηjs] + (βjs + γ
2
s )ηjs ln y
(3.10)
If we compare equations (3.4) and (3.10), we can see how we weaken the SAP
restriction. As in DLP, preferences for the assignable goods are allowed to differ
9DLP impose a stronger version of this with ∂Fj(p)/∂p1j = θ˜(p).
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entirely across household sizes, both in αkjs and in γs. Unlike DLP, we also allow
preferences to differ across people in the slope parameter βjs.10 However, we restrict
preferences to differ across people in the same way across goods, that is, βjs is the
same for both goods. SAP is therefore a special case of our set of assumptions with
βjs = 0.
We can again use an example to illustrate the differences between DLP and our
method. Suppose we observe assignable cereals and proteins (meat, dairy, and fish)
for men, women, and children in a sample of nuclear households with one to three
children. The SAP restriction would require that the man’s marginal propensity to
consume cereals be the same as the woman’s.11 With our assumption, we allow his
marginal propensity to consume cereals to differ considerably from hers. However,
we require that this difference in the man’s and woman’s preferences for cereals be
similar to the difference in their preferences for proteins.
Once again, our identification assumption can be understood a different way using
the above system of equations; let ψ1js = βjs + γ1s and ψ2js = βjs + γ2s be the shape
preference parameters for goods 1 and 2, respectively. With the SAP restriction, DLP
implicitly assume that ψ1js−ψ1j′,s = 0. Our alternative restriction allows this quantity
to be nonzero, however, it has to the the same for both goods. Stated differently:
ψ1js − ψ1j′,s = ψ2js − ψ2j′,s.
To show that resource shares are identified, first let λjs = βjs+γ1s and κs = γ2s−γ1s .
Then we can rewrite system (3.10) as follows for j  {1, ...., J}:
W 1js = . . . + ηjs λjs ln y
W 2js = . . . + ηjs (λjs + κs) ln y
If we then subtract person j’s budget share function for good 2 from their budget
share function for good 1, we are left with a set of equations that are identical to the
10DLP do not require preferences for the assignable good to be identical across people, as the
intercept parameter αjs does across people.
11In DLP, the SAP restriction is imposed on the function Fj(p) with ∂Fj(p)/∂pj = θ(p). Instead,
we assume ∂Fj(p)/∂p1j − ∂Fj(p)/∂p2j = θ˜(p).
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SAP system of equations for j  {1, ...., J}:
W 1js −W 2js = . . . + ηjs κs ln y
We can easily demonstrate resource shares are identified. An OLS-type regression
of the observable budget shares on log expenditure identifies the slope coefficients
cjs = ηjsκs. Then since resource shares sum to one,
∑J
j=1 cjs =
∑J
j=1 ηjsκs = κs is
identified. It follows that ηjs = cjs/κs.
3.3 Graphical Intuition for D-SAP
To understand the results graphically, we first plot hypothetical individual-level Engel
curves for two assignable goods (e.g., vegetables and proteins). Under SAP, DLP
assume that preferences for the assignable good are similar across person types. With
PIGLOG preferences, that results in individual-level Engel curves with the same
slopes as seen in Figure (3.1a) and (3.1b).12
We differ in that we allow allow preferences for the assignable goods to differ
completely across individuals. Figures (3.1c) and (3.1d) illustrate this point as the
slopes are no longer identical across people. However, we restrict preferences to differ
across people in the same way across goods. Intuitively, this means that if women have
a higher marginal propensity to consume vegetables than men, then they also have a
higher marginal propensity to consume proteins than men. Moreover, this difference
in preferences between person types is the same across goods.
It is important to note that DLP also implicitly impose some similarity across
goods. Relating to our example, DLP impose that men and women have the same
marginal propensity to consume vegetables and men and women have the same
marginal propensity to consume proteins. In that sense, the difference in marginal
propensities to consume vegetables across men and women is the same as it is for
proteins, in that it does not differ.
12The following individual-level Engel curves satisfies SAP: wj(y, p) = δj(p) + β(p) ln y since β(p)
does not vary across people.
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Figure 3.1: Individual-level Engel curves for assignable clothing and shoes. Figures (3.1a)
and (3.1b) illustrate Engel curves under the SAP restriction. Figures (3.1c) and (3.1d)
illustrate Engel curves under the D-SAP restriction. The Engel curves in Figures (1c) and
(1d) do not exhibit shape invariance, however, the difference in slopes across men, women,
and children differ in the same way across goods.
(a) SAP-Vegetables (b) SAP-Proteins
(c) D-SAP-Vegetables (d) D-SAP-Proteins
With this assumption, if we difference the Engel curves we end up with Figure
(3.2). Here, the differenced individual-level Engel curves are parallel, similar to SAP.
Essentially the differenced Engel curves are shape invariant. We can therefore use the
DLP identification results to recover resource shares.
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Figure 3.2: Differences in individual-level Engel curves across assignable clothing and
shoes. The Engel curves are derived by taking the difference of Figures (1d) and (1c). By
assumption, the difference across Engel curves will have the same slope. Any difference in
the slopes of the household-level differenced Engel curves can then be attributed to
differences in resource shares, as in SAP.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a new method to identify inequality within the house-
hold. Our method weakens the necessary assumptions to identify resource shares by
employing multiple private assignable goods. This methodology can be applied to a
variety of projects where inequality within the household is of interest, and the data
contains multiple assignable goods. The authors of this paper are currently working
on a project that applies this method to inequality within Bangladeshi households
using individual-level food consumption expenditures. Using budget shares for differ-
ent food groups, such as cereals and vegetables, we document inequality among boys
and girls, young and old children, and adults.
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APPENDIX
3.A Theorems
The section provides the two main theorems of the paper. Both are extensions of
Theorems 1 and 2 in DLP, and therefore share much of the same content. The main
differences are in the data requirements (we need more) and the assumptions (we need
fewer). The key differences can be found in Assumptions A2′ , A3′ , B3′ . Otherwise,
we follow DLP.
3.A.1 Theorem 1
Let j denote individual person types with j  {1, ..., J}. The Marshallian demand
function for a person type j and good k is given by hkj (p, y). Each individual chooses
xj to maximize their own utility function Uj(xj) subject to the budget constraint
p
′
xj = y, where p is vector of prices and y is total expenditure. Denote the vector of
demand functions as hj(p, y) for all goods k. Let the indirect utility function be given
by Vj(p, y) = Uj(hj(p, y).
Let zs denote the vector of goods purchased by a household of composition s, where
the subscript s indexes the household types. Let σj denote the number of individuals
of type j in the household. From the BCL, we write the household’s problem as
follows:
max
x1...,xJ ,zs
=U˜ [U1(x1), ..., UJ(xJ), p/y] (3.11)
such that zs = As
[ J∑
j=1
σjxj
]
and y = z
′
sp
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where As is a matrix that accounts for the sharing of goods within the house-
hold. From the household’s problem we can derive household-level demand functions
Hks (p, y) for good k in a household of size s:
zks = H
k
s (p, y) = A
k
s
[ J∑
j=1
hj(A
′
sp, ηjsy)
]
(3.12)
where Aks denotes the row vector given by the k’th row of matrix As, and ηjs is the
resource share for a person of type j in a household of size s. Lastly, resource shares
sum to one:
J∑
j=1
σjηjs = 1 (3.13)
ASSUMPTION A1: Equations (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13) hold, and resource shares
are independent of household expenditure at low levels of household expenditure.
Definition: A good k is a private good if the Matrix As takes the value one in
position k, k and has all other elements in row and column k equal to zero.
Definition: A good k is assignable if it only appears in one of the utility functions
Uj.
ASSUMPTION A2′ : Assume that the demand functions include at least 2 private,
assignable goods, denoted as goods j1 and j2 for each person type.
DLP require a single assignable good for each person j. We differ in that we re-
quire at least 2 different goods for each person.
Let p˜ be the price of the goods that are not both private and assignable. Let pkj
be the prices of the private assignable goods, with k  {1, 2}.
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ASSUMPTION A3′ : For j  {1,...,J} let
Vj(p, y) = I(y ≤ y∗(p))ψj
[
ν(
y
Gj(p)
) + Fj(p), p˜
]
+
I(y > y∗(p))Ψ(y, p)
(3.14)
where Fj(p) = bj(p1j +p2j , p¯, p˜)+e(p), and y∗, ψj, Ψ, ν, bj e, and Gj are functions with
y∗ is strictly positive, Gj is nonzero, differentiable, and homogenous of degree one.
The function ν is differentiable and strictly monotonically increasing. The functions
bj and e are homogenous of degree 0. Lastly, Ψ and ψ are differentiable and strictly
increasing in their first arguments, differentiable, and homogenous of degree zero in
their remaining arguments.
This assumption differs from Assumption A3 in DLP in the function Fj(p). DLP
restrict Fj(p) to not vary across people with ∂Fj(p)/∂pj = φ(p). Here, we allow Fj(p)
to vary across people in the function bj(·). However, the way Fj(p) varies across people
is restricted to be the same across goods 1 and 2: ∂bj(·)/∂p1j = ∂bj(·)/∂p2j . This holds
since the prices for goods 1 and 2 enter bj(·) in an additively separable way. The
function e(p) does not vary across people.
Use Roy’s Identity to derive individual-level demand functions for goods k  {1, 2}:
• For I(y > y∗)
hkj (y, p) = −
[
∂Ψj(y, p)/∂p
k
j
]
/
[
∂Ψj(y, p)/∂y
]
• For I(y ≤ y∗)
hkj (p, y) =−
∂Vj(p,y)
∂pkj
∂Vj(p,y)
∂y
=
y
Gj(p)
∂Gj(p)
∂pkj
+
(∂bj(p1j + p2j , p¯, p˜)
∂pkj
+
∂e(p)
∂pkj
) 1
ν ′( y
Gj(p)
)
Gj(p)
=
y
Gj(p)
∂Gj(p)
∂pkj
+
(∂bj(p1j + p2j , p¯, p˜)
∂pkj
+
∂e(p)
∂pkj
)
) 1
ν ′( y
Gj(p)
)
y
y/Gj(p)
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=akj (p)y +
(∂bj(p1j + p2j , p¯, p˜)
∂pkj
+
∂e(p)
∂pkj
)
g(
y
Gj(p)
)y
For I(y ≤ y∗), we can then write the household-level Engel curves for the private,
assignable goods for j  {1, ..., J} in a given price regime p:
Hkjs(y) = a
k
jssjηjsy +
(
b˜js + e˜
k
s
)
gs(
ηjsy
Gjs
)sjηjsy (3.15)
ASSUMPTION A4: The function gs(y) is twice differentiable. Let g
′
s(y) and g
′′
s (y)
denote the first and second derivatives of gs(y). Either limy→0 yζg
′′
s (y)/g
′
s(y) is finite
and nonzero for some constant ζ 6= 1 or gs(y) is a polynomial in ln y.
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions A1, A2, A3, and A4 hold. Assume the household-
level Engel curves for the private assignable goods H1js and H2js are identified for j 
{1, ..., J}. Then the resource shares ηjs are identified for j  {1, ..., J}.
3.A.2 Theorem 2
Let p˜ be the price of the goods that are not both private and assignable. Let pkj be
the prices of the private assignable goods, with k  {1, 2} and j  {1, ..., J}. Let p¯ be
the price of the private goods that are not assignable.
ASSUMPTION B3′ : For j  {1,...,J} let
Vj(p, y) = I(y ≤ y∗(p))ψj
[
uj
( y
Gj(p)
)
+ bj(p
1
j + p
2
j , p¯, p˜) + ej(p
1
j , p
2
j , p¯), p˜), p˜
]
+
I(y > y∗(p))Ψ(y, p)
(3.16)
where y∗, ψj, Ψ, uj, bj e, and Gj are functions with y∗ is strictly positive, Gj is
nonzero, differentiable, and homogenous of degree one. The function ν is differen-
tiable and strictly monotonically increasing. The functions bj and e are homogenous
of degree 0. Lastly, Ψ and ψ are differentiable and strictly increasing in their first ar-
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guments, differentiable, and homogenous of degree zero in their remaining arguments.
This assumption differs from Assumption B3 in DLP as follows: We replace
uj(
y
G(p˜)
, p¯
pj
) with uj( yGj(p)) + bj(p
1
j + p
2
j , p¯, p˜) + ej(p
1
j , p
2
j , p¯). The function uj(·) is still
restricted to not depend on the prices of shared goods, however, we have included the
function bj(·) which is allowed to depend on the prices of shared goods, and therefore
varies across household size. However, the way in which bj(·) varies across household
size is restricted to be the same across goods 1 and 2: ∂bj(·)/∂p1j = ∂bj(·)/∂p2j . This
holds since the prices for goods 1 and 2 enter bj(·) in an additively separable way.
Use Roy’s Identity to derive individual-level demand functions for goods k  {1, 2}:
• For I(y > y∗)
hkj (y, p) = −
[
∂Ψj(y, p)/∂p
k
j
]
/
[
∂Ψj(y, p)/∂y
]
• For I(y ≤ y∗)
hkj (p, y) =−
∂Vj(p,y)
∂pkj
∂Vj(p,y)
∂y
=
u
′
j(
y
Gj(p)
) y
Gj(p)2
∂Gj(p)
∂pkj
+ (
∂bj(p
1
j+p
2
j ,p¯,p˜)
∂pkj
+
∂ej(p
1
j+p
2
j ,p¯)
∂pk)j
)
u
′
j(
y
Gj(p)
) 1
Gj(p˜)
=
y
Gj(p)
∂Gj(p)
∂pkj
+
(∂bj(p1j + p2j , p¯, p˜)
∂pkj
+
∂e(p1j , p
2
j , p¯)
∂pkj
)
) 1
u
′
j(
y
Gj(p)
)
y
y/Gj(p)
=akj (p)y +
(∂bj(p1j + p2j , p¯, p˜)
∂pkj
+
∂e(p1j , p
2
j , p¯)
∂pkj
)
fj(
y
Gj(p)
)y
For I(y ≤ y∗), we can then write the household-level Engel curves for the private,
assignable goods for j  {1, ..., J} in a given price regime p:
Hkjs(y) = a
k
jssjηjsy +
(
b˜js + e˜
k
j
)
fj(
ηjsy
Gjs
)sjηjsy (3.17)
We take the ratio of resource shares for person j across two different household
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types, which results in the following equation:
ηj1
ηjs
= ζjs (3.18)
for j  {1, ..., J−1} and s  {2, ..., S}. In total, this results in (S−1)(J−1) equations.
Moreover, in the proof we will use that resource shares sum to one to write the
following system of equations:
J−1∑
j=1
(ζjs − ζJs)ηjs = 1− ζJs (3.19)
for s  {2, ..., S}. Equation (3.19) results in S − 1 equations.
We can stack the system of equations given by Equations (3.18) and (3.19). This
results in a system of J(S − 1) equations. In matrix form, let E be a J(S − 1) × 1
vector of ηjs for j  {1, ..., J − 1} and s  {1, ..., S} such that Ω×E = B, where Ω is
a J(S − 1)× J(S − 1) matrix, and B is a J(S − 1)× 1 vector.
ASSUMPTION B4: The matrix Ω is finite and nonsingular, and fj(0) 6= 0 for j 
{1, ..., J}.
Theorem 2: Let Assumptions A1, A2, B3, and B4 hold. Assume there are S ≥ J
household types. Assume the household-level Engel curves for the private assignable
goods H1js and H2js are identified for j  {1, ..., J}. Then the resource shares ηjs are
identified for j  {1, ..., J}.
126
3.B Proofs
3.B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof will consist of two cases. In the first case, we assume gs is not a polynomial
of degree λ in logarithms. In the second case we assume that it is. Define
h˜kjs(y) =∂[H
k
js(y)/y]/∂y =
(
b˜js + e˜
k
s
)
g
′
s(
ηjsy
Gjs
)
η2js
Gjs
λs = lim
y→0
[yζg
′′
s (y)/g
′
s(y)]
1
1−ζ
Case 1: ζ 6= 1
Then since Hkjs(y) are identified, we can identify κkjs(y) for y ≤ y∗:
κkjs(y) =
(
yζ
∂h˜kjs(y)/∂y
h˜kjs(y)
) 1
1−ζ
=
(
(
ηjs
Gjs
)−ζ(
ηjsy
Gjs
)ζ
[
(b˜js + e˜
k
s)g
′′
s (
ηjsy
Gjs
)
η3js
G2js
]
/
[
(b˜js + e˜
k
s)g
′
s(
ηjsy
Gjs
)
η2js
Gjs
]) 1
1−ζ
=
ηjs
Gjs
(
yζjs
g
′′
(y)
g′(y)
) 1
1−ζ
Then we can define ρ1js(y) and ρ2js(y) by
ρ1js(y) =
h˜1js(y/κ
1
js(0))
κ1js(0)
= (b˜js + e˜
1
s)g
′
s(
y
λs
)
ηjs
λs
ρ2js(y) =
h˜2js(y/κ
2
js(0))
κ2js(0)
= (b˜js + e˜
2
s)g
′
s(
y
λs
)
ηjs
λs
Taking the difference of the above two equations, we derive the following expression
similar to DLP
ρ2js(y)− ρ1js(y) = ρˆjs(y) = (e˜2s − e˜1s)g
′
s(
y
λs
)
ηjs
λs
= φsηjs
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Then since resource shares sum to one, we can identify resource shares as follows:
ηjs =
ρˆjs∑J
j=1 ρˆjs
Case 2: gs is a polynomial of degree λ in logarithms
gs(
ηjsy
Gjs
) =
λ∑
l=0
(
ln
( ηjs
Gjs
)
+ ln y
)l
csl
for some constants csl. We can then identify
ρ˜1js =
∂λ[H1s (y)/y]
∂(ln y)λ
= (b˜js + e˜
1
s)d
1
sληjs
ρ˜2js =
∂λ[H2s (y)/y]
∂(ln y)λ
= (b˜js + e˜
2
s)d
2
sληjs
Taking the difference of the above two equations, we derive the following expression
similar to DLP
ρ˜2js(y)− ρ˜1js(y) = ρˆjs(y) = (e˜2sd2sλ − e˜1sd1sλ)ηjs = φsηjs
Then since resource shares sum to one, we can identify resource shares as follows:
ηjs =
ρˆjs∑J
j=1 ρˆjs
3.B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
The household-level Engel curves for person j  {1, ..., J} and good k:
Hkjs(y) = a
k
jsηjsy +
(
b˜js + e˜
k
j
)
fj(
ηjsy
Gjs
)ηjsy
128
For each j  {1, ..., J} take the difference of the Engel curves for private, assignable
goods k = 1 and k = 2.
H˜js(y) =H
2
js(y)−H1js(y) = a˜jsηjs + e˜j f˜j(
ηjsy
Gjs
)ηjsy
Let s and 1 be elements of S. Since the Engel curves are identified, we can identify
ζjs defined by ζjs = limy→0 H˜j1(y)/H˜js(y) as follows for j  {1, ..., J} and s  {2, ..., S}
ζjs =
e˜j f˜j(0)ηj1y
e˜j f˜j(0)ηjsy
=
ηj1
ηjs
(3.20)
Then since resource shares sum to one,
J∑
j=1
ζjsηjs =
J∑
j=1
ηj1 = 1
J−1∑
j=1
ζjsηjs + ζJs
(
1−
J−1∑
j=1
ηjs
)
= 1
J−1∑
j=1
(ζjs − ζJs)ηjs = 1− ζJs (3.21)
for s  {2, ..., S}.
We then stack Equation (3.20) for j  {1, ..., J−1} and s  {2, ..., S} and Equation
(3.21) for s  {2, ..., S}. This results in a system of J(S−1) equations. In matrix form,
this can be written as the previously defined system of equations Ω× E = B, where
E is a J(S − 1) × 1 vector of ηjs for j  {1, ..., J − 1} and s  {1, ..., S}, Ω is a
J(S − 1) × J(S − 1) matrix, and B is a J(S − 1) × 1 vector. By Assumption B4, Ω
is nonsingular. It follows that for any given household type s, we can solve for J − 1
of the η’s. Then since resource shares sum to one, we can solve for ηJs.
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